Natural Theology and Natural History in Darwin's Time: Design, Direction, Superintendence and Uniformity in British Thought, 1818-1876 by Barnes, Boyd
NATURAL THEOLOGY AND NATURAL HISTORY IN DARWIN’S TIME:  DESIGN, 
DIRECTION, SUPERINTENEDENCE AND UNIFORMITY IN BRITISH THOUGHT, 
1818-1876 
By 
Boyd Barnes 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
Religion 
May, 2008 
Nashville, Tennessee 
Approved: 
Professor James Hudnut-Beumler 
Professor Dale A. Johnson 
Professor Eugene A. TeSelle 
Professor Richard F. Haglund 
Professor James P. Byrd 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
William Buckland 
 
“The evidences afforded by the sister sciences exhibit indeed the most admirable 
proofs of design originally exerted at the Creation:  but many who admit these 
proofs still doubt the continued superintendence of that intelligence, maintaining 
that the system of the Universe is carried on by the force of the laws originally 
impressed upon matter…. Such an opinion … nowhere meets with a more direct 
and palpable refutation, than is afforded by the subserviency of the present 
structure of the earth’s surface to final causes; for that structure is evidently the 
result of many and violent convulsions subsequent to its original formation. 
When therefore we perceive that the secondary causes producing these 
convulsions have operated at successive epochs, not blindly and at random, but 
with a direction to beneficial ends, we see at once the proofs of an overruling 
Intelligence continuing to superintend, direct, modify, and control the operation 
of the agents, which he originally ordained.” – The Very Reverend William 
Buckland (1784-1856), DD, FRS, Reader in Geology and Canon of Christ Church 
at the University of Oxford, President of the Geological Society of London, 
President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Dean of 
Westminster. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
William Whewell 
 
This dissertation concerns the history of design argument and natural 
theology in nineteenth-century Britain. Design arguments, as a general 
definition, attempt to prove or confirm the existence of God by providing 
evidence that the natural world is ordered, to some degree, according to a 
logically pre-existent plan or for a specifiable purpose. The difference between 
design arguments and natural theology is important although largely contextual, 
and it may be determined by whether the argument is restricted to a 
philosophical interest or is represented as an aspect of a larger theology. 
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Observing the logic of various design arguments is essential to this dissertation, 
but the proper subject is nineteenth-century British natural theology. 
Until the 1960s, the historiography of natural theology had focused upon 
studying how seventeenth- and eighteenth-century utilitarian design arguments, 
which in their day had seemed to confirm a supernatural, special creation of the 
earth, had been displaced in the nineteenth century by the scientifically 
discovered “truth” of the earth’s self-formation by natural processes of 
development and evolution.1 This historiography of intellectual displacement was 
never entirely satisfactory because, at least in small part, of problems in correctly 
distinguishing naturalistic from divinely “guided” or “directed” development and 
evolution.2 These distinctions are notoriously slippery because the meanings of 
“evolution” and “development” overlap and, more notably, the adjectives 
“guided” and “directed” do not distinguish between mechanical, organic and 
volitional forms of guidance and direction. These ambiguities have been tolerated 
(they remain prevalent today) because the general tendency of natural science 
to disprove or, at the very least, dispense with the claims of supernatural 
creation and immaterial direction seemed clear. Indeed, this clarity obtained very 
soon after the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, and it quickly led 
to a severe and general disparagement of supernaturalism in natural theology 
                                        
1 A utilitarian design argument seeks to demonstrate that natural forms are designed to suit the 
uses they are discovered to have in their natural environments. Historically, prior to Darwinism, 
the best resource for utilitarian design arguments was the structure of plants and animals. 
 
2 Bowler, Peter J. Fossils and Progress: Palaeontology and the idea of Progressive Evolution in the 
Nineteenth Century (New York : Science History Publications, 1976), pp. 15-46, especially called 
attention to distinctions between evolution, development, and direction in the history of science. 
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that was as much theological as scientific and philosophical in impetus.3 In view 
of so much that is plainly apparent, it has seemed harmless to gloss what are 
mainly considered to be the terminological difficulties of defining a precise, 
logical relationship between natural and theological forms of direction.4 
My dissertation attempts to be more precise, as well as less disparaging of 
design arguments, by carefully attending to a type of direction, commonly called 
superintendence, which may and, for the purposes of this dissertation, will 
signify not only intentional and volitional direction but, most importantly, 
direction according to logically pre-existent plans of both action and form. A fair 
metaphor would be to a construction site superintendent planning, scheduling 
and directing work according to pre-existing architectural plans. The 
superintendent’s and the architect’s plans are distinct but related. Because 
                                        
3 Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (London : John Murray, 
1859). George Campbell, the Duke of Argyll, The Reign of Law (London : Alexander Strahan, 
1867). 
 
4 There are three historical and critical surveys of design arguments in the modern scientific era. 
The most recent, Michael Ruse’s Darwin and Design: does evolution have a purpose? 
(Cambridge, MA and London : Harvard University Press, 2003) expertly and comprehensively 
discusses historical and contemporary design arguments in relation to Darwinian explanations of 
biological complexity. Ruse concludes “that natural theology is now gone,” although the relation 
of natural theology to complexity and to a theology of nature is somewhat unclear (pp. 332-333). 
The earlier studies are L. E. Hicks, A Critique of Design Arguments (Charles Scribner’s Sons : New 
York, 1883); and Robert H. Hurlbutt III, Hume, Newton, and the Design Argument, revised 
edition (Lincoln, NB and London : University of Nebraska Press, 1985). Hicks and Hurlbutt each 
distinguish design arguments based upon utility from design arguments based upon order, and 
each is highly critical of utilitarian argument. Their criticisms are grounded in a belief that 
utilitarian arguments historically committed two errors by presuming that utility may be directly 
observed and by presuming that utility in nature must be there by design. Correct procedure 
would require arguing from certain instances of order in nature to utilitarian design as that 
order’s cause. Despite the persistence and certainty with which Hicks and Hurlbutt have brought 
this charge against historical utilitarian argument, however, not everyone agrees. The issues are 
fairly discussed in philosophical although not historical terms by Thomas McPherson, The 
Argument from Design (London and Basingstoke : Macmillan Press, 1972), pp. 1-13. 
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superintendence directs by intentional volition and with reference to two kinds of 
“plan,” it may be understood as a form of design argument – a natural theology. 
 
Natural theology and nineteenth-century science 
In the nineteenth century, the existence of a determinate order in nature, 
variously understood, was presumable. Today, it is usually thought that the 
nineteenth century reconsidered the question of whether this determinate order 
had been specially created or had developed and evolved. A third option – much 
more important to the history of natural theology if not of science and religion – 
was whether there was not one determinate order in nature but several orders of 
different kinds that were related to one another by a divine superintendence 
intelligible to human reason as the unified plans of creation. Landmark 
documents of superintendential thinking were authored by William Whewell and 
Adam Sedgwick in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s.5 Of course, natural theological 
superintendence was another name for divine providence, but it was the 
philosophical and scientific intelligibility of superintendence that was immediately 
at stake, not the theology. If superintendential plans and actions were intelligible 
and made sense of the physical evidence, taken primarily from geology and 
paleontology, then perhaps they could be accounted as a “scientific” explanation 
of nature. Whatever it had been to previous centuries, nineteenth-century 
                                        
5 Whewell, William. History of the Inductive Sciences, three volumes (London : J. W. Parker, 
1837); Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, two volumes (London : J. W. Parker, 1840). Adam 
Sedgwick, A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge, fifth edition (London : J. W. 
Parker; and Cambridge : John Deighton, 1850). “Whewell” is pronounced “Hule.” 
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natural theology, in the view of such men as Whewell and Sedgwick, was to be a 
philosophical or moral branch of science premised upon physical sciences 
concerned with the history of the earth. 
As admitted into my dissertation, then, superintendential natural theology 
was not a providential theology lurking within science but a design argument 
that could be put to scientific test. I do not claim that superintendence always 
had this meaning but only that it did in significant instances. This was, for 
example, the line of thought exhaustively pursued by Whewell in his History and 
Inductive Philosophy of science, the twin peaks of superintendential thought that 
were epitomized as the more blatantly theological little book, Indications of the 
Creator. However, since the powers of divine superintendence exceeded the 
regularity of material determinacy, they could, of course, be dismissed by 
materialists as an appeal to miracle in science. Materialism, however, amounted 
to a philosophic presumption against divine superintendence and was not an 
easy line of thought to pursue in Britain at the time. Whewell favored the 
presumption of superintendence unless it could be proved inadequate to 
scientific explanation.6 
To date, historians have underestimated the philosophic and scientific 
credibility of superintendential thought by emphasizing its religious and cultural 
bases. Superintendence has been made to seem very miraculous and is believed 
to have survived deeply into the nineteenth century for reasons of social and 
                                        
6 Whewell, History, op. cit.; Philosophy, op. cit.; Indications of the Creator: extracts bearing upon 
Theology from the History and the Philosophy of the Sciences (London : J. W. Parker, 1845). 
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religious persuasion.7 As long as this partial misunderstanding continues, 
historians must misunderstand the relative significance of natural theology, 
science and religion in nineteenth-century thought and society. The current view 
of superintendence as a social phenomenon ingrained with religious bias needs 
to be broadened by taking into perspective the potency of superintendence as a 
philosophical and, ultimately, a scientific design argument. 
Subsequent to the historical studies of the 1950s, historians have been 
exploring ways of understanding natural theology that have not stopped at 
disparaging utilitarian design arguments. No historian today would accept that 
natural theologians of the nineteenth century before Darwin were as foolish in 
their acceptance of design as they were depicted to have been, for example, in 
the superseded histories of C. C. Gillispie and John C. Greene.8 Historical interest 
has shifted to answering why arguments that seemed obviously to have been 
standing on shaky philosophical and empirical ground retained their hold on 
people’s minds for so long. The answers always depend upon what person or 
group of persons is made the historical subject. For British evangelical Christians 
interested in science, for example, it was often literally unthinkable that the 
                                        
7 Brooke, John Hedley. “The Natural Theology of the Geologists: some theological strata,” in L. J. 
Jordanova and Roy Porter, eds., Images of the Earth, second edition, (British Society for the 
History of Science, 1997; 1978), pp. 53-74; and “Why did the English mix their Science and 
Religion?” in Sergio Rossi, ed., Science and Imagination in XVIIIth-century British Culture 
(Proceedings of the Conference Gargnano del Garda 12-16 April 1985), pp. 57-78. 
 
8 Gillispie, C. C. Genesis and Geology: a study in the relations of Scientific Thought, Natural 
Theology, and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790 – 1850 (New York : Harper, 1959). John C. 
Greene, The Death of Adam: Evolution and its impact on Western Thought (Ames, IA : Iowa 
University Press, 1959). 
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world existed in any way other than as designed and governed by God.9 
However, this was not a scientific and religious divide. Many men of science – 
including Darwin – had difficulty adapting their thoughts to a non-intentional 
view of nature.10 
Moreover, the idea that nature developed and progressed had social and 
political ramifications that could strongly influence opinions on natural theology. 
Progressive development implied social change, and social change always 
threatened to be revolutionary in nineteenth-century Europe.11 Therefore, at a 
time before British science was fully professionalized, the political implications of 
science were of immediate and personal consequence to anyone with an interest 
in science’s public estimation. William Buckland’s natural theology, for example, 
may have had less to do with his scientific and religious beliefs than with the 
place in which he was professing geology – Oxford University.12 The London 
morphologist Richard Owen seems to have expressly tailored his views on 
natural theology to suit different urban and academic audiences.13 It has been 
                                        
9 Hilton, Boyd. The Age of Atonement: the influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic 
Thought, 1785-1856 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1988). 
 
10 Gillespie, Neal C. Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation (Chicago : University of Chicago 
Press, 1979). Nicolaas Rupke, The Great Chain of History: William Buckland and the English 
school of geology (1814-1849) (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1983). 
 
11 Desmond, Adrian. Archetypes and Ancestors: Palaeontology in Victorian London 1850 – 1875 
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1982); The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine 
and Reform in Radical London (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
 
12 Rupke, Great Chain, op. cit. pp. 21-27, 51-63, 233-40. 
 
13 Rupke, Nicolaas. Richard Owen: Victorian naturalist (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1993), 
pp. 60-69, 106-219 at 203-04. 
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suggested, also, that the importance of the theologically scientific Bridgewater 
Treatises was not their natural theology but the way they rendered science 
“safe” for public dissemination.14 Natural theology was so deeply tied to personal 
and social fortunes in Britain that it is being asked seriously today whether 
Darwinism was fundamentally an idea in science or a broader social philosophy 
with the significant power of displacing natural theology by a secular, liberal, and 
scientific creed of social progress.15 In this view, Darwinism and natural theology 
were not only opposed but also similar things:  they were ways of legitimating 
competing social norms. 
Over the past fifty years, studies into the social contexts of natural 
theology have revolutionized our historical understanding. It is no longer 
adequate to represent natural theology merely as design arguments of 
questionable standing; natural theology must be understood in its broader social 
significance in order to be understood at all. Nineteenth-century people were 
chiefly arguing not over the “truth” of a natural theological argument but over its 
social, religious and political implications. 
Even so, it is my immediate concern to say that this revolution in our 
understanding has only partly led to an increased appreciation of design 
argument. I particularly refer, of course, to the logic of superintendential design, 
                                        
14 Topham, Jonathan. “Science and Popular Education in the 1830s: the role of the Bridgewater 
Treatises,” in British Journal for the History of Science 25 (1992): 397-430. 
 
15 Ruse, Michael. The Evolution-Creation Struggle (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 
2005); Mystery of Mysteries: is evolution a social construction? (Cambridge, MA : Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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which, it must be said, is even today hardly considered to have been anything 
more in its logic than an assertion of divine interventions into natural processes 
that would be otherwise subject to science. Recently, for example, John H. 
Brooke has listed four known types of nineteenth-century design argument, but 
superintendence is not one of them.16 And despite Boyd Hilton’s sensitivity to the 
importance of superintendence to some natural theologians because of their 
religious views, Hilton’s studies have not attempted to persuade anyone to show 
greater respect for the intellectual merits of superintendential thought. In a 
recent passage, for example, Hilton notes Adam Sedgwick’s view that God 
created natural forms by, in Sedgwick’s words, “contriving a change of 
mechanism adapted to a change in external conditions.” This is accurate, but 
Hilton shortchanges the superintendential view by his conclusion that Sedgwick 
and others, in Hilton’s words, “had to believe this, otherwise all their other 
assumptions would have come tumbling down.” This may be true, but had the 
superintendentialists no other grounds for their belief? They had. As a matter of 
fact, Whewell had not yet begun his History and Inductive Philosophy when 
Sedgwick expressed the view just quoted, and the century’s most sensational 
controversy over “development,” which was instigated by the publication of 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) and would elicit Whewell’s 
Indications as well as major responses from Sedgwick, was more than a decade 
                                        
16 Brooke, John Hedley. “Between Science and Theology:  the defence of teleology in the 
interpretation of nature, 1820-1876”, Journal for the History of Modern Theology 1 (1994): pp. 
47-65. Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: the engagement of Science and 
Religion (Edinburgh : T & T Clark, 1998), p. 160-61.  
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away.17 The scientific arguments over superintendence were not already lost by 
the 1820s and 1830s, as Hilton may lead us to believe. In fact, they had not yet 
earnestly begun and, as I hope to show, had a long and interesting course to 
run.18 
This is not meant to be critical of the historiography of natural theology as 
it stands. Rather, it is primarily a defense of the way in which my historical study 
may appear to look back to outdated studies of natural theology and science that 
were done in abstractly intellectual terms, and to seemingly neglect relevant and 
more recent research into the social context of science and religion that has 
been excellently provided by such as Brooke, Hilton and so many others. It has 
not been my intent nor, hopefully, my method to neglect anything. My subject 
and a decent respect for concision, however, demand that I attend to what is 
more immediately relevant in preference to what is more recently written. It may 
be at bottom that both natural theology and Darwinism were more social 
phenomena than natural philosophy. I am, in fact, strongly inclined to believe it. 
My inclination may hold a personal bias, however, because I believe that a 
thorough appreciation of social historical context, despite my apparently 
regressive point of view, will considerably aid my thesis, for reasons that I will 
specify in a moment. I do not believe, however, that very many historians today, 
                                        
17 Chambers, Robert. Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, published anonymously (London 
: John Churchill, 1844). James A. Secord, Victorian Sensation (Chicago : University of Chicago 
Press, 2000). 
 
18 Hilton, Boyd. A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England 1783–1846 (Oxford : Clarendon 
Press, 2006), pp 454-60, at 459. 
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with their heightened awareness of context, will find themselves reciprocally 
placed at risk of bias in favor of a recent history that attends strictly to the 
intellectual form of a design argument. Hence, my apologetic approach and hope 
that this will not be mistaken for negligence or critical attack. 
My thesis is that nineteenth-century natural theology, as a matter of 
public religion and public religious discourse in Britain, was not opposed to or 
ended by Darwinian science; rather, natural theology became an aspect of 
scientific and no longer of religious discourse by arriving at its theological term 
within the history of nineteenth-century Darwinian thought. The immediate 
subject of my dissertation is superintendential and, more generally, “directional” 
design arguments in natural theology. The claim that superintendential and 
directional natural theology in the middle of the nineteenth century became more 
and not less scientific is my dissertation’s basic point. I claim, also – although 
with important qualification – that the increasingly scientific character of 
superintendential design argument became characteristic of natural theology 
generally, although this resulted from a religious and theological loss of interest 
in natural theology no less than from the history of directional science and 
design argument. Moreover, natural theology as a public discourse suffered a 
great ablation under the pressures of emergent professionalism in science and 
theology. These several factors were in historical combination, so that, by 
approximately the time of Darwin’s death in 1882, little but scientific discussion 
remained of what had once been an important aspect of public religion. In my 
  12 
view, a dormant eighteenth-century tradition of utilitarian natural theology was 
revived early in the nineteenth century as a significant form of public religious 
discourse that was later transformed by the pressures of public controversy into 
a discourse increasingly private and scientific but no less theological. A 
correlative view is that nineteenth-century Darwinian thought was a part of the 
history of natural theology no less than of the history of science. 
The great difficulties facing my thesis, at least by anticipation, are three, 
each stemming from important contributions made by the recent emphasis upon 
social context in intellectual history. First, my thesis, by focusing upon points of 
theological and scientific confusion, may seem to disappoint a recent and general 
expectation that science will be differentiated from religion more carefully today 
than it was in much earlier scholarship.19 In particular, my attempt to view 
natural theology as an increasingly “scientific” argument runs counter to the 
emphasis upon emergent professionalism in nineteenth-century science that has 
received so much attention over the past twenty-five years.20 It is clear, of 
course, that natural theology is not part of what is ordinarily considered today to 
be professional science. I believe, however, that natural theology was a form of 
scientific discourse from early in the nineteenth century, though it did not survive 
the transition to professional science. 
                                        
19 Brooke, John Hedley. Science and Religion:  Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 53-81. 
 
20 Turner, Frank M. “The Victorian Conflict between Science and Religion: a professional 
dimension,” in Contesting Cultural Authority: essays in Victorian intellectual life (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 171-200. 
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Second, my thesis may seem to return to the now discredited view of 
intellectual conflict as a characterization of nineteenth-century science and 
religion.21 Perhaps, however, a conflict that, as I maintain, began earnestly in 
public but transitioned into privacy is not a very severe reassertion of the conflict 
thesis. At any rate, I certainly am documenting a controversy that took place, 
largely in the language of science but also of design and theology, between 
different conceptions of what was meant by historical direction in natural history. 
Third, as mentioned, my thesis runs counter to today’s emphasis upon social 
context as determinative and explicative of intellectual history. In this 
dissertation, I maintain that the history of superintendential natural theology 
may be appreciated only by attending as rigorously to natural theology’s logic 
and evidence as to its social significance. 
Those are the difficulties anticipated to a hearing for my thesis. However, 
it is my belief that they represent problems more of historiographical habit and 
procedure than of deep substance. It is important to acknowledge, to begin with, 
that the technically separate arguments for social and against intellectual conflict 
have in fact walked hand-in-hand over the course of recent studies in science 
and religion. The anti-conflictive views of James M. Moore, for example – who 
strongly argued in 1979 that there was no real theological conflict between 
science and religion – were in some ways challenged by and in other ways 
                                        
21 Russell, Colin A. “The Conflict Metaphor and its Social Origins,” in Science and Christian Belief 1 
(1989): 3-26. James R. Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies: a study of the Protestant 
struggle to come to terms with Darwin in Great Britain and America (Cambridge and New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 1-100. 
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dovetailed beautifully with a roughly contemporaneous study by Frank M. Turner 
that documented social conflict between new, rising aspirants to professionalism 
in science and their more gentlemanly scientific precursors, many of whom had 
been and were clerical by profession.22 Today, the belief that there were social 
causes of troubles that seemed to have been only intellectual in their origin may 
be thought the great key to understanding nineteenth-century science and 
religion. I call this key into doubt, perhaps, by arguing for a type of public and 
intellectual controversy that became much less religious, much less public, and 
much more scientific but no less genuinely theological at that time. I fancy, 
however, that the social causes accepted by historians today as an adequate 
explanation for the manufacture of an apparent intellectual conflict where none 
existed will suffice to explain, as well, the apparent absence of conflict in a 
significant instance where intellectual disagreement was real. In the 1860s and 
1870s, slightly different versions of Darwinian natural theology, with significantly 
different social implications, were being advocated by famously Darwinian “men 
of science” such as Asa Gray, Alfred Russel Wallace, Thomas Henry Huxley, and 
even Darwin. These disagreements were potentially no less inhibitive to the 
public aspirations of professional science than to the public reputation of 
theology, because they revolved around the implications for natural theology of 
very different and very unsettled explanations of evolution’s historical direction. 
                                        
22 Moore, Post-Darwinian, op. cit. Turner, “Victorian Conflict,” op. cit. 
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A concrete example may help to solidify these overly elaborate 
abstractions. It is not uncommon today to find the cordial correspondence of 
Darwin with his collegial American acquaintance Gray mentioned as an instance 
of harmony between agnostic and Christian forms of “Darwinism.”23 Cordiality, 
however, must not be allowed to gloss the significant disagreements that existed 
between what Darwin and Gray thought was true of organic nature and the 
scientific prospects for Gray’s view of “guided” evolution. Similarly, Wallace’s mix 
of Darwinian science with spiritualist beliefs kept to scientific lines of thought 
that paralleled those of Darwin and Gray. Wallace, however, published his radical 
social and religious views and, in response, saw them very publicly dismissed as 
quaint quackery by Huxley, a man greatly concerned for science’s public 
reputation and much angered by the unwelcome affiliation of science with 
spiritualism. The reasons for what passed between and around these four men, 
in public and private, cannot be adequately understood without appreciating that 
Darwinian science asked questions of natural theology that were only doubtfully 
answerable, at a time when natural theology was still of some public note. Nor 
will it do to expect, before our study commences, that today we know who was 
ultimately proved correct in yesterday’s science. The problems of “direction” 
were subtle and long-lasting. They concerned problems of discovering nearly 
invisible evolutionary mechanisms and, in addition, they concerned the 
theological concept of divine superintendence understood not as the religious 
                                        
23 Miles, Sara Joan. “Charles Darwin and Asa Gray Discuss Teleology and Design,” Perspectives 
on Science and Christian Faith 3 (2001): 196-201. 
 
  16 
affirmation of God’s supernatural “control” over material processes but as a form 
of design argument, a philosophical natural theology that had a firm basis in the 
history of scientific thought.24 
For a long time now, historians have been interested in the way social 
context has determined ideas in science. This determinative view may be 
exaggerated but is tolerably true; and, of course, social determinacy helps to 
explain what goes unnoticed by science as well as what and how things are 
positively explained. To the few men of nineteenth-century science expert in 
Darwinian explanation and theory, there were questions between Darwinism and 
design that had no definitive answer. This means, as is widely recognized, that 
Darwinism did not disprove God or natural theology, but the relationship 
between Darwinism and natural theology goes much deeper than that. Darwin 
changed forever the way natural theology would be done if it were to be done, 
                                        
24 The problem of possibly superintendential explanations for physical phenomena is of 
contemporary and not merely historical interest. Although “superintendence” is not a term used 
in design argument today, nonetheless, what John D. Barrow has recently called the difference 
between the laws of nature and their outcomes, so that “knowledge of those laws may not allow 
us do deduce the permitted outcomes,” is the kind of epistemological difficulty that allows for 
superintendential explanation in complement to physical science. Similarly, John Leslie has 
commented upon the philosophical problems caused “When even the distinction between ‘God 
using physical laws’ and ‘God operating through miraculous acts of interference’ becomes 
fuzzy….” If Barrow and Leslie correctly represent the conundrums of physical science today, then 
their difficulties are, I believe, closely analogous to those of directional and superintendential 
science and natural theology in the period of my study. That this similarity passes unnoticed is 
possibly explainable, in terms of my thesis, as a result of superintendential natural theology 
having reached its term in the nineteenth century as a form of scientific but no longer religious 
discourse that did not become an aspect of professional science. If my historical argument is 
sound, then the formal similarities of the problems in science remain today, although natural 
theological language is uncharacteristic of today’s scientific discourse. John D. Barrow, “How 
Chaos Coexists with Order,” in Niels Gregersen and Ulf Görman, eds. Design and Disorder: 
perspectives from science and theology (London and New York : T&T Clark, 2002), pp. 11-29. 
John Leslie, “The meaning of design,” in Neil A. Manson, ed. God and Design: the teleological 
argument and modern science (London and New York : Routledge, 2003), pp. 55-65. 
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and before historians may understand what transpired between science and 
religion in the nineteenth century, they must understand, also, what natural 
theology was before and could have been after Origin of Species. It is important 
to understand the ways in which natural theology or, at least, design arguments 
may have but did not continue in post-Darwinian public discourse before we 
agree about the historical significance of natural theology’s post-Darwinian public 
remission. 
It is generally considered today that natural theology failed equally as a 
scientific and as a theological argument. In the terms of the subsequently 
differentiated professions of science and religion, I do not doubt that this is true. 
Natural theology’s public remission, however, will require a different explanation 
if I am able to show by this dissertation that natural theology did not fail as a 
theology in an argumentative confrontation with Darwinian science; rather, it 
transitioned from a primarily public and religious form of scientific and 
theological discourse into the primarily private and extra-professional concern of 
a very few men of science. This was a cultural and intellectual change that also 
involved a change in the questions being asked by and of natural theologians. 
Stating this with fewer nuances, natural theology transitioned from a form of 
public religion into a very scientific theology at a time when to be at once 
“scientific” and “theological” was becoming professionally impossible and 
increasingly unwelcome in various public forums. 
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It is important to acknowledge that natural theology’s transition from 
religious to scientific discourse was socially and professionally a counter trend. 
The larger trend, as historians have understood for fifty years, was to 
differentiate science from theology and to deem the latter a properly religious 
discourse. The argument that “natural” theology became more scientific and 
less religious asks important questions, then, about the relationship between 
natural theology and theology as well as between science and religion. Does the 
history of natural theology in the nineteenth century properly belong to the 
general history of theological and, more particularly, of Christian religious 
thought, so that it becomes inappropriate to discuss natural theology in only 
scientific terms? If that were true, my dissertation, which discovers a scientific 
theology within the history of Christian thought, would be stalled from the start. 
 
Natural theology and Christian theology 
The long historical relationship between natural and Christian (or 
“revealed”) theology is complex and, therefore, difficult to describe in general 
terms. In form and logic natural theology is a rational argument for theism, 
unaffected by the particular claims of religion. Nonetheless, natural theology was 
also historically expected to prove, along with the existence, some of the 
attributes of God, such as omnipotence and benevolence, which were thought to 
lend an initial philosophical credibility to specifically Christian claims concerning 
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creation and redemption.25 It was sometimes said, along the same line, that 
revelation would be incredible without natural theology, or that natural theology 
was more certain than revelation. Theologians often demurred, however, and 
sometimes reciprocated by critiquing natural theology’s own uncertainties and 
inadequacy to the transcendent nature of God, or by remonstrating that the 
emphasis upon natural knowledge encouraged indifference to matters of faith. 
Although natural theology was often useful against atheism and materialism 
when those philosophies threatened social currency, even this utility could lead 
to the seemingly self-defeating impression of natural theology as an admixture of 
religious with purely philosophical motives. 
These observations may be understood to caution against historical 
generalizations concerning natural theology’s relationship with religion and 
theology. The role played by natural theology within Christian religion and 
society was never perfectly settled. There are, however, two general points that 
may be admitted for the purposes of this dissertation. First, although nineteenth-
century natural theology is today usually considered to have been an apology for 
Christian theology and for British social institutions, its relation to religious faith 
was actually somewhat problematic (faith, at its best, often is problematic) and, 
necessarily, natural theology’s social expediency was correspondingly disputable. 
                                        
25 The term “natural theology” still tends to carry this Christian association, and it is interesting 
today to contrast writings about “natural theology” to writings about design in the natural order. 
In comparing, for example, Manson, God and Design, op. cit., to James F. Sennet and Douglas 
Groothuis, eds. In Defense of Natural Theology: a Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL 
: InterVarsity Press, 2005), the latter is much more concerned to make conclusions about order 
in nature into philosophical supports for Christian theism. 
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I do not mean only that historians may dispute how successful and valued 
natural theology was as religious and social apology. I mean also, and more 
especially, that the formal independence of natural theology’s arguments, and its 
close association with modern scientific thought, sometimes led to conclusions 
that ran counter to apologetic interests. There is a danger that, if historians 
consider natural theology as apology but not argument, then we will see only 
what apologists saw. 
My second general point, related to the first, is that the causes of natural 
theology’s association with Christian faith were historical rather than logical or 
formal. Natural theology was fitted into Christian history and philosophy; it did 
not happen the other way around. It may seem correct to view natural theology 
as a social and religious rather than a philosophical argument, but if historians do 
this, then we risk seeing only religious and social projections. By taking the 
arguments seriously – as, for example, did David Hume in the eighteenth 
century, William Paley in response to Hume, and Darwin and many of his 
colleagues after Paley26 – we may see natural theology as an integral aspect of 
modern philosophic and scientific thought that was not restricted to baptizing 
mechanical philosophy or providing a theodicy in justification of religiously 
supported social institutions. Indeed, the possibility that natural theology, as 
design argument, was more than dogma and apology provides the great hinge 
                                        
26 Paley, William, Natural Theology; or, evidences of the existence and attributes of the deity, 
collected from the appearances of nature (1802). David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion (1779). 
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upon which, hopefully, my dissertation will open doors to historical 
understanding. 
Rather than being dogmatic or apologetic, I would prefer to say that the 
superintendential natural theology of immediate concern was a “scientific” 
theology. At no point within my dissertation’s historical period, however, would 
the idea of a scientific theology have meant a theology not religious. Although 
scientific theology was explicitly advocated by men as different as were Huxley 
and Hugh Miller, and although these two meant something very different by the 
terms, each would have agreed that any theology – even one that had a 
scientific form – was of religious significance. Each would have disagreed that 
religion dictated to science, or that science dictated to religion:  the question, in 
a technical sense, was purely theological rather than mixed of science and 
religion. Each would have agreed, as well – although Huxley at first denied it – 
that a credible theology in the nineteenth century had to be adequately scientific. 
Theirs was a concern, then, of natural theology, a form of theology that, in its 
technical or argumentative form, only science could support. The problem, for 
Miller and Huxley as for their time, was what to do with design argument, which, 
insofar as it was a philosophical argument concerned with the order of nature, 
had a place within science but which, insofar as it could be made into a natural 
theology, had a place within religion. This was especially true in the nineteenth 
century, when science was still thought of more largely as “natural philosophy.” 
Whether you avoided or engaged the scientific, philosophical, and theological 
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arguments of natural theology depended upon how you thought your line of 
argument would fare, not only in the argumentative sense but also with respect 
to ramifications of social context. Any particular “side,” however, was never only 
the side of science or religion. The Anglican natural theologian Baden Powell, for 
example, despaired of Miller’s science, and Miller despaired of Powell’s religion. 
Similarly, as already mentioned, Wallace despaired of Darwin’s materialism (he 
understood Darwinian materialism better than most), and Huxley despaired of 
Wallace’s science. It was always a question of what kind of science and what 
kind of religion. The disputes between science and religion were always, also, 
intra-religious and intra-scientific.27 
The great advantage to historians of differentiating science from religion is 
that the intra-scientific and intra-religious aspects of nineteenth century “science 
and religion” debates become clearly visible. The example most pertinent to my 
dissertation, perhaps, is Nicolaas Rupke’s study of the nineteenth century 
geological school of “catastrophism” in England, which Rupke denies was 
catastrophist and refers to as merely the “English school” of geology. At least in 
part, Rupke’s point is that “catastrophism” is a term loaded with religious 
connotation. He believes that the natural theology of the catastrophists – and, 
                                        
27 Considerable confusion concerning the correct form of Powell’s surname and christened name 
has been caused by an unusual family circumstance. Christened “Baden,” Powell’s large family by 
his third wife, Henrietta Grace Smyth, changed its surname to Baden-Powell in his memory 
following his death in 1860. Four children by Powell’s second wife, Charlotte Pope, also survived 
him and retained the Powell surname. Powell’s first marriage, to Eliza Rivaz, had been childless. 
Several of the Baden-Powell’s became notable public figures – such as Robert, founder of the 
Scouting movement. Nonetheless, Baden Powell was not surnamed Baden-Powell, and repeating 
this common mistake risks degrading the familial status of two wives and four children. 
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specifically, that of William Buckland – was not integral to their geological 
science but was a consequence of teaching geology at the English universities, 
especially at Buckland’s Oxford, where relating geology to a primarily textual and 
theological education was a paramount concern.28 
Rupke’s study has superseded Gillispie’s Genesis and Geology, which had 
explained Buckland’s catastrophism as “descriptive science … enlisted into the 
service of natural theology.” Of course, this “service” fitted within Gillispie’s 
larger belief that natural theology was in the service of religion. A little further on 
in the same paragraph, for example, Gillispie wrote of science’s service to natural 
theology that “There was always the fundamental point of design, of course, but 
beyond that … geology now offered new and specific evidence for the recent 
creation of mankind and for the historical reality of the flood. These were the 
essential points, both in Genesis and in geology.” In this sentence, unfortunately, 
Gillispie has confused what Rupke’s history wonderfully differentiates – the 
textual concerns of religion from the physical concerns of science and design 
argument. Buckland understood that the two were logically separate but actually 
nearly related at Oxford. It is unsurprising, then – although noteworthy – that in 
his inaugural geological lecture, Vindiciae Geologicae, Buckland parceled his 
discussions of natural theology and revelation into separate but adjacent 
sections. The point of the lecture was that problems created by geology for 
literalist interpretations of scripture would be offset by gains taken from geology 
                                        
28 Rupke, Great Chain, op. cit. pp. 193-208. 
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into natural theology. Less emphasis was placed in the lecture upon geological 
evidence for the flood than upon establishing a balance between natural and 
revealed religion. Buckland’s point becomes barely intelligible if we follow 
Gillispie into blurring the distinction between design and revelation.29 
However, although Rupke’s careful study clearly explained English 
geological science, it was less than complete as an understanding of the religion 
of the catastrophists, to which natural theology was more integral. In the 1820s 
and 1830s, Sedgwick at Cambridge followed Buckland in reasoning that the 
physical concerns appropriate to science ought to be kept apart from the study 
of texts. In fact, Sedgwick worked harder than Buckland to keep the so-called 
“scriptural geologists” from interfering with “philosophical” geological science in 
England. Although Sedgwick became increasingly evangelical during his long life 
and correspondingly more regardful of biblical texts, he never retreated on the 
importance of natural theology. He greeted Darwin’s Origin with as much 
emotional disdain as he had Vestiges – although, remarkably, the hostility 
                                        
29 Gillispie, Genesis and Geology, op. cit. p. 120. William Buckland, Vindiciae Geologicae: or the 
connexion of geology with religion explained (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1820). Mott T. 
Greene has correctly described the balance that Buckland sought to maintain between revealed 
and natural religion, although, within his description, Greene has confused natural theology with 
diluvialism and the “Genesis and geology” controversy. See Greene, “Genesis and Geology 
Revisited: the Order of Nature and the Nature of Order in Nineteenth-century Britain,” in Ronald 
L Numbers and James C Livingston, eds. When Science and Christianity Meet (Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 139-60. 
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toward Darwin was more personal (Darwin had been Sedgwick’s student at 
Cambridge) and privately expressed.30 
The point of these instances is that the differentiation of science from 
religion may bring clarity to the history of science in ways that need to be 
complemented from the history of religion. Historians of religion have been 
willing to offer that complement, but they are inclined to focus upon the same 
textual and peculiarly religious concerns that Gillispie had mistakenly presumed 
were a natural theologian’s high allegiance. Pietro Corsi’s study of the science 
debates at Oxford, for example, rarely discusses any technical points of science 
or design. Corsi’s concern is with Anglican theological debates that took place 
over the relation of science to religion, not with the discoveries of science or the 
logic of design argument.31 Similarly, J. R. I. Klaver’s recent supplement to 
Rupke’s study of the catastrophists is concerned with the relation of English 
geological science to “religious sentiment,” not with the relation of geological 
science to design argument.32 Gregory P. Elder, studying the development of a 
nineteenth-century Anglican doctrine of “providential evolution,” expressly 
appreciates that Anglicanism’s theological embrace of Darwinism was based 
upon the “scientific lacuna [of] an unknown cause … responsible for the 
                                        
30 Klaver, J. M. I. Geology and Religious Sentiment: the effect of Geological Discourse on British 
Society and Literature between 1829 and 1859 (Leiden, New York, Köln : E. J. Brill, 1997), pp. 
102-31. 
 
31 Corsi, Pietro. Science and Religion: Baden Powell and the Anglican Debate, 1800–1860 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
 
32 Klaver, op. cit. 
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mutation of species … [that today] leaves providential evolution in an 
embarrassing discomfort in regard to the existence of chromosomes.” 
Nonetheless, Elder does not discuss the scientifically informed considerations of 
directional evolution and of directional natural theology that were contemporary 
to the development of a theology of “providential evolution” and that, perhaps, 
could have prepared the way for a chromosomal consideration that never took 
place.33 Again, Mark A. Noll and David N. Livingstone, in their excellent 
introduction to their new edition of Charles Hodge’s What is Darwinism, 
acknowledge that understanding or, at any rate, defining the relationship 
between Darwinism and design remains today, no less than in Hodge’s day, “a 
critical decision.” That acknowledgement, however, does not prepare students of 
history to understand the difficult intellectual engagement that took place when 
Gray, Darwin’s scientific colleague and an expert natural theologian, reviewed 
Hodge’s book. Although Hodge understood very well the theological implications 
of Gray’s design arguments, he understood only partly the science behind Gray’s 
defense of Darwin. On the other hand, Gray was hindered in his arguments by 
uncertainty among Darwinians about exactly what was Darwinism. It therefore 
became, as Noll and Livingstone note, a question of controlling definitions. 
Hodge and Gray would not agree upon whether Darwinism was atheism for 
                                        
33 Elder, Gregory P. Chronic Vigour: Darwin, Anglicans, Catholics, and the development of a 
Doctrine of Providential Evolution (New York, London : University Press of America, 1996), at p. 
184-85. 
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reasons that went well beyond any inquiry after truth, whether scientific or 
theological.34 
Noll and Livingstone’s consideration of Hodge and Darwinism, with its 
intense focus upon the importance of controlling definitions in public discourse, 
brings me back to the emphasis placed upon social context by today’s historians. 
However, I hope that I will now be able to make my own position clear in 
relation to the historiography of social context. When I wrote earlier that it “may 
seem correct to view natural theology as a social and religious rather than a 
philosophical argument but, if historians do this, then we risk seeing only 
religious and social projections,” I was somewhat anxious that this should seem 
contrarian. The word “projections” was, perhaps, somewhat affronting, as if I, in 
comparison to others, intended to escape contextual and personal limitations and 
see the truth. What I hope and intend is more modest. My claim will be that it 
was natural theology’s changing social significance – rather than the usual three 
suspects of natural theology’s intellectual bankruptcy in the face of Darwinian 
science, the new differentiation of scientific from theological discourse, and the 
advent of science and secularism in displacement of traditional religion in public 
life – that caused natural theology’s remission from public discourse. Although I 
attend very carefully to the arguments of direction and superintendence 
throughout the dissertation, this is not because superintendence existed above 
                                        
34 Hodge, Charles. What is Darwinism? And Other Writings on Science and Religion, ed. Mark A. 
Noll and David N. Livingstone (Baker Books : Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1994), “Introduction: 
Charles Hodge and the Definition of ‘Darwinism’,” pp. 11-47, at p. 46-7. 
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context, but because superintendence must be seen as a design argument that 
perdured into the time of Darwin if it is to be understood as something affected 
by the social history of the Darwinian era. What needs to be shown about 
superintendential natural theology’s transition from a discourse in public religion 
to a discourse of private science is that it happened, not why. The problems of 
why it happened would, I believe, return us to social history with a vengeance 
and with new questions to ask. 
This provides, as well, the explanation of my dissertation’s relation to the 
history of Christian thought. Although the men studied here are primarily men of 
science – as well as, in many cases, ordained Anglicans and men of Christian 
faith – this is because the science that supported the superintendential argument 
needs most to be understood. Were it not for that necessity, men of the 
theological caliber of Hodge and, to my mind even more interestingly, George 
Campbell, Duke of Argyll, would not have escaped the narrative so largely. 
Hodge and Argyll are late examples of men writing natural theology in response 
to Darwin and for general public consumption. Remarkably, in 1867 Argyll 
suggested that God’s superintendence of natural history ought to be considered 
“superhuman” rather than “supernatural” because human activity was not 
incomprehensible to science.35 Because I am attending to scientific rather than 
theological argument, I will encounter a similar suggestion made by Wallace, the 
Darwinian man of science. Remarkably, Wallace desired superintendence to be 
                                        
35 Campbell, Reign of Law, op. cit. pp. 1-52. 
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considered “spiritual” and “scientific” rather than supernatural, theological or 
superhuman because, as we will see, there were significant differences of 
connotation. To Huxley, however, superintendence was only ever simple 
nonsense and plain supernaturalism because it was not physical science. As Noll 
and Livingstone would appreciate, how you defined superintendence was 
important to these public men, and, undoubtedly, an inability or unwillingness to 
agree upon a definition may partly explain superintendential natural theology’s 
public remission. However, I will attend not to these attempts at assigning 
definitions but to the design arguments variously defined, because, for as long as 
there were design arguments, the possibility remained of an argumentative 
relation to science, to natural theology, and to Christian thought, and a limit 
could be placed, as well, upon our human capacity to mistake definitions for 
critical engagement.  
We begin with Buckland, Anglican cleric, geological professor, natural 
theologian and dean of Westminster, who glossed geological science and 
superintendential design argument as a way of vindicating the study of geology 
to men of letters at Oxford and, subsequently, to the British general reading 
public. Buckland’s Vindiciae Geologicae contains, perhaps, the first public 
expression of a fully superintendential natural theology. Although his 
superintendential argument was brief and the consideration of science 
perfunctory, others would treat these problems more and more thoroughly and 
in greater technical detail as the historical period of my dissertation wore on, 
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until, at last, nearly nothing but scientific questions remained amid the echoes of 
a significantly past controversy in public religious discourse. 
  31 
 
CHAPTER II: 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY IN BRITAIN, 1818-1838: SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY IN A 
LIBERALIZING ANGLICAN ESTABLISHMENT 
 
 
 
Adam Sedgwick 
 
My thesis, as previously stated, is that nineteenth-century natural 
theology, as a matter of public religious discourse in Britain, became an aspect of 
scientific and no longer of theological discourse by arriving at its theological term 
within the history of nineteenth-century Darwinian thought. Two converging 
arguments will sustain the thesis: first, that directional and superintendential 
design argument became increasingly scientific during Darwin’s lifetime; second, 
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that natural theology became increasingly marginal to public religious and 
theological discourse at the same time. Taken together, these make it possible to 
say that natural theology reached its theological term as an aspect of Darwinian 
scientific thought rather than of religious discourse. 
My thesis works with constant reference, then, to the history of science 
and religion in Britain. Nonetheless, it is crucial to remember – and I must beg 
my readers to constantly recall – that I intend my dissertation as a contribution 
to the history of natural theology and not to the histories of science and religion 
at large. Since the 1960s, studies in the history of science have done much to 
integrate generally directional and, especially, geological catastrophist science 
into the history of developmental and evolutionary science in Darwin’s time; and 
upon this body of research my own work will heavily and straightforwardly 
depend.1 The only difficulty, with respect to the history of science, will be to 
maintain the relation of directional science to superintendential design argument 
correctly, because adopting the language of superintendence removes direction 
at once from scientific into natural theological discourse and, through natural 
theology, into contact with broader theological issues. 
                                        
1 Cannon, Walter F. “The Uniformitarian – Catastrophist Debate,” Isis 51, 1 (1960): 38-56; “The 
Basis of Darwin’s Achievement: a revaluation,” in Victorian Studies 5 (1961): 109-34. Reijer 
Hooykaas, The Principle of Uniformity in Geology, Biology, and Theology: Natural Law and Divine 
Miracle, (Leiden : Brill, 1963). Martin Rudwick, The Meaning of Fossils: episodes in the history of 
paleontology (London : Macdonald, 1972). Bowler, Fossils and Progress, op. cit. (Ch I, note 2); 
The Eclipse of Darwinism (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); and The Non-
Darwinian Revolution (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). Gillespie, Charles 
Darwin, op. cit. (Ch I, note 10). Dov Ospovat, The Development of Darwin’s Theory: Natural 
History, Natural Theology, and Natural Selection, 1838-1859 (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). Rupke, Great Chain, op. cit. (Ch I, note 10). 
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It is with reference to theological and religious history that my thesis 
becomes more difficult to delineate and control. As at any time, theological 
discourses during the historical period of my study had interests and 
significances peculiar to them; and these peculiarities are manifest within the 
natural theologies of my study. Even so, it is the scientific bases of these natural 
theologies – whether barely apparent or much elaborated – that is my principal 
concern. Along with this principal concern, however, the point must be made 
that superintendential natural theology was brought to public notice in Britain, 
although only in part, by men whose interest was to comprehend scientific 
knowledge and practice within existent theologies and religious institutions. This 
attempt to admit science into established religious discourses and religious social 
institutions was controversial from the start, more for social, political and 
religious than for scientific reasons. As the scientific explanations for the general 
direction of natural history became more difficult and doubtful – this began 
about 1830 with the publication of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology and 
continued beyond the historical period of my study – a new controversy over the 
scientific standing of superintendential natural theology entered into existing 
theological controversies over the social and intellectual relationships between 
science, natural theology and religion.2 Because the theological controversy 
predated the scientific, it is not necessary to posit scientific knowledge as an 
original cause of theological troubles. Rather, scientific knowledge became 
                                        
2 Lyell, Charles. Principles of Geology, 3 volumes (London : John Murray, 1830-33). 
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entangled within a theological controversy that had always been concerned for 
the significance of science for religion. In addition, these controversies in 
science, religion and natural theology were always a part of the much larger 
issues of liberalism and reform that occupied a considerable portion of British 
political, social and ecclesiastical attention before the 1840s. 
My task in Chapter II is to show how nineteenth-century superintendential 
natural theology, which began as hardly more than a footnote to the published 
version of a geological and religious lecture given at Oxford University in 1819, 
came to play an important part in an extended and very public controversy over 
natural theology’s significance for religion.3 In so beginning my dissertation’s 
argument, it is important to bear in mind the limits of my argument’s burden. 
Understanding the relationships between nineteenth-century science, religion, 
politics and society is a huge task that has claimed a significant part of the 
attention of historians recently. My task, however, is not to explain those 
relationships but to allow for their influence upon that small portion of discourse 
in natural theology that was written by men expert in and concerned for practical 
science. These men held different views about science, religion, liberalism and 
reform, and it is part of my obligation to represent their views correctly. It must 
not be supposed, however, that these men are my dissertation’s topic, or that 
my task is to add to our knowledge of them. Rather, my task is to bring recent 
scholarship to a consideration of a particular argument in natural theology:  the 
                                        
3 Buckland, Vindiciae, op. cit (Ch I, note 29). 
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argument that the general direction of natural history had a superintendent 
cause. 
Even so restricted, the task of my dissertation is dauntingly large, and 
managing it has required some difficult choices and, perhaps, compromise. There 
is an absolute omission, for example, of important figures such as William 
Herschel, David Brewster, Joseph Dalton Hooker, William Carpenter and William 
Thompson. Such omissions are not fatal so long as the men selected for study 
are adequately representative. Further, what chiefly qualifies a representative is 
his explicit and expert consideration of the scientific bases for superintendential 
and directional design argument. My select group – principally Buckland, 
Sedgwick, Whewell, Powell, Huxley, Gray (although American) and Wallace – 
were clearly expert and are sufficiently well studied to enable connections 
between my dissertation and the greater historiography of science and religion. 
In large measure, my emphasis – beginning in Chapter II and maintained 
throughout – upon liberalism, Anglicanism and natural theology as a discourse in 
public religion reflects the topics most pertinent to the study of my select group. 
These aspects of nineteenth-century British social history are used to help 
characterize superintendential natural theology at the time. I make no effort to 
reverse the argument and view superintendential natural theology as 
characteristic of larger social, religious and political issues. 
The subject of my dissertation is superintendential and, more generally, 
“directional” design arguments in the guise of “scientific” natural theology. Each 
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of the general terms of my subject – “science,” “design argument” and “natural 
theology” – is large subject in itself, and it is necessary to be clear about the 
limits and specifics of my particular concern. A design argument taken separately 
from larger theological issues is not usually considered to be natural theology 
and, conversely, it is fairly ordinary for natural theology to be seen presuming 
rather than arguing for design in nature. Moreover, what counts as an 
“argument” is not always easy to tell, because casual comments will often 
suggest more argument than they provide. This last point is especially 
remarkable here, because I contend in Chapters II and III that nineteenth-
century superintendential natural theology began as a very bare argument that 
became increasingly detailed and scientific as the evidence for a developing and 
evolving natural world became increasingly convincing and apparent to the 
British reading public. 
In order to sustain this contention, it is necessary to be as clear as 
possible about what will mark or brand design argument and natural theology as 
“scientific.” Chiefly, I understand this mark to be some degree of explicit 
discussion, in the practical terms of contemporaneous science, of the probable 
causes for the general direction of the earth’s historical development from a 
primitive to a more complete and complex state of being. The conviction that the 
development of the natural world had a definite direction was nearly universal in 
the nineteenth century, although, remarkably, its bases could be as different as 
the philosophical principles of materialism, idealism, spiritualism and theism. At 
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stake and in debate were the causes more than the fact of developmental 
direction; and theological superintendence was commonly supposed to be a 
probable cause. When that common supposition was referred to and, eventually, 
stated and discussed in the terms of physical science, then theological 
superintendence became a scientific argument. 
The idea that God superintends the course of natural events obviously had 
a much wider reference at the time than to only scientific claims about the 
causes of directional development. In this wider reference, the belief that God 
superintends natural events was related closely to the theological doctrine of 
providence – to the belief that things happen according to God’s purposes. This 
wider, providential reference is very important to my argument but must not be 
confused with what I will refer to as superintendent design argument and natural 
theology. Within my dissertation, the meaning of superintendence will always 
have reference to a design argument claiming that the natural world is ordered 
to some degree according to an ideal and partially intelligible plan; and that, 
from the point of view of a natural historian, an evident theological 
superintendence over natural events has been directed to the realization of that 
plan. In other words, superintendence for my purposes means a design 
argument that was potentially demonstrable in terms of physical science. There 
is no reference to the wider belief – which may be also considered 
superintendential although with a larger, providential significance – that in the 
natural world things happened upon occasion that cannot be explained in terms 
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of physical science because they exceeded the possibilities of physical cause. 
Certainly, also, there is no reference to any understanding of causality that 
would negate the distinction of supernatural from natural causes, since such a 
distinction is indispensable to a superintendential view. 
Keeping the two different understandings of superintendence from 
confusing one another is not a straightforward task, because the 
superintendential design argument did claim that causes essential to nature’s 
proper development occasionally had exceeded physical limits. Famously among 
these occasional, supernatural causes was the creation of specific forms of life. 
Superintendence in both its providential and scientific significances, then, shared 
a belief in supernatural or supra-physical causality. They differed in that the 
scientific superintendentialists sought to make supernatural causes evident to 
reason according to scientific thought, while a providential superintendentialist 
needed to have no such concern. 
Basically, a superintendential natural historian and natural theologian 
would claim that to make an allowance within physical science for the possibility 
that God had personally directed natural processes in forming the earth did not 
contradict the premises of physical science, any more than it contradicted, for 
example, archaeological science to accept human direction as a cause in the 
formation of historical artifacts. By analogy to human direction, then, the natural 
world was presumed by superintendentialists to be an artifact of sorts; and they 
expected the physical sciences to discover something about the manner in which 
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physical and, often presumably, “vital” forces had been directed by God to this 
definite end. It was not necessary for a superintendential natural theologian to 
maintain, for example, that the origins of life were incapable of scientific 
explanation. The essential thing was to discover natural forces, physical and 
vital, that required a personal and supernatural but intelligible direction to the 
end of originating specific forms of life. 
In the 1980s, historians of science were brought to grappling with the 
importance of “direction” to nineteenth-century science in response to Peter 
Bowler’s seminal Darwinian studies.4 In the history of philosophy, also, the 
philosophy of science that supported the superintendential view – specifically, 
Whewell’s philosophy of science – has received important reconsideration in 
recent decades.5 In my judgment, it is not necessary for persons reading in the 
history of natural theology to be very familiar with these scholarly studies in the 
history of science and philosophy, except upon one point. Denoting directional 
ideas in science and philosophy as “superintendential” removes them rather 
pointedly into the history of theology. “Superintendence” was a significantly 
theological term that was intended for theological use when employed by 
nineteenth-century natural theologians. As a consequence, superintendence is a 
term largely avoided by historians of science and philosophy. Nonetheless, 
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5 Fisch, Menachem and Simon Schaffer, eds. William Whewell: a Composite Portrait (Oxford : 
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superintendence is the natural theological significance of certain forms of the 
directional science addressed by Bowler. Superintendence is a form of direction. 
Superintendential natural theology had some history in Britain prior to 
1818, the starting point of my study. It is not necessary for readers to be familiar 
with this earlier history, and, in certain respects, such a familiarity brings 
attendant dangers. At times in the eighteenth century, God’s superintendence 
was equated to a constant energy that was thought necessary to keep matter in 
motion. Such a view, of course, completely misunderstands Newtonian inertia 
and may only detract from my attempt to give superintendence a scientific 
credibility. Isaac Newton and Colin Maclaurin, who were certainly credible 
Newtonians, considered, to take another example, that God’s superintendence 
may be necessary to maintain a good order between intrusively elliptical 
planetary orbits as well as to hold motionless stars in their places. However, this 
Newtonian understanding of superintendence does not involve superintending 
the processes by which solar systems were originally formed. Bear in mind that, 
although Newton’s appeal to superintendence eventually ran afoul of dynamical 
explanations for degrees of self-correction in planetary orbits, the misfortune of 
his and other eighteenth-century superintendential views does not impugn the 
significance of superintendential design argument as accepted into my 
dissertation. Indeed, to rehearse the many instances in which God’s 
superintendence of the natural order has been explained away by physical 
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science does not at all serve my purpose, although I would not have readers be 
wholly unrehearsed in this matter, either.6 
It must be chiefly born in mind that my topical superintendential design 
argument is defined as the personal direction or guidance of natural forces 
toward the gradual realization of an ideal or planned natural order. Since geology 
was the first truly historical physical science, it was impossible for 
superintendence, as I define it, to be “scientific” before it was proposed as an 
explanation for geological phenomena. I do not know of any historian that has 
taken theological superintendence more seriously with respect to geological and, 
later, evolutionary science than with respect to earlier views. I believe, however, 
that superintendence deserves some reconsideration in its significance for 
Darwinian thought and in the history of natural theology. 
Chapter II will serve to show that, early in the nineteenth century, a 
rather commonplace superintendential view of natural history was newly 
supported by an illustrative or adductive (rather than an entirely non-
demonstrative) geological design argument that was intended to represent 
geology as a contribution to natural theology and as an aspect of a broadly 
theological education. Later, the geological science behind this superintendential 
natural theology became a point of public controversy without losing its 
theological connotation. The first appearance of superintendential natural 
theology founded upon directional geological science marks the origin of my 
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dissertation’s principal subject, and, therefore, I begin my study with the men 
chiefly responsible for bringing geology into natural theology – Buckland at 
Oxford and Sedgwick at Cambridge. It is equally foundational to my dissertation’s 
argument to show, however, that this originally modest design argument became 
elemental to a much larger and more public debate about liberalism and reform 
in education, theology, and political and social life in Britain. The public 
expectation, pronounced by a significant few natural theologians and men of 
science, that the gradual formation of the earth would require a 
superintendential explanation brought science into theological controversy in 
such a way that points of physical science eventually became the chief 
characteristic of natural theology in public discourse. 
 
William Buckland:  natural theology and “Genesis and geology.” 
William Buckland was born in 1784 into a family of Anglican clerics. He 
attended Corpus Christi College at Oxford, graduated in 1805, and was elected a 
fellow in 1808. Educated in the classics, science was his hobby. He was 
appointed Oxford’s mineralogy reader in 1813 and the geology reader in 1818. 
Publication of Reliquiae Diluvianae: or, Observations on the Organic Remains 
contained in Caves, Fissures, and Diluvial Gravel, and on Other Geological 
Phenomena, attesting the action of an Universal Deluge (1823) brought him 
international recognition in science and forever associated him with diluvialism, 
the geological theory of a catastrophic flood that corresponded to the deluge 
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described in Genesis.7 His Bridgewater treatise on Geology and Mineralogy 
considered with reference to natural theology (1836) gained him wider, public 
renown.8 In the 1840s, he favored glacial theory over diluvialism but failed to 
persuade his geological colleagues to his new point of view. Despairing of a place 
for the natural sciences at Oxford and weary of controversy with the theological 
Tractarians there, Buckland quit the university to become Dean of Westminster 
in London in 1845. He died in 1856 after several years of a physically distressing 
mental illness.9 
The first Oxford readership in geology was created in 1818 specifically for 
Buckland. It was intended to supplement his existing stipend as mineralogy 
reader and to enhance the standing of scientific education at Oxford, which had 
become the target of aspersions cast upon the university’s reputation from 
Edinburgh and elsewhere.10 Buckland was already known in scientific circles for 
his contributions to the development of stratigraphical tables and as a friend of 
Cuvier, the famous and conservative natural philosopher of Paris. A proponent of 
moderate educational reform and a political Tory after the mold of his friend 
Robert Peel, Buckland was committed to science as “a part of our established 
                                        
7 Buckland, William. Reliquiae Diluvianae (London : John Murray, 1823). 
 
8 Buckland, William. Geology and Mineralogy considered with reference to natural theology, two 
volumes (London : Pickering, 1836). 
 
9 Buckland’s biography is by his daughter, Elizabeth Oke Gordon, The Life and Correspondence of 
William Buckland, two volumes (London : Murray, 1894). Relevant studies are Rupke, Great 
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system of education” and to the “ingrafting … of the study of … Geology and 
Mineralogy, on that ancient and venerable stock of classical literature” that was 
taught at Oxford.11 
Part of Scotland’s boast over Oxford was the separation of the study of 
science from religion at Scottish universities, and, consequently, part of 
Buckland’s mandate as the new geological reader was to justify the inclusion of 
science within a religious and classical education in England. Not everyone at 
Oxford was in favor of the reform. In the minds of many, science was associated 
with the politics and religion of the radical philosophers of France. It was 
dismaying to many, also, that Buckland and all credible geologists were insisting 
upon a vast natural history of the earth that was without mention in the classical 
literature. Additionally, many geologists in Scotland and elsewhere advocated a 
“quiet deluge,” denying that there was any geological evidence of the biblical 
flood and dismissing as scientifically irrelevant the textual evidence in its favor. 
Buckland, then, was under pressure to show how geology subordinated itself to 
establishment politics and classical learning. There was not much example for 
him to follow at Cambridge, where the Woodwardian chair in geology had 
produced hardly any lectures since its foundation in 1727 (although the 
appointment of Sedgwick in 1818 would soon change that.)12 
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Buckland gave an inaugural lecture on the founding of the new readership 
on May 15, 1819, which he entitled Vindiciae Geologicae: or the Connexion of 
Geology with Religion Explained. The lecture reflected his professional 
circumstances. He began by asserting an “imperative” to teach science at Oxford 
that was premised upon scientific advances being made in London and at most 
universities in Europe, so that “a competent knowledge” of the sciences had 
become common in Britain among “intelligent persons” and “even amongst the 
imperfectly educated classes of society.”13 He recommended geology as no less 
important to “pecuniary profit” than as a gentlemanly exercise of “the higher 
powers of the mind.”14 All together, about a quarter of the lecture was given to 
observing the importance of science and geology without the university, 
reflecting themes that would be touched upon again and again in the coming 
decades in justification of teaching science at Oxford.15 
The fundamental purpose of the lecture, as the dedication in its published 
version prominently noted, was to show that “geology has a tendency to confirm 
the evidences of natural religion” and was “consistent with the accounts of 
creation and the deluge recorded in the Mosaical writings.”16 External pressures 
were forcing geology into Oxford, but these were the rationalist’s accepted 
rubrics of continuity with religion: natural theology and the evidences of 
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14 Ibid. p. 5. 
 
15 Ibid. pp. 1-10. 
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Christianity. Remarkably, however, it was not geology’s confirmation of scripture 
and suitability to design argument that was most emphasized by Buckland. He 
meant, rather, to persuade his audience into admitting a greater regard for 
natural theology in religion. Only when that was achieved could Buckland use 
natural theology to emphasize the connection of geology to religion and soften 
the new science’s contradictions of a literal interpretation of scripture, as he 
intended. 
Buckland began by alluding to the contributions of geology to natural 
theology. The allusions were quaint, and none was quainter, perhaps, than his 
respect for the evaporation of sea water, which, Buckland noted, usefully left salt 
to preserve the purity of the sea while it distributed fresh water “in genial 
showers to scatter fertility over the earth.” As a design argument this was 
insignificant, but it did serve to remind his audience of natural theology’s benefit 
to a cultivated sermon. Buckland further promoted natural theology by referring 
to philosopher-theologians of acknowledged stature in Britain, such as Newton 
and Paley, whom he dutifully praised for their “heartfelt piety” rather than their 
contributions to knowledge. Similarly, the salutary effect of geology upon natural 
religion was sanctioned by quotes from John Bird Sumner, later the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, and the anti-revolutionary natural philosopher of Paris, Cuvier, 
whose geological theories were the foundation of Buckland’s own. There was not 
much of an attempt to expound upon geological design. That was not the 
lecture’s purpose. Buckland wanted, very simply, to advance the idea that 
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geological science was natural religion, and natural religion was safe politics and 
warm piety, acceptable at Oxford.17 
The importance of recommending natural religion became clear when 
Buckland turned his attention to the connection of geology with scripture. He did 
not begin by attempting to reconcile the facts of geology to the biblical narrative. 
He conceded, without elaboration, “an apparent nonconformity of certain 
geological phenomena with the literal and popular account of creation,” and 
sought to minimize the religious significance of this lack of conformity by 
affirming that the problem was “superfluous to … those who knew the strength 
of the irrefragable moral evidence, on which the general authority of the sacred 
writings is established.” The difficulty was restricted to those “who have not 
examined the [moral] evidences, and who look only to natural phenomena” in 
validation of scripture.18 
The natural phenomena could not be ignored entirely, however, and 
Buckland maintained that “the evidence of facts unequivocally confirms [the 
Mosaic] records in all points of most essential importance; …as, for instance, … 
that the existence of mankind can on no account be supposed to have taken its 
beginning before that time which is assigned to it … [and] the grand fact of an 
universal deluge at no very remote period….”19 The geological confirmation of 
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18 Ibid. p. 22-23. 
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scripture, however, was notably restricted to these twin temporal coincidences. 
Buckland did not suggest any further correspondence between natural and 
scriptural history on these or any other points. 
Indeed, it was only in an appendix to the published lecture that geology’s 
universal deluge was explicitly identified with the Mosaic flood.20 Generally, their 
identity was left to be implied by their temporal coincidence. Any attempt to 
elaborate a physical correspondence would only have highlighted the fact that 
Buckland’s geological catastrophe, which he envisioned as something like a great 
tidal wave, did not coincide very well at all with scripture in its descriptive details. 
Instead, Buckland reiterated his claim that geology has “added largely to the 
evidences of natural religion,” and he suggested that it was not inconsistent with 
revelation to affirm that the world had existed differently from scripture prior “to 
the destiny or to the moral conduct of created man.”21 Stripped of its rhetorical 
strategies, then – and without suggesting that the rhetoric was unimportant – 
this was Buckland’s connection of geology to religion explained: two temporal 
coincidences, the contributions of geology to natural theology, and the distinction 
of geology’s interest in physical history from scripture’s concern for moral 
history.22 
                                        
20 Ibid. pp. 35-8. 
 
21 Ibid. p. 23, 25. 
 
22 Mott T. Greene has correctly noted the rhetorical balance that Buckland maintained between 
revealed and natural religion. However, in his account, Greene has confused natural theology 
with diluvialism and the “Genesis and geology” controversy, repeating a pervasive confusion 
among historians. For that reason, it is important to emphasize the logical structure of what 
Buckland was proposing, rather than his rhetorical intentions. See Greene, “Genesis and Geology 
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As meager as these connections to textual and traditional religion may 
seem, it is important to add that, still more meagerly, it is doubtful they 
extended much beyond a simple commitment to natural theology as an adjunct 
to the authority of classical texts. The reason is that the creation of humanity, 
the universal deluge, and the distinction between physical and moral history 
were all eventually made into parts of a very broad and historical design 
argument that stood impressively apart from any appeal to texts. Although 
Buckland made only a passing reference to this historical argument in his lecture, 
it became increasingly important over the next three or four decades, as the 
natural sciences became more independent of scriptural authority and more 
committed to the historical development of the natural world. By 1835, it had 
appeared, by reference or in variation, in the Bridgewater treatises of Thomas 
Chalmers, Charles Bell, and William Prout.23 Sedgwick had used it in advocacy of 
educational reform in A Discourse on the Studies of the University (1833).24 The 
same argument was, also, the theological “flip side” of the important scientific 
debates of the early 1830s between the “catastrophists” and the 
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“uniformitarians” in geology. One version of the argument would appear in the 
mathematician Charles Babbage’s idiosyncratic (and unofficial) Ninth Bridgewater 
Treatise, and another made its way into the very heart of William Whewell’s 
writings on the history and philosophy of science.25 It featured prominently in 
Hugh Miller’s Testimony of the Rocks, and its utmost expression would be found 
as late as 1867 in the Duke of Argyll’s Reign of Law.26 Indeed, the publication of 
Vindiciae Geologicae marked the introduction of one of the more important 
innovations of nineteenth-century natural theology:  the concept of historically 
“superintended” design. 
Buckland suggested in his lecture that natural history had been 
“superintended” by God in a gradual progress toward ideal and benevolent ends. 
Stated most succinctly, his argument was that “the subserviency of the present 
structure of the earth’s surface to final causes … is evidently the result of many 
and violent convulsions subsequent to its original formation. …[T]hese 
convulsions have operated at successive periods, not blindly and at random, but 
with a direction to beneficial ends, [displaying] at once the proofs of an 
overruling Intelligence continuing to superintend, direct, modify, and control the 
operation of the agents, which he originally ordained.” This was an early and 
theologically-phrased reference to the scientific doctrine of geological 
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catastrophism, for which Buckland and the entire English school of geology have 
been primarily known to history.27 
In a footnote to the published lecture, Buckland illustrated his 
superintendential argument with reference to Britain’s “coal measures.” These 
coal fields were not only set at an inclined plane, so that a portion reached the 
earth’s surface, but, also, geological faults had cracked the coal beds and pushed 
them into overlapping layers, so that more coal lay near the surface and less was 
deeply embedded. The faults drained water that would otherwise have made 
mining impossible and, also, interposed layers of stone and earth between the 
once-continuous coal deposits, so that underground fires in mines would not 
spread to entire coal fields. Other examples could be cited, but these will indicate 
the meager utilitarian grounds upon which Buckland believed that it was 
“impossible … to attribute such a system to the blind operation of fortuitous 
causes,” and that it would be “unphilosophical to scruple at [final] causes….” He 
concluded to “a system of wise and benevolent contrivances [that had been 
made] prospectively subsidiary to the wants and comforts of the [earth’s] future 
inhabitants … from its first formation through all the subsequent revolutions and 
convulsions….”28 
Sixty years ago, in Genesis and Geology, Gillisipie ridiculed Buckland’s 
proof that God, “the Divine Engineer, had assured manufacturing primacy to his 
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British creation” and belittled Buckland’s God as “a landscape gardener” rather 
than a divinity.29 Today, historians no longer interpret the coal measures analogy 
as indicative of Buckland’s scientific merit or the superintendent divinity as 
Buckland’s final word on the nature of God. Nonetheless, the evidential force of 
Buckland’s superintendential natural theology has not recovered from the ridicule 
to which it has been subjected; and this is a problem that I would redress. 
Buckland was not arguing (although he was intimating) that the English earth 
was intended for coal mining and Englishmen for the benefits of coal; he was 
claiming only that the accessibility of coal and other minerals had been a 
utilitarian concern that had directed the geological processes that had formed 
the surface of the earth. His analogy was to “a thick sheet of ice … broken into 
fragments of irregular area and those fragments again united … [by] intervening 
portions of more recent ice by which they are held together….”30 The analogy, 
then, was to discontinuous but unspecified physical forces that had interposed 
somewhat messily upon the regular course of natural events, rather than to a 
clean, mechanical design. The superintendentential argument was not an easy 
inference to make, and Buckland knew it.31 The geological evidence, however, 
suggested a succession of disruptive, convulsive actions followed by periods of 
stability, which in Buckland’s view was unlikely to have been the result of 
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uniform natural causes or blind fortuity because of the apparent causal 
discontinuity as well as the relative utility of the final result. 
Although historians have emphasized that Buckland and catastrophism 
went beyond the more “scientific” Cuvier in suggesting “supernatural” causes for 
the geological revolutions of the past, this was not Buckland’s main contention.32 
Rather, his claim was that the catastrophes of the past, which may have had 
natural although discontinuous causes, had been directed by future 
considerations and to “beneficial ends.” This was a superintendential form of 
design argument, which is worth noting because it entailed scientific and 
theological commitments alike. 
Scientifically, catastrophism committed geologists to defending the 
apparent discontinuity of natural history, whether in terms of secondary natural 
causes or direct supernatural interposition, and it is now allowed to have been as 
much a contribution to the history of science as was an emphasis upon the 
uniformity of nature: the uniformity of nature, after all, does not demand an 
uninterrupted, steady-state system of the earth, whether or not God is posited as 
the cause of discontinuity and sudden change.33 Theologically, the 
superintendential design argument freed natural theology from its unhappy 
association with eighteenth-century mechanical deism, enabling it to become a 
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distinctly historical and theistic argument and providing a theoretical ground for 
continuity with scriptural history and narrative. For example, historical 
superintendence was the common ground of natural theologians and scriptural 
literalists: the geologists had physically “proved” what was religiously accepted 
by the literalists, that God had frequently interposed upon history, whether 
directly or by secondary causes and whether natural or human history was 
concerned. Such a proof, as Buckland supposed, would make a remarkable 
contribution of science in support of natural religion, the foundation for revealed 
religion. 
In the body of the lecture, apart from the footnoted coal measures 
argument, Buckland made a similar claim for superintendential natural theology 
even more briefly. He noted that the geological evidence clearly pointed to a 
time when the earth had been uninhabited and uninhabitable. He went on to say 
that “organic beings must therefore have had a beginning subsequently to this 
period; and where is that beginning to be found, but in the will and fiat of an 
intelligent and all-wise Creator?” Once again, God was shown to have acted 
historically: firstly, the earth was created; subsequently, it was prepared for life; 
and subsequently, again, life was created upon the earth. The earth and its lives, 
therefore, are not eternal, and all hypotheses of earth history as “an eternal 
succession of causes … are still more at variance with the conclusions of 
Geology, (as a science founded on observation,) than they are with those of 
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Theology.” Buckland wanted his audience and readers to know that atheism and 
deism had their best refutation in physical science.34 
However, although Buckland had wanted to emphasize natural theology, it 
was the coincidental confirmation of scripture that figured most prominently in 
public discussion. It is important to note, however, that the turn from design 
argument to scriptural consideration was as much the result of historical 
accidents as of Buckland’s intention. Soon after he had delivered his inaugural 
lecture, Buckland was forced to notice an article in the Quarterly Review that 
doubted the geological evidence of a universal flood. Inconveniently for 
Buckland, the article was written against the views of the so-called “Scriptural 
geologists” who, unlike Buckland, were defenders of the tradition of applying 
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textual evidence to problems in natural history. The article forced Buckland at 
once to defend the geological evidence for diluvialism “as a matter of science” 
and to reaffirm an entirely coincidental relation to scripture, which he did in an 
appendix to the published Vindiciae Geologicae.35 He then pinned himself more 
closely to this controversy with the subsequent publication of Reliquiae 
Diluvianae, a book which awkwardly forced the debatable evidence for 
diluvialism upon a fine work of science in the rediscovery of what he called 
“antediluvial” fauna.36 Although originally in Vindiciae there had been less 
emphasis upon geology’s coincidence with scripture than upon natural theology, 
public discussions of the geological evidence for diluvialism and Buckland’s own 
study of ancient and extinct fauna turned that emphasis around. 
Nevertheless, Buckland’s commitment to diluvialism as a confirmation of 
scripture was never as great as it seemed. As Rupke has shown, it had always 
existed primarily in deference to the system of classical education at Oxford 
rather than as a part of his scientific or theological thought. In Geology and 
Mineralogy, he would quietly renounce the evidence for the universal deluge and 
deny that he had ever identified it with the Genesis flood. This, however, was 
years after the controversy over “Genesis and geology” had played out in public 
view.37 
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By the time Buckland renounced diluvialism over unsupportive evidence, 
the problem of reconciling Genesis to geology had already publicly broken the 
proposed coincidence between textual revelation and physical science. 
Inevitably, this brought a greater reliance upon natural theology (considered as a 
design argument) as a point of theological interest that might compensate for 
the loss of scriptural reference. Buckland, however, was not the first Anglican 
geologist to recognize or deal with the consequences of this break. That 
distinction had fallen to his colleague in geology at Cambridge, Adam Sedgwick. 
 
Adam Sedgwick: Science, Natural Theology, and Anglican Education in 
a time of Reform 
 
In contrast to Buckland, Sedgwick had come to his clerical and geological 
professions more haphazardly. He was born in 1785, third of seven children born 
to the rector of the little Yorkshire village of Dent. He was elected a fellow of 
Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1810, in part because economic considerations 
had discouraged his personal preference to study for the bar. He delayed until 
1817 being ordained a deacon (later a priest), knowing that ordination was 
required of Cambridge fellows within seven years of taking their M.A. The 
Woodwardian professorship in geology – hardly considered a plum appointment 
– chanced to fall vacant the following year, and, having promised to learn a 
science of which he was admittedly ignorant, he was elected to that chair in 
1818. Despite the somewhat circumstantial choosing of his professional 
commitments, however, the sincerity with which Sedgwick accepted and fulfilled 
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his obligations as cleric and geologist is not in doubt. Over a long and eventful 
life (d. 1873), he retained his dedication to science, natural theology, and 
evangelical faith.38 Although Buckland has always tended to receive first billing 
among the English geologists of the period, Sedgwick may have been the more 
impressive of the two, both scientifically and theologically.39 
Sedgwick’s early work in geology supported Buckland’s diluvialism. At an 
1829 meeting of the Geological Society, however, he was dramatically persuaded 
by colleagues that Buckland was wrongly interpreting the evidence for a 
universal deluge. In his 1831 presidential address to the same Society, he 
“thought it right … publicly to read my recantation,” having been, “to the best of 
my power, a propagator of what I now regard as a philosophical heresy….”40 
Despite recanting diluvialism, however, on December 17, 1832, in a sermon to 
the Master, fellows, and students of Trinity, Sedgwick uninhibitedly declared the 
full importance of all the sciences, including geology, to an Anglican university 
education. A version of that sermon, laboriously expanded and appended to 
twice its original length, was published one year later as A Discourse on the 
Studies of the University.41 Having recognized that a geological coincidence with 
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scripture was untenable, Sedgwick was not reticent to discuss the implications 
for the connection of science to religion in an Anglican education. 
Taken out of context, it would be possible to read Sedgwick’s Discourse as 
a conciliatory gesture and a thorough harmonization of science and religion in 
education. Therefore, it must be emphasized at the outset that Sedgwick was 
taking sides in a local and national debate. Writing, rewriting, and publishing the 
Discourse coincided with Parliamentary debates that had already led to the 
electoral franchise reforms of 1832 and would lead to thorough reforms of the 
Anglican Church in Ireland and England over the next few years. Drastic change 
to the church and its universities was a real possibility, even including 
disestablishment. Keble was within seven months of famously warning at Oxford 
of a national apostasy. Brougham was promoting popular scientific education as 
a means to the self-improvement of the working classes and had already helped 
to found the new and secular University of London.42 Although Sedgwick was not 
a radical reformer and still considered the topic of his Discourse to be the 
education of Anglican gentlemen, he was known to be a political Whig and an 
advocate of educational reform. His geological lectures were among the most 
renowned in the nation upon any scientific topic. These circumstances help to 
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explain the considerable significance and popularity of the Discourse, which 
quickly ran to three printings of 2500 total copies.43 
Where it concerned geology and natural theology, the Discourse was not 
vastly different from views that had been expressed before. Sedgwick was no 
more detailed in his design argumentation than Buckland had been, although he 
went further than Buckland in grounding his religious arguments in natural 
theology and the moral authority of religion. He no longer made a show of a 
physical or literal coincidence with scripture. The Genesis flood, of course, was 
no longer an event of geological significance. The recent creation of the human 
race was still taken to be geologically evident, but it was not represented any 
longer as a coincidence with revelation but was observed “[i]ndependently of 
every written testimony.”44 The distinction between natural philosophy and 
textual authority was becoming more evident all the time. 
In pertinence to natural theology, more than a decade had passed since 
Buckland had first sketched his superintendential design argument, and advances 
in geological science made it possible for Sedgwick to enlarge upon it. He 
pointed out that recent geological theory made it possible to consider all of 
terrestrial history as a grand advance in the inhabitability of the earth’s surface, 
with the recent creation of humans in their intended environment marking full 
progress. This teleological view fitted the apparently recent creation of humans 
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into a superintendential natural theology and enabled the correlation of geology 
with revelation to become a problem of biblical criticism, not physical science.45 
According to the advanced (if somewhat theoretical) geological science of the 
English school in the 1830s, very little of the natural history of the earth 
remained without its theological significance. Science and natural theology 
suggested that the laws of nature, their final causes, and God’s discrete 
superintendence of natural events were the logically unified determinants of 
natural history.46 This was superintendential natural theology taken to its utmost 
implication, although it was fully conformable with any theological view that did 
not contradict the “facts” of geological science. 
However, where Sedgwick really ran past Buckland was in promoting 
natural philosophy, moral philosophy and natural theology as the basis for 
reforming Anglican education. He was not content to attach the physical sciences 
onto the classical system, as had been Buckland earlier. In order to appreciate 
the significance of this, two points must be noted: Sedgwick grounded his 
observations about university studies (with the exception of the physical 
sciences) in the nature of moral and social human being; and he envisioned 
moral and social being as governed by general laws of human nature. It was a 
thoroughly naturalistic view, although this naturalism, founded upon a 
superintendential understanding of natural history, was not incompatible with 
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Sedgwick’s evangelical religion. While it was in character, then, for Sedgwick to 
speak explicitly about Christian beliefs – as for example, that “The Christian 
religion is … of national importance not merely because it is expedient, but 
because it is true; and … of an overwhelming interest to every member of the 
state” – yet such claims tended to sit comfortably with natural religion – just as 
in this instance, where the truth of Christianity was soon resolved into the belief 
that “nothing can, in the end, be expedient for man, except it be subordinate to 
those laws the author of nature has thought to impress on his moral and physical 
creation.”47 Significantly, for the historian of natural theology, Sedgwick’s 
comments upon “expediency” were part of an attack upon the tenets of 
utilitarian ethics, which were often represented by the ethical philosophy of the 
foremost utilitarian natural theologian, Paley. Understanding the laws of nature 
as subordinate to God’s purposes rather than to utilitarian principles was 
important to Sedgwick. Nonetheless, this attempt to reclaim Christian faith from 
expediency was compatible with naturalism. Sedgwick’s natural theology was 
premised upon a lawful natural order discernible to human reason. 
This was not simply an aspect of the Discourse. Rather, Sedgwick 
presented the general lawfulness of the physical and moral worlds, and also the 
subordination of revelation to those laws, as the first argumentatively significant 
point of the Discourse, stating as his premise that “We are however justified in 
saying that in the moral as in the physical world, God seems to govern by 
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general laws: and when he declares to us [by a revelation] … we hear a formal 
promulgation and higher sanction of [his moral government].”48 Sedgwick had 
brought the moral universe, which Buckland had reserved to textual study, under 
the umbrella of a general naturalism. 
Of course, the idea that revelation was a republication of natural law had 
been floating about Britain for several centuries. Nonetheless, it may have been 
disturbing, after the reforms of 1832, to have it brought out as the potential 
basis for an Anglican education. Certainly, its implications were considerable. For 
example, when Sedgwick doubted the worth of studying “dead languages” as a 
means to acquiring literary skill and a taste for elegant prose, and advocated, 
instead, that classical literature and ancient history be used to develop the 
understanding of “a true system of moral philosophy,” he was suggesting that 
classical studies must become a different and, pointedly, more philosophical 
discipline from what they were.49 
More importantly, by basing his moral and social observations upon the 
general laws that govern morality and society, Sedgwick was advocating a more 
“scientific” university education. This is not meant to suggest a less religious 
education – on the contrary, the distinction between science and religion is 
exactly what Sedgwick was disclaiming. The words “science” and “scientific” did 
not, in 1833, denote only what are regarded today as the natural or physical 
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sciences. Rather, they meant any body of natural knowledge that could be 
rendered systematic by a consensus upon its methods and principles; very 
explicitly, then, Sedgwick was connecting education to natural knowledge and 
moral science. 
History is to our knowledge of man in his social capacity, what 
physical experiments are to our knowledge of the laws of nature.50 
 
We may … act on a system of Christian ethics founded on the 
positive declarations of the word of God: but without an inherent 
moral capacity ... placed in the breast of man, by the same hand 
that made him, the science of moral philosophy has not, I think, 
the shadow of any foundation whereon to stand.51 
 
Religious knowledge, also, became subject to the strictures of natural knowledge 
and moral nature. 
In natural knowledge, we may mount from phenomena to laws: 
but in doing this we are held by fetters we cannot break – we 
cannot alter one link in the chains of natural causes – we can only 
mark the traces of an unvarying power, external to ourselves, and 
to which we are ourselves in bondage. If this be our condition in 
acquiring natural knowledge, what right have we to think, that in 
gaining religious knowledge, we are permitted to be more free?52 
 
Revelation, as has been noted, was regarded as a “higher sanction” of moral 
laws, and in the end even Christian grace was conformed to this naturalistic 
pattern, becoming the health and approval of our natural social and moral 
perceptions: 
                                        
50 Ibid. p. 36. 
 
51 Ibid. p. 46. 
 
52 Ibid. p. 104. 
 
  65 
Learning, almost beyond that of man – a happy power in tracing 
out the proofs of natural religion – … may coexist without a single 
Christian grace…. [Although] our natural perceptions are cleared 
and elevated by the light of Christian truth: … yet we are infirm of 
purpose, and cannot do what our heart approves and our 
conscience dictates.53 
 
Although Sedgwick postulated a clear distinction between the physical and moral 
worlds, this marked a distinction within the phenomenal sciences, not a 
distinction between the scientific and the religious; and this emphasis upon 
phenomena systematically understood challenged the classical system of 
Anglican religion in its dependence upon textual authority. In points of physical 
science, geology had denied even a significant coincidence with the physical 
facts to the authority of scripture. Although in moral questions, it was certainly 
not true that texts and revelations had lost all authority, nonetheless Sedgwick 
made it clear that their authority was based upon their correspondence with and 
insight into moral phenomena, and he made it clear that revelation was no 
exception: the authority and truth of revelation was determined by moral 
philosophers who were not “more free” in gaining religious knowledge than were 
natural philosophers in gaining physical knowledge. 
Geological science and social circumstances alike had changed in the 
years between Vindiciae Geologicae and A Discourse on the Studies of the 
University. The status of science within society had changed, becoming, in the 
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hands of the Broughamites, a tool for social, political, and educational reform.54 
Whereas previously Sedgwick had supported Buckland’s diluvialism and the 
implied subordination of science to classical texts and authorities, it was now 
geologically less possible, as well as professionally and socially less liberal, to 
continue in that way. By 1832, a time of reform, a new Anglicanism was being 
invested by Sedgwick in physical, moral, and religious phenomena, in the general 
laws that governed those phenomena, and in the natural and moral philosophers 
who searched for those general laws in the name of science. In the midst of 
educational, social and political controversy, Sedgwick was not merely making 
connections between science and a theological education. He was more and 
more closely identifying them by putting the study of religious phenomena 
(subject to general laws) before the study of religious texts, and he was willing 
to engage in theological controversy to gain his point. 
This interpretation is confirmed by Corsi’s study of the place of science 
within the “Anglican debates” at Oxford in the 1830s, and by Rupke’s discussion 
of the relation of the Tractarians to the English school of geology.55 Although 
these debates certainly concerned the place of science within Anglican theology 
and education, they were remarkably free of technical scientific discussion. 
Rather, their concern was for the relation of religious to natural truth. The 
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Oxford Tractarians, for example, were not so much against science as indifferent 
(or, perhaps, superior) to it, deliberately reserving it to a place outside the 
university and in commercial society, while advocating a renewed classical 
education at university and emphasizing the ancient authorities in religion.56 
Other Oxford Anglicans remained convinced of an eventual coincidence between 
the physical evidence of science and the textual evidence of revelation and a 
consequent subordination of science to religion.57 As these concerns reveal, it 
was not the scientific merit of design arguments that was in dispute among 
Anglicans – almost everyone assumed an intentional regularity to the natural 
world. Rather, the debate was over the relation of natural knowledge to religion, 
theology, and Anglican education, which was being contested at Oxford in terms 
that were similar to those of Sedgwick’s advocacy of science at Cambridge. 
As the 1830s progressed, these contested views were mirrored in writings 
on natural theology that reached a much wider audience than the universities. 
Once again, however, what was of primary significance at this time was not 
whether science supported religion and natural theology, but the place and 
importance of science and natural theology in politics and religion. The final 
section of this chapter will show that natural theology in the 1830s was not 
struggling to keep theology abreast of increasingly intractable science, as has too 
                                        
56 Ibid. Corsi, p. 136. Rupke, p. 271. 
 
57 Corsi, pp. 209-224. 
 
  68 
often been supposed. Rather, the struggle was to assess and affirm the religious 
significance of science within Anglicanism and within British society. 
 
Natural Theology and the Anglican establishment in the 1830s 
 So much natural theology was written in the 1830s that it may seem to 
have been a general interest of the time. This was hardly the case. Recent 
historical studies have indicated causes for natural theology’s popularity that 
were quite particular and not particularly theological. Jonathan Topham, for 
example, in his detailed studies of the eight Bridgewater Treatises, has noted 
that “none of the authors primarily designed his treatise to be an exposition of 
the philosophy of the design argument”58 and that the works were “chiefly 
attractive for the qualities of their scientific exposition….”59 John H. Brooke, also, 
has provided non-theological causes for the popularity of natural theology, 
especially social mediations such as dispelling suspicions of heterodoxy in science 
or brokering religious differences that might arise around scientific views or 
within scientific societies.60 Other important studies have followed these same 
lines of thought in maintaining that natural theology was of less religious than 
social importance. 
                                        
58 Topham, Jonathan. “Beyond the ‘Common Context’: The production and reading of the 
Bridgewater Treatises,” Isis 89, 2 (1998): 233-62 at p. 238. 
 
59 Topham, “Science and Popular Education,” op. cit, p. 403-04. The Bridgewater Treatises are 
considered as design arguments by John M. Robson, “The Fiat and Finger of God,” in Richard J. 
Helmstadter and Bernard Lightman, eds. Victorian Faith in Crisis (Stanford, CA : Stanford 
University Press, 1990), pp. 71-125. 
 
60 Brooke, “Theology of the Geologists” and “English mix,” op. cit. (Ch 1, note 7). 
 
  69 
There is no doubt that the popularity of the Bridgewater Treatises had 
more to do with the social history of science than an inherent theological 
interest. The scientifically vacant but philosophically astute Natural Theology of 
Alexander Crombie, for example, published in 1829, did not share in the 
popularity of its more scientific cousins.61 The publisher of the Bridgewater 
Treatises believed that the market for theological books was depressed and did 
not expect their initial popularity.62 In retrospect, the publisher had not allowed 
for the fundamentally scientific interest of what Peter Mark Roget, author of the 
Treatise on physiology, described as “adducing” design through science rather 
than proving a design argument. For the most part, Roget’s adductions could be 
read as scientific descriptions of natural phenomena with a theological moral 
tacked on.63 
It should not seem odd, however, that, even without a widespread 
interest in natural theology, the Bridgewater Treatises sparked a public 
theological controversy. Our reading of Buckland and Sedgwick has shown that 
natural theology was primed as a point of Anglican political and academic 
debate. Works of natural theology written in response to or at the instigation of 
the surprisingly popular Treatises would betray these political and academic roots 
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and exhibit a more properly theological concern. Clearly, the Bridgewater series 
was being understood by some Anglicans, not as an exposition of science, but as 
part of a growing political and theological controversy. 
Perhaps the most representative non-Bridgewater and non-academic work 
in affirmation of natural theology in the 1830s would be Brougham’s A Discourse 
of Natural Theology, published in 1835.64 An alliance of science with natural 
theology had been part of Brougham’s intentions for political and educational 
reform all along, and several works of that nature were published by the Society 
for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in the 1820s – notably by Charles Bell, a 
future Bridgewater author.65 Brougham and the SDUK soon discovered, however, 
that natural theology “open[ed] the door to religious controversy among us” 
(board members could not agree upon what was a safe and suitable point in 
natural theology as an interpretation of science), causing them to abandon a 
plan to annotate and republish Paley’s book on that topic. Brougham personally 
went ahead with the project, however, teaming up with Bell to produce a new 
edition of Paley and, in addition, separately writing and publishing as A Discourse 
of Natural Theology what he had intended to say in an introduction to Paley for 
the SDUK.66 
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Although it is interesting to note that natural theology proved 
controversial even among Broughamite allies, two points are of more immediate 
interest. First, Brougham began the dedication of his Natural Theology by noting 
that “scientific men were apt to regard the study of Natural Religion as little 
connected with philosophical pursuits.” The disengagement of men of science 
from theology and religion was viewed by Brougham as a problem in need of 
correction, and the entire discourse was structured, not as a design argument, 
but as a demonstration that natural theology was a science that fit within the 
matrix of the other natural and moral sciences.67 In this respect, it was akin to 
what Sedgwick was claiming for natural theology at Cambridge and was a clear 
attempt to enlist natural theology on the side of liberal reform.  
Secondly, Brougham’s view of the religious significance of natural theology 
was bound to elicit controversial response from textualists and traditionalists, 
and, indeed, it is impossible to imagine that Brougham was innocent of 
controversial intent when he wrote that 
it is a vain and ignorant thing to suppose that Natural Theology is 
not necessary to the support of Revelation. The latter may be 
untrue, though the former be admitted …. But Revelation cannot 
be true if Natural Religion is false….68 
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Brougham also wrote that revelations became less credible over time. Such 
views, written by the leading public advocate of popular and secular scientific 
education in a time of social reform, cannot have been mistaken as other than 
controversial by design. 
Books were written in reply by Thomas Turton, Regius Professor of 
Divinity at Cambridge, and by William Irons of Queen’s College, Oxford.69 It is 
significant, even remarkable, that Turton and Irons tacked against Brougham 
along different theological lines despite their unity in opposition to liberalism. 
Although Turton decried any comparison between natural theology and “those 
glorious manifestations of the Divine Perfections which illuminate the pages of 
Holy Writ,” yet he conceded to Brougham that a proof of natural theology was 
necessary to the support of revelation.70 He objected to Brougham by viewing 
natural theology as a well-rehearsed feature of classical and philosophical 
thought – a subject in which the Cambridge scholar, Turton, could suppose 
Brougham to have made innumerable mistakes and omissions – rather than as a 
novel point of science. Quite differently from Turton, however, Irons rejected any 
form of design argument as a mode of theology. He argued that “man, by his 
unassisted natural powers, could never have certainly determined any one truth 
of theology or religion,” and this claim exposed a difference between Irons and 
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Turton about what counted as theology. Beyond theological controversy, 
however, Irons’ book, in which Brougham figured prominently, was a 
denunciation of all “liberality” in religion and politics.71 Although the liberal 
Brougham was undeniably a member of the political establishment, his 
effectiveness in addressing the religious establishment was being fiercely 
contested. 
It is legitimate to suppose that Brougham’s motives in writing his Natural 
Theology were not purely religious. He had his political and educational agenda 
in mind. I do not contend, however, that natural theology had a religious cause, 
but that it was of religious consequence. We may suppose the replies to 
Brougham by Turton and Irons to have been equally and oppositely motivated by 
politics, but they were unquestionably theological arguments. Brougham had 
argued for natural theology because it pressed science, with its liberal 
implications for theology and religion, upon the religious and political 
establishment, which was being defended from science by Turton and Irons. As a 
politician of national prominence, Brougham ensured that these theological 
issues, which had already troubled the universities for more than a decade, were 
seen to be of importance for the nation’s political and social life, as well. 
Of course, the religious establishment did not respond to these challenges 
only as did Turton and Irons. As Corsi has shown, the Oxford don, 
mathematician, philosopher, and theologian Baden Powell spoke more harshly to 
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his colleagues about their failure to embrace science within their theology than 
would any of the practical men of science. Like Brougham, Powell’s motives had 
their political aspects and concerned the implications of science for the political 
and religious establishment. In a pointed passage, Powell wrote that 
Scientific knowledge is rapidly spreading among all classes EXCEPT 
THE HIGHER, and the consequence must be, that that Class will no 
longer remain THE HIGHER. If its members continue to retain their 
superiority, they must preserve a real preeminence in knowledge, 
and must make advances at least in proportion to the Classes 
which have hitherto been below them.72 
 
It was in the interest of maintaining the Anglican hegemony and its real 
preeminence in knowledge that Powell advocated opening the Anglican 
universities, and particularly Oxford, to dissenters.73 
Despite this social and political edge, however, Powell’s central concern 
was for the established religion, and the result was the publication of what may 
be the most comprehensive and astute consideration of natural theology in the 
1830s, entitled The Connexion of Natural and Divine Truth.74 Powell had access 
to all the earlier discussions of that decade, and he made use of them. He 
understood that one part of the controversy lay in determining whether it would 
be a detriment or a contribution to theological argument to prove that invariable 
laws of nature could provide causes and explanations for all natural phenomena. 
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In Powell’s view, all physical phenomena ought to be explained completely by 
the general laws of matter, although the order of the general laws would require 
intelligent explanation.75 This went further than Buckland or Sedgwick, both of 
whom had argued that natural history was in part the result of a superintending 
power that exceeded and directed the known and uniform laws of nature. 
Powell’s view was no more liberal than that of Brougham. Powell, 
however, was incontrovertibly a part of the religious establishment and was 
capable of philosophical argument. He was concerned specifically with the 
theological resistance of Anglicans to science, which he thought was leaving the 
national religion to stand upon the increasingly inadequate bases of miraculous 
revelations and traditional authorities. There was more credibility to be gained, 
he believed, from solidifying the relationship between natural science and better 
design arguments.76 
The title chosen by Powell for this religious advocacy of science and 
natural theology – The Connexion of Natural and Divine Truth – was not 
misleading but revealing: the point of the controversy was not whether science 
might explain nature without God – no one but radicals thought this possible – 
but whether a natural theology supported by science was necessary to the 
credibility of revelation. As Corsi has acknowledged, “Within Anglican circles, the 
debate on the relationship between scientific and religious values became a 
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crucial issue, closely related to the question of the role of the universities and of 
their educational priorities in modern society.”77 
Science and natural theology were enlisted upon only one side of this 
theological controversy. Although no one was arguing that natural theology 
dispensed with revelation entirely, there was no doubt that interpreting natural 
theology as basic to religion and revelation implied a restructuring of the 
religious and political establishment. Brougham had related natural theology and 
science to his educational and political reforms, and Powell – beyond providing 
the Broughamites with their theological justification – was considering the new 
basis for the Anglican religious establishment to be its comprehension of science. 
These men, like Buckland and Sedgwick in more limited ways, were not so much 
connecting or reconciling science to religion as identifying them more and more. 
Natural theology was their religious premise, and they were criticized upon that 
point by their opponents: Turton complained that Brougham would fall back 
upon natural theology as soon as “a direct defense of revelation could no longer 
be maintained,”78 while Irons argued against the possibility of having a natural 
theology to fall back upon.  
 In such a context, it is not surprising that the advocates of science should 
find it necessary, not to defend design arguments upon scientific grounds, but to 
assert the religious significance of natural theology. Brougham’s insistence has 
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already been mentioned. Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater Treatise was written in 
the conviction that “the truths of Natural Religion rest on foundations far 
stronger than those of any human testimony.”79 Powell stated that “The stability 
of natural theology rests upon the demonstration of physical truth; and upon the 
assurance of … natural theology must … all notions of a revelation be essentially 
founded.”80 
The Bridgewater Treatises, ever safe and conciliatory,81 tended to be less 
concerned to discuss the relation of natural theology to revelation, but they, too, 
needed to affirm the naturalist’s place in theological discussion. Buckland, as an 
ordained cleric and a geologist, was inevitably concerned to discuss revelation, 
especially Genesis; and he repeated his trusted affirmation that geology did no 
damage to revelation that was not vastly offset by important gains in natural 
religion.82 Chalmers, the evangelical clergyman, was another Bridgewater author 
drawn to discuss the relation of natural and revealed religion at some length. He 
claimed that “two positions are perfectly reconcileable – first … the insufficiency 
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of natural religion; and secondly, the great actual importance of it.” He found 
natural theology “indispensable, as a preliminary to the gospel.”83 
Significantly, the importance of natural theology was not diminished by 
leaving its relation to revelation unspecified. Among the Bridgewater authors, 
Whewell, Roget, Prout, and Bell were largely silent about revealed religion, and, 
in effect, this left the religious importance of natural theology unbounded. 
Whewell, for example, identified the most original and insightful discoveries and 
discoverers of science – particularly, astronomical physics and the exalted 
Newton – with the methods and premises of natural theology, while Prout called 
God “the Great Chemist of nature” and claimed that the person “who the most 
studied His works, will be the best qualified – nay, will be alone qualified, to form 
an adequate opinion of Him.”84 Prout’s view, in fact, expressed the audacity of 
science and natural theology toward traditional religion as succinctly as anything 
may: he was removing the understanding of God from the hands of people who 
only lived piously and studied books. Not only politically and socially, but 
religiously and theologically, natural theology was a wedge by which these men 
were pushing science more deeply and controversially into the Anglican 
establishment. This was an advance upon Buckland’s attempts to “connect” 
science and religion at Oxford, but Buckland’s views were preliminary to those of 
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Sedgwick, and Sedgwick’s views were part of the reforming impulse, even if they 
were not as liberal as those of Brougham and Powell. 
Within Anglicanism, the proponents of natural theology and theological 
superintendence were seeking to bring science into areas of traditional and 
established authority. They were controversial advocates for science and liberal 
reform at the universities, in politics, and in theology. If they were successful in 
furthering their interests, then science would be established as necessary to the 
support of revelation and views like those expressed by Prout would gain a 
certain religious authority. On the other hand, the opponents of natural theology, 
such as Turton and Irons, did not need to refute or even understand science in 
order to deny the religious significance of design arguments and, at the same 
time, deny science a voice within established religion, if not politics. These were 
social and theological disputes about the religious significance of science, and 
they were unavoidable so long as sincere Anglican clerics like Buckland and 
Sedgwick considered science a part of their religious and educational vocation 
that led to clerical advancement; as long as theologians like Powell argued that 
the privileged and national character of his church required that its theology fully 
comprehend and endorse science; as long as politicians like Brougham believed 
that science and natural religion, if not Christian revelation, were essential to the 
political and social well-being of the nation; and as long as there were social, 
political, and religious conservatives to resist these liberal views. 
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Natural theology’s prominence at this time, then, was significantly 
attributable to a religious and theological debate that left scientific argument 
largely unaffected and brought new knowledge in the natural and moral sciences 
into social, political, and religious debates of utmost consequence. The 
celebrated wrong steps – such as an early association with geological diluvialism 
and a lasting susceptibility to utilitarian explanations of “specially created” 
organic species – that afflicted natural theology in its efforts to press science into 
the Anglican establishment were largely confined to the social, religious, and 
political consequences of its expression, leaving generally directional design 
arguments remarkably well supported by science and theologically quite 
controversial in their religious, social and political implications. It was this 
scientific support for directional design that would be famously challenged by the 
publication in 1844 of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation. 
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CHAPTER III: 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY IN BRITAIN, 1844-1856:  SCIENTIFIC RESPONSES TO THE 
THEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF VESTIGES OF THE NATURAL HISTORY OF 
CREATION 
 
 
 
Robert Chambers 
 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation sensationally expounded the 
“hypothesis of development,” including the transmutation of biological species, 
and was once known to historians as an amateurish precursor of Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory.1 The public reception of Vestiges, too, was once understood 
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to have been a rehearsal of the social and religious antipathies to evolution that 
Darwin again stirred up but, this time, successfully overcame.2 Subsequently, 
however, historians discovered that Darwin worked without any considerable 
reference to the theories of development represented by Vestiges,3 and, 
moreover, that the public reception of Darwinism was relatively more accepting 
and less hostile than had been thought, in part because of partial resolutions to 
the implications of transmutation worked out in response to Vestiges.4 More 
recently, it has been argued that Vestiges was even more important than 
Darwin’s Origin for the adjustments variously made by social groups in Britain, 
both publicly and in private, to the suggestions of transmutation and progressive 
social development.5 Perhaps Darwin did not so much change as settle minds 
into opinions already explored in response to Vestiges. It is better appreciated 
today, as well, that the scientific writing of Vestiges, by the Edinburgh journalist 
Robert Chambers although published anonymously, was disputed not only for its 
logical and evidential adequacy, or for its religious acceptability, but, with equal 
vehemence, as a question of social authorization concerning who would speak 
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publicly on behalf of practitioners of science.6 The great importance of Vestiges, 
as we understand it today, was not its place in relation to Darwin’s theory but its 
place in the interstices of British scientific and social history. Following suit, 
nineteenth-century responses to Vestiges also are better appreciated today for 
their social motivation and context, so that, for example, it is Sedgwick’s moral 
and Huxley’s professional outrage that are significant, rather than debated points 
of physical evidence and logical inference. 
Scientific responses to Vestiges written for a general readership are my 
concern in Chapter III. I will be attending, however, less to their social 
motivation and context than to their intellectual form. I hope to be understood, 
that the formal dispute with Vestiges was not primarily over transmutation and 
special creation but over two different causal explanations for the gradual and 
historical formation of the natural world, one that premised uniform, the other 
superintendent causality. My purpose is not to challenge the social histories for 
their adequacy upon this point, but to revisit aspects of the earlier histories of 
formal argument that seem to me to have misrepresented the place of 
superintendential thought in science. 
Strictly with respect to the arguments of Vestiges, our appreciation of the 
book today is not greatly different than what it was fifty or sixty years ago. This 
is not to say that earlier histories may be read just as well as more recent ones. 
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The earlier tendency to categorize responses as either clerical or scientific was 
no less unfortunate than erroneous, and from that mistake followed another – 
the tendency to opposed “naturalisitic” to “supernaturalisitic” views of natural 
history. Forced into such categorizations, clerics were, of course, found to be in 
support of supernaturalism and religion, opposing naturalism and science. 
However, the reduction of ideas to fixed, abstracted categories of thought may 
never do them justice; and it is important to know that the opponents of 
Vestiges were not opposing science and naturalism so much as questioning what 
science and naturalism were about. These matters extend well beyond the forms 
of arguments, and, therefore, it is inadvisable to read the earlier histories without 
some preparation in overcoming their limitations. 
The truth remains, however, that the developmental hypothesis 
categorically excluded “supernatural” causes from the explanations of natural 
history; that many opponents of development did object to this exclusion; and 
that, to the extent that “scientific” explanations since Vestiges have become only 
and ever more closely associated with uniformly natural causes, a gap still exists 
between the developmental hypothesis and its critics that leaves Vestiges on the 
side of science. So long as that gap is not bridged, setting the arguments into 
their historical context may only provide vantage points from which this 
difference may be partially overlooked. Traversing that gap would considerably 
augment the efforts of recent historians to see continuity between science and 
religion at the time of Vestiges. It also would bring greater appreciation for how 
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design arguments at the time may have looked capable of bringing science and 
natural theology into contact, leading science onto religion. 
It is my contention that superintendential design argument was a true 
bridge across the divide of nineteenth-century naturalism and supernaturalism, 
and that admitting superintendential design into the history of scientific thought, 
if not into the history of the physical sciences, will provide better insight into 
what science and religion meant to the opponents and proponents of material 
development. Because God’s superintendence of natural history was presumed to 
follow an ideal plan, there was no insurmountable objection to practicing science 
upon the premise of superintendential design. Science would prove a way to 
discover the plan. Objections to superintendence applied only when intervention 
was presumed to be arbitrary; and the close association of supernatural causality 
with willful arbitrariness is an historical bias today that may find its correction in 
due appreciation of superintendential design. 
In form, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation was a naturalistic 
argument for the progressive material “development” of the natural world that 
was opposed to acts of “special creation.”7 However, the author of Vestiges 
claimed that his thesis was “creation by law” and insisted that he was not 
contesting the fact of divine creation but only its “mode.”8 For the most part, this 
should be taken as a quibble, and Chambers seems even to have found it 
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conveniently added rather than essential to his views.9 He argued steadfastly in 
Vestiges for the material development of an originally nebulous cosmos, and his 
concerns were plainly more philosophical than theological. Nonetheless, 
Chambers had turned his natural history to theological account, and, in response 
to his critics, he tended to emphasize “creation by law” rather than the 
developmental hypothesis.10 Moreover, the theological responses to Vestiges 
were in many ways more “scientific” than the work they critiqued or, at least, 
were written by acknowledged men of science, such as Whewell and Sedgwick at 
Cambridge and, ten years later, Huxley in London. Such concerns make suspect 
any historiographical view that undervalues the naturalism or scientific stature of 
the critiques of development. 
When nineteenth-century design arguments and natural theology are 
opposed to science, it presupposes an opposition between what are taken to be 
“supernatural” explanations that lead to theology, such as special creations and 
geological catastrophes; and more “naturalistic” theories that lead to Darwin, 
such as progressive development and geological uniformity.11 Since the 1960s, 
however, studies in the history of science have exposed the mistakes in that 
opposition. Cannon first argued that the basis for Darwin’s achievement had 
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been “stolen” from natural theology rather than derived from contemporary 
science.12 Subsequently, Ospovat showed that natural theology had been an 
integral aspect of the development of Darwin’s theory,13 and Gillespie noted that 
Darwin’s “creationist” opponents were committed to a scientific paradigm rather 
than to a defense of theology.14 More nuanced descriptions of catastrophism and 
uniformitarianism were offered by Hooykaas and others,15 and Bowler 
distinguished Darwinian evolution from what he called developmental and 
“directional” understandings of natural history that were more amenable to 
theological interpretation.16 Vestiges, as well, is the subject of a monumental 
new study by the intellectual and social historian James Secord that carefully 
dissects all suppositions of a general religious hostility to the book.17 
These studies have blurred the earlier understanding of an opposition 
between nineteenth-century science and natural theology. Yet the possibility of 
integrating these and other studies further into intellectual and social history is 
frustrated by an inadequate understanding of the design argument standing 
behind the natural theology written in the 1840s and 1850s, subsequent to 
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Vestiges and just before the publication of Origin of Species.18 If science in the 
Darwinian era was somewhat theological, then is it possible that natural theology 
was scientific in its arguments? 
By examining the natural theology written in response to Vestiges, a more 
subtle understanding of the relations between natural theology, design 
arguments, science, and religion will emerge than has been possible when 
Vestiges is allowed to settle more firmly upon the side of naturalism and science 
than upon religion and natural theology. The difficulty posed by Vestiges for 
nineteenth-century natural theologians and natural philosophers was not only its 
advocacy of material development, but that it remained, in addition, a work of 
natural theology. In Vestiges, a natural theology of material development was 
premised upon finding design in the perfect uniformity and continuity of the 
natural order, and the foremost intellectual alternative to this view was not a 
common Christian understanding of special creation but a “superintendential” 
natural theology that argued, upon scientific and philosophical grounds, for the 
recognition of directed discontinuity in the order of natural history. 
                                        
18 Today, the most significant studies of natural theology after Vestiges may be those of John H. 
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It is by attending to the distinction of superintendential from 
developmental natural theology that further understanding must begin. However, 
a closer examination of these theologies does not result only in better 
distinctions. Many of the theological responses to Vestiges indicate complicated 
concerns that generally tended to separate science from religion, not by 
opposing science to natural theology, as has been commonly understood, but by 
associating natural theology more closely with science while divesting it of 
religious significance. That is the thesis of this chapter. The thesis will be 
sustained by attendance to critiques of Vestiges written over a period of a dozen 
years by Whewell and Powell, Anglican philosophers of science and natural 
theologians; Sedgwick and Hugh Miller, geologists and natural theologians; and 
Huxley, a younger and aspiring “man of science” with a technically adequate 
grasp of the bases for natural theology in the most current natural sciences of 
his day. 
 
Geology, superintendence, and Anglican science – the 
“catastrophism”/“uniformitarianism” debate in advance of Vestiges 
 
 A tenth edition of Vestiges – the last before Darwin’s Origin of 
Species – was published in 1853, and the young Tom Huxley, not yet thirty years 
old or secure enough as a scientific professional to marry Henrietta Heathorn, his 
Australian fiancé, was asked to write a review article for the British and Foreign 
Medico-Chirurgical Review. The journal was relatively obscure, but Vestiges still 
commanded enough public attention for Huxley to value the acclaim of being its 
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critic. He set to it with a will, unabashedly hostile, beginning by quoting Macbeth 
after seeing Banquo’s ghost: “Time was, that when the brains were out, the man 
would die.” Pertinent to Vestiges, Huxley was amazed that the “utter ignorance 
of the public mind as to the methods of science” had prevented “a mass of 
pretentious nonsense” from being exposed as “charlatanerie.”19 
 Later in life, Huxley regretted his ferocity in this review.20 He might as well 
have regretted his misrepresentations. His most savage criticisms were founded 
upon a blatant and undoubtedly deliberate misreading of the “fundamental 
proposition” of Vestiges, which was, in the words of the tenth edition, “ ‘creation 
in the manner of law,’ that is, the Creator working in a natural course, or by 
natural means.” In his review, Huxley reduced this proposition, “in all its naked 
crudeness, [to] the belief that a law is an entity – a Logos intermediate between 
the Creator and his works” that was capable of causing or producing natural 
effects.21 A more philosophical view, perhaps, would have been that the laws of 
science were not actual causes but only abstractions or generalizations induced 
from observed phenomena. However, although Vestiges did admit of this 
philosophical doubt, there was undoubtedly more to its fundamental proposition. 
 Huxley supported his claim with a few citations from the book. The 
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longest of these revealed not only the error of Vestiges but Huxley’s misreading 
of the basic point. In a crucial passage cited at more length by Huxley, Vestiges 
had claimed that “The Eternal Sovereign arranges a solar or an astral system, by 
dispositions imparted primordially to matter; he causes, by the same majestic 
means, vast oceans to form and continents to rise and fall … so as to fit the 
earth for a residence of organic beings. But when [life is created, we hear from 
some learned philosophers of] ‘creative fiats,’ ‘interferences,’ ‘interpositions of 
the creative energy’…. Let the contrast between the two propositions be well 
marked. According to the first, all is done by the continuous energy of the divine 
will…: according to the second, there is a procedure strictly resembling that of a 
human being in the management of his affairs.”22 
Huxley mocked this view by denying that there was a genuine distinction 
between a continuous energy of the divine will, on one hand, and interpositions 
of creative energy, on the other. Also, the longer passage supported Huxley’s 
contention that Vestiges mistook the scientific laws of nature for an efficient 
Logos-entity. There is no doubt, however, that the passage cited from Vestiges 
had most urgently contrasted the creation of astral and geological systems “by 
dispositions imparted primordially to matter” to the creation of biological systems 
by “a procedure strictly resembling that of a human being in the management of 
his affairs.” Huxley made no reference to this distinction in his criticisms, and, by 
that omission, somewhat surprisingly neglected to mention the point of the 
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controversy over Vestiges, which was, in fact, whether natural history was the 
product of unvarying material laws or had included a theological superintendence 
that strictly resembled the management of affairs by a human being. 
 Superintendential natural theology became an issue in Vestiges because 
of its robust scientific pedigree in nineteenth-century Britain. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, the idea that God had superintended geological and biological 
history “with a direction to beneficial ends” had been first broached by Buckland, 
the Anglican clergyman and geological catastrophist, in his 1819 inaugural 
lecture as geology reader at Oxford. In the lecture as published, Buckland had 
used the British “coal measures” to adduce his argument, urging that these coal 
fields had been anciently broken into fragments and reset into vertical layers that 
reached the earth’s surface, exhibiting “a system of wise and benevolent 
contrivances … for the wants and comforts of the [earth’s] future inhabitants….” 
Buckland noted that this superintendential argument was an improvement upon 
the natural theology of Paley, Newton, and others, because their mechanical 
proofs had left room to “doubt the continued superintendance [sic] of that 
intelligence” which had originally created the world. Following the publication of 
Buckland’s lecture, many natural theologians and men of science – the most 
important of whom will be discussed in this chapter – would follow his lead in 
commending a superintendential view of natural history. As the first truly 
historical natural science, geology had contributed the first truly 
superintendential design argument, founded upon the remarkable claim that 
  93 
causal discontinuity in geology exhibited intention and design differently than did 
Paley’s argument from the utility of natural forms or Newton’s argument from 
mechanical regularity.23 
 The formation of the coal measures was, of course, an instance of 
Buckland’s convulsive, cataclysmic, or “catastrophic” geological theory that has 
more commonly been associated by historians with earthquakes and floods. In 
fact, however, that common association is a classic instance of the confusion 
that historians have long suffered between the scientific, theological, religious 
and cultural aspects of natural theology. Despite a religious and cultural 
emphasis upon “supernatural” events such as global floods, Buckland’s primary 
claim was that the natural forces that had formed the earth’s surface had been 
discontinuous, and that they had been directed or superintended by God to 
benefit increasingly advanced and, ultimately, human life. The argument 
depended upon fairly definite conceptions of natural forces, natural history, and 
natural forms, not upon an allowance for the arbitrary exertion of supernatural 
powers.24 The exercise of God’s will over the forces of nature was limited to 
instances of superintendential design, somewhat similarly, it may be suggested, 
to the way machines at any construction site have been superintended by 
intelligent workers who managed them, and who, in turn, were informed by 
construction plans in determining an appropriate act of superintendence. 
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Superintendence was able to incorporate supernatural causation into an historical 
and evidential design argument because design, not miracle, was the key to the 
argument.25 
In the history of British science, Buckland’s cataclysms were famously 
opposed by the uniformitarian geological science of Charles Lyell.26 Lyell 
contended that geologists must form their theories by strict analogy to natural 
forces that are seen to be presently (or “actually”) at work in forming the earth’s 
surface. Unwilling to suppose that past natural forces may have differed in kind 
or intensity from those that were now actual and observable, Lyell proposed 
perfectly uniform forces at work over practically infinite time as a more plausible 
explanation of geological formation. The theoretical result was a geological 
system perpetually maintained in a state not identical but always closely 
analogous to that of Lyell’s own day, a view that harkened back to the 
eighteenth-century geology of James Hutton, who had found in the unvarying 
system of the earth “no vestige of a beginning, - no prospect of an end.”27 The 
expectation of a world that had been originally in a radically different and 
uninhabitable state, that had changed slowly and, upon occasion, convulsively 
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into a hospitable earth, and that had hosted at least one subsequent, original 
appearance of life, was Buckland’s view, not Lyell’s, despite the influence of 
Lyell’s theories upon Darwin and their consequent association with more modern 
science. 
The designation of Buckland’s theory as geological “catastrophism,” 
however, was not his own but that of Whewell, the Anglican historian and 
philosopher of science, and Master of Trinity, Cambridge, who chronicled and 
philosophized over the geological debates of the 1830s.28 Although Buckland has 
been considered the archetypal catastrophist, it is a designation that would be 
more aptly applied to Whewell. In fact, the effect of the debate with the 
uniformitarians upon Buckland (or, better said, of the conversations he had with 
his friend Lyell) was that he quietly dropped the claim of geological 
superintendence from his natural theology.29 Whewell, however, elaborated 
catastrophist geology into a demonstrative argument for the theological 
superintendence of natural history. 
Whewell’s philosophy of science has generated scholarly debate largely 
over its projected antipathy or sympathy to Darwin, so that Jonathan Hodge has 
found it necessary to remind historians that Whewell cannot be adequately 
considered a precursor of Darwin. Hodge and Richard Yeo have called attention 
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to Whewell’s overriding interest in adjudicating the boundaries of the various 
sciences with respect, ultimately, to theology and, in particular, Anglicanism.30 
Whewell was concerned, in other words, with providing a conceptual basis for 
the incorporation of science into Cambridge and other Anglican institutions. 
Contrasting uniformitarianism with catastrophism was of central 
importance to Whewell’s philosophical project. It was primarily by a consideration 
of geology that Whewell established three of his most characteristic ideas:  a 
unique category for the physical sciences of historical causation (“palætiology”), 
a union of the physical and moral sciences, and a superintendential natural 
theology. These ideas, in turn, would prove fundamental to the relation of 
science to theology and religion. It is not too much to say, therefore, that the 
debate over geological catastrophes was basic to Whewell’s conception of a 
suitably Anglican philosophy of science. His philosophy is easily related, in turn, 
to the wider work of determining a place for science within the Anglican 
educational, political, and religious establishment, which was the motive force 
behind much of British natural theology at the time. Although historians have 
followed Buckland’s natural theology insofar as it tended to support debates over 
miraculous catastrophes and the relation of geology to Genesis, the implications 
of what Buckland was doing become fully visible by following them to Whewell. 
                                        
30 Hodge, M. J. S. “The History of the Earth, Life, and Man: Whewell’s philosophy of 
palaetiological science,” in Menachem Fisch and Simon Schaffer, eds. William Whewell, op. cit. 
(Ch II, note 5), pp. 255-88. Richard Yeo, “William Whewell’s Philosophy of Knowledge and its 
Reception,” in Fisch and Schaffer, pp. 175-99; and “William Whewell, Natural Theology, and the 
Philosophy of Science,” in Annals of Science 39 (1979): 493-516. 
 
  97 
After the publication of Vestiges, the first fully engaged response from the 
Anglican establishment was Whewell’s Indications of the Creator, published in 
1845.31 Indications contained selections from Whewell’s previously published 
History and Philosophy of science as well as from his earlier Bridgewater treatise 
on astronomy and general physics,32 and it was prefaced by a consideration of 
Vestiges that did not refer to the latter by name. The casual manner and brevity 
of the original material could be interpreted as Whewell’s failure to appreciate or, 
perhaps, unwillingness to acknowledge the significance of Vestiges.33 Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Whewell’s thin volume, prepared and priced to 
appeal to the well-to-do, drew upon his familiarity with the kind of theories 
advocated by Vestiges and, often, of the particulars. In Whewell’s view Vestiges 
was nothing new; and, to the educated Anglicans who found Vestiges novel and 
shocking, his message was clear: Anglican science is your first defense against 
the disturbing implications of development. Why Whewell believed that science 
repudiated Vestiges will be the next topic for discussion, along with why others 
were not so sure. 
 
 
                                        
31 Whewell, Indications, op. cit. (Ch I, note 6). 
 
32 Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics, op. cit. (Ch II, note 84); History; Philosophy. 
 
33 E.g. Millhauser, Just Before Darwin, op. cit. p. 120. A different perspective is provided by 
Secord in Victorian Sensation, op. cit. pp. 227-9. 
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Anglican philosophical debates in response to Vestiges:  William 
Whewell and Baden Powell 
 
Whewell distinguished historical from mechanical causation within the 
physical sciences partly by distinguishing the causes from the effects of any 
physical system.34 Today, Whewell’s distinctions are surprising because of our 
familiarity with regular mechanical explanations for the historical development of 
the physical world. In Whewell’s mind, however, physical mechanics – the 
exemplar of which would have been the Newtonian solar system – were more 
closely associated with systems whose effects did not vary or “develop” over 
time; and these mechanics, therefore, could not be used to explain the origin of 
a system nor subscribe to gradual development. Of course, various scientific 
philosophies of mechanical and material development had been proposed as 
explanations for the formation of the physical world ever since Descartes, but 
such philosophical speculations were antithetical to the tradition of British 
inductive science that was Whewell’s model and interest. From Whewell’s point 
of view, the novelty of geology in British science was its insistence that sound 
inductions from physical evidence pointed towards the historical origin of many 
things in nature; most notably, of biological species and a cooling earth. This 
allowed for the repeated and perhaps wholesale creation and extinction of 
species, along with the possibility of a hot, nebular origin of the earth and the 
eventual exhaustion of terrestrial heat.35 
                                        
34 Whewell, Indications, pp. 96-103; Philosophy, pp. 637-42, 654-8. 
 
35 Indications, pp. 96-122; Philosophy, pp. 637-708. 
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In Whewell’s thought, however, such evidence did not lead inevitably to 
the acceptance of mechanical systems of material development, but, rather, to 
the open question of historical causation. What were the causes of nature’s 
terrestrial history as it appeared in the geological record? Whewell recognized 
that principles of material development were a potential explanation, but, in his 
judgment, it was just as plausible that natural history’s causes were theological, 
not material. His philosophy of induction was built around the presumption that 
theological explanations of nature, although not binding upon physical science or 
constitutive of it, were nonetheless valid in their own way when found to be in 
consonance with natural knowledge. Although any science, when it had reached 
a demonstrable conclusion upon valid principles of induction, was allowed to 
correct theology where their views openly conflicted, no science began with 
premises that precluded the validity of theological contributions to our 
understanding of natural history.36 
Central to these philosophical contentions was what Whewell termed 
“palætiology,” a class of sciences, such as geology, philology, and archeology, 
“directed … to ascertain[ing what a] series of events has been… [and] also how 
it has been brought about.”37 In their physical aspects, the palætiological 
sciences would appeal to mechanical and material principles, but Whewell 
thought it would prove impossible to reduce the phenomena entirely to their 
                                        
36 Indications, pp. 62-71; Philosophy, p. 658; History, pp. 483-88. Hodge, “History of the Earth,” 
op. cit. Yeo, “Whewell’s Philosophy,” op. cit. 
  
37 Indications, p. 96; Philosophy, p. 637. 
  
  100
mechanical and material explanations. For example, in archeology it was 
impossible to keep physical effects entirely separate from intellectual and moral 
agency: humans have intentionally altered the physical course of nature, just as 
nature has unintentionally altered the physical characteristics of humans and 
their products, exerting a physical influence upon moral affairs. Analogously, 
Whewell thought that it was possible for God to have played an intentional part 
in natural history and for there to be laws of physical nature that were intended 
by God to a moral effect. It did not seem likely to Whewell that the origination, 
laws, mechanics, and history of spoken language, for example, would be 
explainable without reference to moral as well as physical categories.38 
Although the analogy to moral laws and human intentions obviously 
prepared a theological design argument, Whewell did not pursue it directly. He 
argued, divertingly, that the causes of all natural events are capable of being 
described by the general laws of nature, without reference to God’s moral 
intentions or miraculous interventions. Whewell insisted that natural science was 
always concerned with inducing the general laws of nature from their empirical 
evidence, and that all natural phenomena were referable to one or another of 
the natural sciences. In insisting upon this, Whewell was not wavering upon the 
reality of theological causes. Rather, he argued that the evidence of theological 
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agency in nature was to be found at the level of the general laws; in their logical 
interrelation and historical operation.39 
Through his defense of catastrophism, Whewell argued that it may be 
necessary for science to discover laws of nature in description of physical forces, 
effective in the past, that were very different in kind or intensity from any forces 
that are presently actual. The order of the laws of nature, in other words, may 
not have been historically uniform. There may have been different laws for 
different occasions, and Whewell believed that geological evidence, especially, 
may support such a conclusion. This was, after all, the exact point of debate 
between catastrophists and uniformitarians, and although Whewell would not 
prejudge the outcome of that debate, he did worry that an insistence upon 
causal uniformity as an explanatory model risked forcing facts to fit theory.40 As 
an example, he hit upon problems in explaining the historical origins of species. 
At a time when paleontology was not a science distinct from geology, 
difficulties in explaining the geological record of past life could be construed as 
an objection to a geological theory in general. The problem for Lyell and the 
uniformitarians was that there was no evidence for the present creation of new 
species, and therefore there was no uniformitarian analogy to a geological record 
in which a whole earth’s worth of new species seemed to have been created on 
several distinct occasions in the past. On the other hand, the episodic extinction 
                                        
39 Indications, pp. 94-5; Philosophy, pp. 634-6; Astronomy, pp. 300-02, 356-65. 
 
40 Indications, pp. 106-9; Philosophy, pp. 665-79; History, pp. 513-8. 
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and creation of species fit well with the twinned ideas of geological catastrophes 
and a changing terrestrial habitat brought on by a cooling earth. The 
paleontological record represented a difficult challenge for uniformitarian theory, 
and although Whewell thought it rash and unscientific to speculate upon 
precisely what had been the cause of special creation, he had no difficulty 
accepting the historical record of special creations as a fact within the 
palætiological sciences, whether or not their cause were specifiable. In fact, 
Whewell believed that, in this case, it would prove to be beyond the capability of 
the mechanical or physical sciences to provide a cause because the ultimate 
explanation would be the original creation or intentional implementation of a new 
order of nature – an act, in other words, of theological superintendence – that 
was evident in the geological record and that marked the introduction of new 
physiological and biological mechanisms into natural history. These new 
mechanisms, in turn, would determine the subject matter of their associated 
mechanical sciences.41 
Whewell was not calling upon natural philosophers to admit theological 
explanations into their work, and he placed no restrictions upon what the 
philosophers might attempt to demonstrate. He believed, however, that there 
were limits to what the laws of nature and the properties of matter could be 
expected to explain. He did not think it likely that mechanical principles would be 
capable of explaining the entirety of geological formation, that geology and 
                                        
41 Indications, pp. 62-71; History, pp. 483-88. 
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mineralogy would be able to explain life’s origins, forms, and adaptations, or that 
biology and physiology would be able to explain moral consciousness and 
reason. Although these and all natural phenomena were subject to the laws of 
nature appropriate to them, it did not follow, Whewell argued, that geology was 
implicit within physics, or biology within geology, or reason and morality within 
biology. Thus, the origins of life, consciousness, reason, etc., were like the 
episodic geological catastrophes of the past in their indication, not of miracles 
falling outside the bounds of nature, but of the historical and discontinuous 
origins of new orders of nature that could be creative or destructive in their 
power.42 It followed that each of the separate branches of science ought to be 
established upon the explanatory and causal principles as well as what Whewell 
called the “fundamental ideas” most appropriate to them. There was no absolute 
unity of physical causation and explanation to the sciences; each science rested 
upon its own physical and intellectual foundations.43 
Whewell considered it to be the goal of the natural sciences to derive the 
most general laws of nature possible by the practice of sound philosophical 
induction from the available empirical evidence, without theological restriction. 
Nonetheless, in his view, natural history would be shown eventually to accord 
with the historical superintendence of the general laws of nature rather than with 
the principles of uniformitarianism or material development. God had called into 
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being new orders of nature at the time appointed for them – material, biological, 
conscious, and moral orders, intended for each other and building upon one 
another but not implicit within one another. Although the various natural 
sciences worked toward understanding the natural order without reference to 
this ultimately theological explanation, they would inevitably point to the 
theology of the natural world when they discovered the restricted relation of 
nature’s most general laws to each other and to the consequent direction of 
natural history.44 
In perfect distinction from having been caught unaware by Vestiges, 
Whewell had prepared a philosophy to circumvent it. The association of science 
with his particular philosophy of induction predetermined that the speculative, 
hypothetical approach of Vestiges was deemed unscientific. Having premised the 
various sciences upon the understanding that each branch of natural philosophy 
should be left to discover the general laws and fundamental ideas most 
appropriate to its particular order of nature, the universally applicable principle of 
development espoused by Vestiges was inevitably considered unscientific, 
inexpert, and presumptive. Moreover, because he criticized Vestiges at the 
philosophical and methodological level, Whewell had no positive need to disprove 
the developmental hypothesis. Rather, he criticized the hypothesis as the result 
of poor method, a criticism that connoted a moral judgment against its author 
and suggested a lack of character and education. Whewell’s History and 
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Philosophy of science contained an ambush waiting for Vestiges, an ambush that 
was quickly sprung as Indications of the Creator.45 
It should be clear, however, that Whewell’s Indications epitomized the 
“learned” philosophy that was ridiculed in later editions of Vestiges as wavering 
between a commitment, on one hand, to primordial dispositions of matter and a 
commitment, on the other hand, to a supernatural and intentional agency strictly 
resembling that of a human being in the management of daily affairs. Nor did 
the author of Vestiges wait for subsequent editions to attack Whewell on these 
and other grounds, but initiated his response with the publication in 1846 of 
Explanations: a sequel to “Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.” 
Perceptively, Explanations targeted the palætiological sciences as both the 
crucial and weak link in Whewell’s philosophy and raised the difficult question 
whether Whewell, in the interests of sheltering a religious and political 
establishment from ideas that were found threatening, was reserving science to 
the domain of highly specialized and formally educated professionals.46 
 
Baden Powell 
Advocates for Vestiges and Explanations within the Anglican establishment 
were not easy to find, but a prominent one was Baden Powell, whom we have 
already met in Chapter Two, the Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford and, 
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like Whewell, a philosopher of science and a natural theologian. Powell’s 
extended discussion of science, philosophy, and natural theology, The Unity of 
Worlds and of Nature, contained a running commentary upon Whewell’s 
conception of scientific induction and its relation to natural theology and design 
argument.47 Despite their mutual commitments to established Anglicanism, 
science, and natural theology, Powell and Whewell opposed one another upon 
basic points. For example, Whewell’s inductive philosophy placed its emphases 
upon protecting scientific inquiry from a presumption of the uniformity of nature, 
assuring that each branch of natural philosophy worked upon the distinct 
explanatory principles that were indispensable to its success. Powell, however, 
found that the “Principle of uniformity throughout nature [is] the essence of all 
induction” and that the inductive sciences all strove toward unity through the 
discovery of ever more general laws of nature as an expression and confirmation 
of nature’s presumably absolute uniformity.48 
Although Powell did not advocate the developmental hypothesis of 
Vestiges conclusively, he did accept it as suitably scientific theory which, if 
demonstrated, would conform to his understanding of science, natural 
uniformity, and natural theology. In his view, it was not only that there was 
nothing unphilosophical about postulating inherent properties of matter that 
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might generate life under predetermined physical conditions, as Vestiges had 
suggested. Powell also held that the developmental scheme would be more 
consistent with the principles of science than would the presumption of causal 
discontinuity. Criticizing Whewell implicitly, Powell wrote that “the sciences of 
organization and life … are sometimes supposed [exceptional] … to the general 
unity of the sciences … and not only that we cannot explain [their ultimate 
causes] on any merely physical principles, but that we ought not to attempt to 
do so: … [however,] the inductive philosopher would simply seek … [the] 
determinate order which undoubtedly in reality pervades them….”49 
Having premised his philosophy of science upon the uniformity of physical 
causes and the unity of the sciences, Powell could not then embrace a 
superintendential natural theology. He distinguished design arguments that were 
premised upon intention from those that were premised upon order, arguing 
that, although nature displayed orderliness everywhere, any supposed purpose 
to this order was much less evident.50 The clearest evidence of intentional or 
purposeful design in nature was restricted to biological morphology, and even 
there, many features of organic form were without any evident purpose. Indeed, 
at the time Powell was writing in the 1850s, advanced morphological science was 
drawing ideal or strictly formal relationships between biological individuals, 
species, and genera, rather than explaining the apparently intentional adaptation 
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of special biological forms to their conditions of existence. Morphological science, 
in other words, was using concepts of orderly form, not intentional adaptation. 
Powell argued that order, and not only intention, was a characteristic of 
intelligent design. 
Having premised his natural theology upon order rather than intention, it 
was obvious to Powell that positing discontinuity in the physical causes of natural 
history would be an impediment to his argument. This was the fundamental 
point of Powell’s disagreement, not only with Whewell, but with quite nearly all 
of what passed for natural theology in Britain at the time. The superintendential 
argument required causal discontinuity in natural history as a feature that 
afforded an intentional and precluded an inherently physical and uniform 
explanation for the historical development of the earth. It must be remembered, 
however, that what was at stake in superintendential argument was not the 
arbitrary interruption of the natural order by God. Rather, at stake was the 
intentional direction of natural forces toward ends that were nature’s intended 
order but to which the physical forces of nature were inadequate without 
supervision. 
It is sometimes supposed that the distinction of order from intention 
brings clarity to different kinds of design arguments.51 However, in considering 
the case of Powell and superintendential natural theology, at least, this was only 
partly the case. Intentions are, of course, an ideal form of order; and ordered 
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physical states may be the result of intention, even if there was no intention 
further than the achievement of order. As we have seen, the general and 
comprehensive orderliness of nature were affirmed by Whewell and was an 
essential part of his superintendential design argument. Powell’s conception of 
orderliness, on the other hand, may be characterized as a denial of 
superintendence:  it denied the plausibility of appeals to supernatural 
contraventions of nature’s presumably absolute physical uniformity. 
Because science was soon to reject superintendential explanations, it is 
easy for historians to give exaggerated weight to Powell’s ideas. The denial of 
superintendence in natural history, however, is not as philosophically 
straightforward as it may seem. Although it must be allowed in philosophical 
discussion that, as one commentator has said, “It is not easy to see how some 
laws might be suspended in an arbitrary way and the universe remain 
intelligible,”52 the basic superintendential claim is that intervention is not 
arbitrary but conforms to an ideal plan or preconception. It may be noted, in 
addition, that chaos and unintelligibility cannot be superintended. A preexistent 
and a subsequently reliable order are always premised by a superintendential 
argument whether or not there is reference to purpose or utility. 
The fundamental difference between Whewell and Powell, therefore, was 
not perfectly clarified by the distinction of intention from order. Whewell 
premised his understanding of the natural order upon the idea of theological 
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superintendence. Consequently, he denied that the discontinuities he postulated 
in natural history were an impediment to an understanding of the order of 
nature. Directed discontinuity was, rather, characteristic of the kind of order 
always exhibited by nature – even though discontinuity was, at the same time, 
“miraculous” by its exception to the inherent order of physical causes.53 Powell, 
however, characterized orderliness as a continuously operative physical process 
without need of superintendence. Consequently, Powell thought that the kind of 
discontinuity postulated by Whewell was antagonistic to the order of nature and 
an impediment to the advancement of science. Although Powell’s view may seem 
more scientific today, this was not clarity in his thought but confusion when 
considered as an argument in nineteenth-century natural theology. 
The idea of uniform physical processes in continuous operation is 
(perhaps) synonymous with science today. It was not yet so in the 1850s, 
however, and had nature clearly exhibited the kind of order envisioned by 
Whewell, the physical sciences would have had to comply. No one of significance 
in the 1840s and 1850s was arguing that physical science must comply with 
theological dictum and cede the reality of miracles, and few were arguing that 
nature in all its aspects served obvious purposes. Rather, there was 
disagreement over whether the order exhibited by nature was characteristic of 
theological superintendence or of uniform physical causality. Nor was it the case 
that Powell, in distinguishing order from intention, had freed his natural theology 
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from all understanding of purpose. He had not. Powell still believed that the 
natural order was beneficent and ended properly in human being; he was 
denying only that nature’s mechanisms had been historically superintended to 
that end.54 
 
Superintendence, natural theology, and science in response to Vestiges 
Whewell recognized that these problems remained philosophical until 
science could advance its understanding of natural history, and he recommended 
that the best response to Vestiges was to criticize its methods and hasty 
generalizations and to get on with surer induction, not to attempt a disproof 
upon the basis of existing science. Perhaps his advice was easier for a 
philosopher of science to give than for a “scientist” (Whewell had coined the 
term, and, although it did not catch on until the 1890s, we may use it here as his 
own55) to follow, but in any case, it is remarkable that two practicing geologists 
who were also natural theologians, Sedgwick and Miller, wrote lengthy replies to 
Vestiges that attempted to reach theological conclusions by detailed scientific 
argument. Similarly, each new edition of Vestiges was used by its author to 
incorporate better scientific arguments in its favor, even as the book’s thesis was 
being restated in theological terms as a retort to its religious critics. 
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Through the responses to Vestiges, the relation of natural theology to the 
natural sciences would be significantly changed. Sedgwick’s vast preface to the 
fifth edition of A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge and 
Miller’s more famous Footprints of the Creator, as well as Powell’s The Unity of 
Worlds and of Nature, were among the last works of natural theology to stem 
from the social and religious issues that had generated an audience for natural 
theology in the 1820s and 1830s.56 Those issues had included promoting science 
within Anglican theology and institutions, especially at the universities, and 
extending scientific knowledge to interested, literate members of the working 
classes and the broader public. This had meant conflating discussions of science 
that were intended for a general readership with briefer theological adductions or 
allusions. There was no great need at the time to prepare a technical design 
argument out of the details of natural science.57 
After 1845, however – due largely to efforts to refute Vestiges – natural 
theology became increasingly detailed, sustained, and expert in its scientific 
discussion. Indeed, natural theology became a means of placing scientific 
reputations on the line. At the same time, and very remarkably, an emergent 
professionalism in science was discouraging institutional connections and explicit 
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references to theology and religion.58 In an effort to meet the challenges of 
Vestiges, natural theologians were subjecting their readers to the demands of 
increasingly technical, non-theological, and professional sciences. This change 
was potentially determinative of the theological status of design arguments: 
because natural theology became more expertly scientific, therefore it became 
less recognizably religious, although this tendency ran directly counter to the 
desire of many natural theologians to provide religion with a scientific basis. 
Sedgwick’s Discourse was first given as a sermon in 1832 to the members 
of Trinity College, Cambridge – Whewell’s college, too – and, interestingly, 
Sedgwick had then affirmed that the possible material development of the solar 
system out of nebulous matter would constitute an argument for design “by 
making every material power, manifested since the creation of matter, to have 
emanated from God’s bosom by a single act of omnipotent prescience.” Designed 
development allowed for the possibility that, when it came to the formation of 
the planets, material development may “be thought more in conformity with 
what we see of the modes of material action” than would either the immediate 
exertion of God’s will upon matter or “an act of creative interference … [to 
impress upon matter] at successive epochs … new powers [that] may have 
brought about the next system of material conditions.” The creative addition of 
new powers of nature was Whewell’s view, of course, and Sedgwick noted that 
“This [last] hypothesis (though perhaps less philosophical than either of the 
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other two) is supported by the analogy of the repeated changes of organic 
species … each of which can be regarded only as a positive creative 
interference.” Like Whewell, Sedgwick referred the creation of living organisms 
to material developments and “countless superadded powers, bound up with life 
and volition.”59 
It has been thought that the “special creation” of biological species was 
the last line of defense for the idea of divine creation in its long opposition to 
material development.60 Reading Sedgwick and Whewell clearly indicates, 
however, that this was not the case. It is not true that Whewell and Sedgwick 
had been pressed to almost granting the truth of the uniformity of nature and 
had only special creation to rely upon for their theological argument. In fact, 
they hotly disputed uniformity upon geological as well as paleontological 
grounds. Nonetheless, cosmology and geology were far from well enough 
understood to afford definitive explanations, and, in this instance, the biological 
sciences were regarded as analogical guides to the physical sciences. This was 
especially important at a time when analogical reasoning and scientific method 
were closely associated. Divine intervention seemed necessary to the creation of 
species due to the paleontological evidence for repeated special creations in 
natural history, as well as the apparently intentional adaptation of each created 
species to changing terrestrial conditions caused by a cooling earth. Special 
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creation, therefore, in its relative certainty, provided analogical legitimacy to 
theories of theological superintendence in other branches of natural philosophy. 
Not the last, but all of the physical sciences were implicated in the debate over 
special creation.61 
At stake for the theological superintendentialists was not merely the 
evidence for special creation, but the proper direction of analogical reasoning. 
Vestiges began its argument with a review of the nebular hypothesis of the 
earth’s origin and used principles of material development and uniformity that 
seemed applicable there as the basis for a reasonable analogy to the material 
development of life, species, and, ultimately, human consciousness.62 It was 
Vestiges’ particular charge, as quoted above, that the superintendentialists 
changed from reasoning upon material principles in physical cosmology and 
geology to theological principles in biology. Although the reasoning in Vestiges 
started with the origins of the earth and was temporally sequential, it was not 
soundly analogical. Much more certainty or, at least, more empirical knowledge 
to serve inductive reasoning was available to biology and paleontology than to 
cosmology and geology; and, therefore, the appropriate place to begin an 
analogical argument that would work across the biological and physical sciences 
(or, in Whewell’s case, within the palætiological sciences) was in biology, 
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working toward physics. That, at least, was the inference as pursued by 
Sedgwick and Whewell. 
When Sedgwick argued, then, over singular biological and paleontological 
examples to prove that species in general had not followed one from another by 
progressive material development, it was not because instances of special 
creation were becoming increasingly hard to find in the fossil record, but because 
particular instantiation was an aspect of his larger analogical argument. Again, 
when he went into exhaustive scientific detail to pursue a theological point, it 
was not because Vestiges had made his science more difficult to defend, but 
because doubt about the grounds for analogical reasoning in the physical 
sciences could only be removed by providing relatively indubitable examples 
from biology and paleontology. Sedgwick had to match the level of scientific 
description achieved by Vestiges. The natural theology of his generation had not 
begun with the need to provide a detailed design argument, but had been 
brought to it.63 
The importance of the sciences was increased by Sedgwick’s insistence 
that natural theology was necessary to the support of Christian revelation. As we 
saw in Chapter Two, natural theologians in the 1820s and 1830s had been very 
concerned to secure the status of natural theology and science within Anglican 
thought and institutions by designating it the necessary basis for the acceptance 
of revelation, and it was this claim, rather than doubts about the scientific 
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evidence for design, that had ensured natural theology a controversial response 
from religious traditionalists.64 Indeed, Sedgwick’s Discourse as originally written 
in 1832 may be characterized as a proclamation of natural theology as the new, 
indispensable basis for an Anglican university education. In 1849, Sedgwick was 
disinclined to change his view. He quoted J. S. Mill – “natural religion is the 
necessary basis of revealed … [and] a school which … denies to mankind the 
right to judge religious doctrine, and bids them depend on miracles as their sole 
guide; must, in the present state of the human mind, fail in its attempt to put 
itself at the head of the religious feelings and convictions of this country” – in 
order to say that “I agree with [Mill’s] conclusion….” However, Sedgwick did find 
it necessary to add that natural religion was a logical but not historical necessity 
to the support of revelation, and he requested an allowance for miracles that 
were made in testament of a moral revelation.65 
Sedgwick made no attempt to deny that the “creative additions” to natural 
history that his science discovered, and the consequent natural theology of 
historical superintendence, were a preparation for the acceptance of religious 
miracle. Nonetheless, it was not merely a linguistic trick to employ words like 
“creative interferences” or “special creations” rather than “miracles” when 
referring to science. Nominally, at least, a special creation could still be studied 
scientifically for the discovery of the mode or method of creation, rather than 
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putting a stop to investigation in attestation to a miracle. Indeed, the author of 
Vestiges had claimed to be doing just that, and it was the justness of such a 
claim that forced the superintendentialists into scientific response. Further, even 
if science had nothing more to do than to acknowledge an act of creative 
interference, it remained a theological and not a scientific task to attribute this 
interference to God.66 
These were not merely semantic distinctions. They adjudicated important 
disciplinary boundaries, not only between science and theology, but between 
natural theology, science, and revelation. Miracles concerned revelation. Natural 
theology dealt with “miracles” of a sort; or, it might be better said, with 
supernatural, superintendential causes; but these fell within the bounds of 
human knowledge of the natural order. They were evidence for the theological 
superintendence of natural history and were, therefore, part of a design 
argument, not a matter of faith. The importance of maintaining these distinctions 
can be seen by contrasting Sedgwick’s semantics with the science and natural 
theology of his younger contemporary, Hugh Miller, who earnestly obliterated the 
distinction between creative interferences and miracles, as well as the 
distinctions between science, natural theology, and revealed religion, in his 
Footprints of the Creator.67 
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Although Miller’s Footprints is usually classified as a work of natural 
theology in line with those of Buckland, Sedgwick, and Whewell, this is extremely 
misleading. As a young man, Miller had self-consciously rejected a university 
education in favor of a becoming a stonemason. He was self-consciously 
Scottish, not English; Free Church, not Anglican; and an author of newspaper 
articles and popular books, not philosophical papers. Although Miller shared with 
the others a commitment to superintendential natural theology, to confuse this 
simple fact with a more general identity is to lose sight of crucial distinctions in 
social context.68 
Much natural theology in the first half of the nineteenth century had 
existed with reference to the integration of science into Anglican educational, 
political, religious, and social institutions.69 Adjudicating the boundaries between 
science, natural theology, and theology was critical to this task because it 
determined the boundaries of several intellectual disciplines and spared some of 
the antagonism that could exist between people favoring and opposing science in 
religion. For example, when R. W. Church, historian and Tractarian sympathizer, 
admonished in a review of Explanations that “The Vestiges reminds us, if proof 
were required, of the vanity of those boasts which great men used to make, that 
science naturally led on to religion,” it was their idea – the idea of the scientific 
Anglicans – not his idea – Church had never thought that science led to religion 
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– that was dismissed.70 In many ways, Vestiges served Church’s purposes, 
because it rendered natural theology problematical and highlighted the 
advantages of keeping science and religion separate. Although Sedgwick was a 
scientific Anglican, his differentiations between science, natural theology, and 
revealed theology approximated to the separation of science from religion that 
was called for by Church and others, helping to diffuse tensions at the 
universities. 
Miller, however, wrote as if the whole Christian religion – the religion, at 
least, of all who believed in the immortality of the human soul and the original 
fall of humanity from grace into sin – were contradicted by Vestiges. In his view, 
the developmental hypothesis “would fain transfer the work of creation from the 
department of miracle to the province of law, and would strike down … all the 
old landmarks, ethical and religious.”71 It was incompatible with the belief, “most 
fundamentally essential to the revealed scheme of salvation,” that humanity had 
been created morally upright and fallen “from this high and fair beginning.”72 The 
developmental hypothesis must mean, also, that either the “vitalities” of fishes, 
reptiles, birds, and beasts “are individually and inherently immortal … or … 
human souls are not so.”73 He thought it inconsistent with the character of the 
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evangelical churches to “slight or overlook a form of error at once exceedingly 
plausible and consummately dangerous.”74 Powell, for one, was appalled that 
such “strenuous” claims, which were “a popular topic with a certain class of 
writers,” had become “the main object” of Miller’s “polemical spirit and avowed 
theological bias” in Footprints.75 
Theological bias – for such it was – appeared in Miller’s science, as well, 
when he stood the theory of progressive material development on its head and 
proposed the original creation of the higher members of organic classes and a 
subsequent “progress of degradation” to account for the later appearance of 
species that were lower in the scale.76 Although Miller made no attempt to 
explain the mechanics of creation and degradation, the process, if it were true to 
the historical record, had the happy coincidence of disproving the developmental 
hypothesis and prefiguring the history of man’s creation and fall, all at once. This 
sort of mixing of science and revelation had not been a part of academic natural 
theology since the recantation of geological diluvialism twenty or thirty years 
earlier.77 
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If the differences in style between Miller and the Anglican natural 
theologians of this study are not respected, then much of the pathos of 
nineteenth-century natural theology is lost to view. While Miller’s writing was 
more popular and conveyed a sense of openly confronting difficulties that the 
Anglicans were hedging upon, there were also important differences in the 
relations that it presumed between religion, science, and natural theology. 
Miller’s rejection of professional and academic interdisciplinary distinctions left 
him with the expectation of being proved right or wrong simultaneously in 
science and religion, as well as being decidedly religious in his approach to 
science. The expectations of Sedgwick, Whewell, and Powell, however, were less 
straightforward. Their commitments to science, natural theology, and religion 
were separable and relative, not identical; and consequently there is greater 
doubt in telling how their commitments to science may have affected their 
theology. 
In the case of Powell’s defense of Vestiges, for example, many thought he 
had gone too far when he suggested that designed and uniform material 
development was a better, more scientific argument for natural theology than 
were theological interventions and creative additions into natural history. 
Sedgwick may have thought that Powell’s view, although proposed as a theistic 
proof, was tantamount to atheism because Powell’s natural theology was not 
superintendential, and Sedgwick had already asked of material development (in 
relation to Vestiges) the fundamental question, “who can utter any prayer 
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against events chained together in the unvarying sequence of material 
causes?”78 Perhaps that was a less rhetorical question than Sedgwick believed. 
After all, Powell retained his belief in miracles, although he restricted them to 
miracles of moral importance.79 No one doubted, however, that the differences 
among these natural theologians had become an exercise in the interpretation of 
intractable details in science. 
 
Huxley’s review of Vestiges: natural theology and professional science 
Although, as indicated earlier, Huxley began his review of Vestiges by 
misconstruing its “fundamental proposition” into the unphilosophical belief that 
natural laws were an “entity,” he did acknowledge later in the review that 
Vestiges raised a matter not “unworthy of serious attention” when it “mixed up 
and confounded … the totally independent idea, which took place in far other 
heads – that the past may be interpreted by the present; and that the succession 
of phenomena in past times, took place in a manner analogous to that which 
occurs at the present day.” This was a reference to Lyell’s uniformitarianism, 
hotly disputed by the interferences and creative additions into natural history 
advocated by Sedgwick and Whewell. Tellingly, Huxley did not mention the 
controversy over the uniformitarian premise, but accepted uniformitarian analogy 
as “the base of the modern science of history, whether natural or civil….” 
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Implicitly, Huxley was denying that Whewell’s palætiology was scientific. Huxley 
was no longer concerned with whether or not science must accept the uniformity 
of nature, but only with whether or not the presumed uniformity of nature 
“diminishes the ‘region of marvel’” by attributing all natural phenomena to the 
laws of nature.80 
As our study to this point has indicated, Huxley’s answer to this question 
had to cover a lot of ground. It did so in a way that not only ignored the 
scientific defense of theological superintendence, but reduced it to theological 
insignificance. Huxley’s own words best state his case:  
If with Sir Charles Lyell we affirm that the physical forces at 
present at work are sufficient to account for the changes 
undergone by the earth’s surface in past ages, we do not render 
those changes either more or less wonderful than they were before 
– nor do we in any way account for them – we merely state them 
in a readily conceivable form. 
So, if with the Progressionists, we conceive that species of 
living beings undergo transmutation at the present day; that this 
transmutation is from a lower to a higher type; and that all kinds of 
living beings which have ever existed upon the earth’s surface, 
have originated in this way; the idea is a perfectly legitimate one, 
and must be admitted or rejected according to the evidence 
attainable; but if fully proved, it would not be, in any intelligible 
sense, an explanation of creation; such “creation in the manner of 
natural law,” would, in fact, simply be an orderly miracle. 
…the demonstration of the analogy of two sets of 
phenomena, each of which is marvellous, does not … diminish the 
marvellousness of either. The production of Goethe and Schiller by 
German civilization is analogous to that of Shakespeare and Milton 
by English civilization; but we do not perceive that … either case is 
thereby rendered less wonderful or in any way explained. 
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Whether true or false, then, the scientific basis of the 
“Vestiges” cannot bear out its speculative conclusions; for the 
progression theory, if true, would be no explanation of creation.81 
 
In this passage, Huxley has simply elided the contention of the theological 
superintendentialists that there cannot be an “orderly miracle,” in any 
theologically significant sense, if the “order” in question is an unbroken 
succession of physical forces and lawful events. The difference can be brought 
out sharply by juxtaposing the citation of Huxley with another from Sedgwick: 
Activity is the very essence of intellectual power. We cannot 
comprehend it as quiescent. In one view we see the great 
animating First Cause in the laws impressed by Him on the vast 
bodies of the visible universe. In another view we see Him in 
positive acts of creative power shewn in the organs of successive 
animated beings brought into life during long successive periods. 
…we can by our feeble ken discern … the successive times when 
many successive material organic laws began…. 
 
 …[Vestiges has stated, contrastingly,] in language 
that I cannot read without feelings of loathing and deep aversion 
(for it is irrational, ignorant, and profane) that God is not a present 
living providential governor of the world of nature….82 
 
The difference between what Huxley and Sedgwick conclude about the 
theological significance of Vestiges, if material progression were true, is 
attributable to the fact that Sedgwick contended for proof of God’s intelligence 
through the active superintendence of natural history, and not in only the 
physical order of nature. It was facile of Huxley to reduce that contention to a 
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clarification of whether nature’s laws were actual entities or generalized 
conceptions. 
These points are of more than theological significance. Sedgwick was 
maintaining that the possibility of a physical uniformity to the order of nature 
was disprovable by physical evidence taken from the sciences of natural history 
that pointed to the materially unprovoked creation of new phenomena and the 
appearance of new laws and orders of nature. Huxley, on the other hand, 
understood such historical discontinuity to be a violation of the basic premise of 
the historical and natural sciences. This was coupled with the assertion that 
uniformity was no less “marvellous” than discontinuity. At one stroke, by his 
review of Vestiges, Huxley had dismissed Sedgwick’s views from the realm of the 
scientific and rendered them theologically insignificant. A clearer instance of the 
marginalization of superintendential natural theology by new interests in science, 
and of the divestiture of natural theology’s religious significance, would be 
difficult to find, despite the fact that Huxley went out of his way to make this 
marginalization seem religiously appealing. 
The transference of authority in science from Anglican natural theologians 
like Sedgwick to lay professionals like Huxley was far from a fait accompli, 
however, in 1854, and Huxley’s dismissal of theological superintendence was not 
without risk. Undoubtedly, that was why Huxley ignored the superintendential 
controversy in his review of Vestiges. He could hardly count on Sedgwick not to 
notice, however, and Huxley addressed that difficulty in the last pages of his 
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review by affirming Sedgwick’s scientific reputation against that of the 
anonymous, but professedly amateur, Vestiginarian. “The author of ‘Vestiges,’” 
wrote Huxley, “… complains bitterly of the [unphilosophical] tone adopted by … 
Professor Sedgwick. The handling of the Woodwardian Professor may have been 
a little more rough than should beseem a Cambridge Don: but to a thorough, an 
earnest, and above all, a genial man, who has made truth the search of his life, 
and knows the difficulties of the road and the stern practical discipline required 
for success – to such a man … there is a source of wrath, such as the author of 
the ‘Vestiges’ is obviously quite unable to understand … who would have been an 
astronomer – but for sitting up at night; a geologist – but for soiling his fingers; 
… [and who attempts] to divide the spoil he was incompetent to win….”83 Huxley 
was not only gratifying Sedgwick with this passage (and libeling a hardworking 
professional journalist), but was also converting Sedgwick’s theological loathing 
of Vestiges into the wrath of a fellow professional in science.  
At this stage of the game Huxley was evidently willing to share the spoils 
of science with clerical dons. The first division he had proposed between religion 
and science was not between clerical and lay professionals, nor was it between 
ecclesiastical defenders and honest critics of religious truth. Those distinctions 
would come later and were more blatant. Huxley’s first target was more subtle 
and more subtly attacked:  there was to be no reference within professional 
science to the natural theology of historical superintendence, and Huxley 
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attempted to flatter the scientific superintendentialists into passing this 
admission. Remarkably, it was at this time that natural theologians, in response 
to Vestiges, were becoming increasingly bound to the language and demands of 
Huxley’s new professionalism. Huxley’s sly elision of natural theology was in 
sharp contrast to the expressed challenge to superintendence that had been at 
the heart of the sensational argument of Vestiges. 
Historians have not always appreciated that Huxley gave at least limited 
and implicit expression to his views on natural theology before he was 
acquainted with Darwin’s theory. By 1854, as this chapter has shown, Huxley 
was sufficiently expert in the jargon of natural theology to effectively 
misrepresent its theological importance and its considerable basis in science and, 
at the same time, mask this misrepresentation from all but the most 
philosophically expert audience. Moreover, the basis for Huxley’s 
misrepresentation was a determined ignorance, rather than an evidential 
disproof, of the scientific argument in favor of the theological superintendence of 
natural history. 
  129
CHAPTER IV: 
 
HUXLEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY, AND PROFESSIONAL SCIENCE PRIOR TO THE 
PUBLICATION OF ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
 
 
 
Thomas Henry Huxley 
 
Chapters Two and Three studied the scientific and religious status of 
natural theology in Britain as Huxley, a prototypically positivistic and 
professionalizing “man of science” in Britain, would have found it early in his 
scientific career, before he was acquainted with Darwin’s views. That study is 
now complete except for a mention of the “ideal” or “archetypal” form of natural 
theology that was most nearly related to Huxley’s own scientific practices and 
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theories.1 Chapter Two determined that the proliferation of British natural 
theology in the 1820s and -30s was partly impelled by efforts to liberalize the 
Anglican establishment by making theology more scientific and less textual. The 
association of liberal Anglicanism with science and superintendential natural 
theology was noted; and the widely accepted view of natural theology as a 
reconciliation of science to religion was tempered by noting that natural theology 
often represented not merely reconciliation but the identification of theology and 
science, as well. By the end of the 1830s, natural theology stood publicly for 
science and liberalism in religion. It was controversial upon religious and political 
rather than scientific grounds. 
Chapter Three noted that Robert Chambers’ Vestiges publicized a natural 
theology of designed development that questioned the scientific validity of 
superintendence. Attempts to refute Vestiges introduced disputed and technical 
points of science into design argument, abstracting natural theology from the 
public and religious discourse that had provided its earlier context. At the same 
time, an emergent professionalism was furthering the distinction of science from 
religion. Rather than becoming less plausibly and professionally related to 
science in the 1820s, -30s, and -40s, as is often assumed, natural theology by 
the 1850s was embedded within the most intractable problems of science, and, 
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although it retained its theological relevance, its arguments were increasingly 
associated with scientific debates and with the philosophy and history of science. 
Huxley’s professional reputation was being forged at this time, and his 
initial public response was to elide natural theology’s scientific importance and 
recommend its religious inconsequence. His concern was to spare science from 
theological implication – especially, from superintendential implication – and this, 
remarkably, had as much in common with the defenders of traditional, textual 
religion as with the liberal and scientific Anglicans who were Huxley’s 
professional colleagues. Natural theology placed Huxley in a bind: it promoted 
science but only within the context of the Anglican political and social network 
whose constraints were keenly felt by a scarcely middle class, self-made 
professional aspirant. Huxley wanted his science unfettered by religion, and 
natural theology stood in the way of his desire. 
Our next step, undertaken in Chapters Four and Five, is to examine the 
difference made by Darwin in Huxley’s reckoning with natural theology. Sherrie 
L. Lyons has argued that Huxley’s support of Darwin was part of a larger 
preference for naturalism, and a corresponding rejection of natural theology, that 
played a constructive role in Huxley’s scientific thinking. From among viable 
scientific views, Huxley selected those that were least implicative of theology.2 
Lyons’s thesis has placed Huxley’s practical science under the sway of the 
philosophical naturalism and personal anti-clericalism that often have been noted 
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as the source for his extra- or meta-scientific thought. Huxley’s science, in other 
words, was largely, practically, and from the beginning concerned with 
advancing ideas in science that limited or excluded appeal to natural theology. 
Given Huxley’s professional bind in science and religion, it is not surprising that 
this should be so. 
However, although it is correctly noted that Huxley’s negative attitude 
toward natural theology was practically constructive of his science, nonetheless, 
Lyons has gone too far in suggesting that Huxley was philosophically opposed to 
natural theology. In fact, Huxley stated that he never had been philosophically 
opposed to naturalistic arguments for the existence of God, so long as there was 
scientific evidence in support of the argument.3 Further, when Huxley expressed 
his opinion that there was no evidence of that kind, his claim was generally 
restricted to the natural theology of superintendence, which pretended to find 
scientific support for directed discontinuity (or, to phrase it less favorably to a 
scientific appeal, for supernatural interposition) in natural history. 
Huxley rejected superintendence upon the grounds of its appeal to a 
supernatural cause. However, as we shall see, Huxley’s later understanding of 
evolution not only tolerated but was premised upon the possibility that the 
natural order had developed gradually and along a materially predetermined 
course. This view was amenable to a non-superintendential design argument. 
Additionally, Huxley’s conceptions of empiricism and scientific proof allowed or 
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even required him to debate with the superintendentialists when they argued 
upon empirical grounds.4 These basic ties to design argument conflicted with 
Huxley’s intention of freeing science from theological implication and allowed for 
the difference that Darwin would make in Huxley’s views. 
Darwin would provide Huxley with an empirical and scientific, and not 
merely a practical and personal basis for rejecting the natural theology of 
superintendence. (Darwin’s theory made it possible to dispute designed 
development no less, but Huxley was insufficiently adherent to his friend’s 
hypothesis to follow it to that conclusion.) Further, Darwin provided Huxley with 
a nearly unassailable example of scientific objectivity in matters of natural 
theological but not explicitly religious importance.5 Nonetheless, the argument of 
Origin of Species was deeply indebted to British natural theology, and Darwin’s 
hypothesis explicitly competed with utilitarian design argument and the claims of 
special creation in attempting to correctly interpret the evidence or “facts” of 
natural history.6 Although Huxley’s earlier predilection had been to spare science 
from all theological implication, continuing in that way would be impossible if 
Huxley were to defend Darwin’s science from attack or misrepresentation. 
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How and why did Huxley relate Darwin and evolution to religion? All that 
can be safely said at the outset is that he did so controversially. Older ideas of 
Huxley as a champion of objective truth against religious obfuscation have been 
falsified by recent scholarship in so many ways that it becomes tedious to 
enumerate them. It is no longer credible to claim that Huxley acted purely in the 
interests of truth, science, and Darwin.7 Historians have demonstrated that 
Huxley’s personal interest in the monetary, political, and social fortunes of 
scientific professionalism ran counter to many of the monetary, political, and 
social interests that had been traditionally reserved to the clergy.8 It has been 
argued that Huxley’s agnosticism and scientific naturalism were useful in a war of 
words against the clergy but failed to provide an epistemological basis for 
science that was proof against the criticisms he leveled at religion.9 Moreover, it 
has been maintained that evolution was as much a “religion” to men like Huxley 
as was Christianity to its adherents. Rather than presenting us with anything as 
simple as an evidential controversy or even a professional rivalry between 
science and religion, the Victorian debates may have been a conflict of 
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worldviews with fundamentally different understandings of what science and 
religion were.10 
Although Chapters Four and Five study Huxley, evolution, and religious 
controversy within this larger historiographical context, they focus narrowly upon 
the significance of natural theology for Huxley’s thought, leaving open the 
question of how that may be related to the broader concerns of science and 
religion. They accept natural theology as Huxley found it: a problem of more 
scientific moment than he would admit and with political and social implications 
that chafed. Moreover, although “science” was at this time a very broad category 
with moral as well as physical significance, my chapters are concerned only with 
ideas in the evolution of species as Huxley considered them with reference to 
biological science and theological controversy. 
My thesis now, to be sustained over the course of Chapters Four and Five, 
is that the publication of Origin of Species brought Huxley into the existing tide 
of natural theological debate rather than opposing him to it. There is 
considerable evidence prima facie against this thesis. There is, for example, 
Huxley’s famous charge that he would be less ashamed of descent from an ape 
than from a natural theologian.11 Nonetheless, the remarkable fact is that 
                                        
10 Ruse, Evolution-Creation, op. cit.  (Ch I, note 15), especially at pp. 89-96. 
 
11 Although Huxley’s retort to Bishop Samuel Wilberforce is generally remembered as confronting 
a clergyman, the immediate context was Wilberforce’s defense of natural theology and critique of 
Darwin’s ideas at the 1860 annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science. Many years later, Huxley wrote that he had preferred an ancestral ape to “a man … 
[who would] distract the attention of his hearers from the real point at issue by … skilled appeals 
to religious prejudice.” Thomas Henry Huxley, ed. Leonard Huxley, Life and Letters of T. H. 
Huxley, two volumes (New York : D. Appleton & Co., 1990), i, p. 199. 
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Huxley, upon acquaintance with Darwin’s views, changed from the public 
dissociation of science and religion that was evident in his 1854 review of 
Vestiges, to a public insistence that science and religion were “twin sisters 
[whose] … separation is sure to prove the death of both,” and that “[i]t is the 
duty of the general public to await the results [of science] in patience” in 
determining Darwin’s general significance.12 Although it would be easy to 
interpret this as honing Darwin against religion – a view for which, again, there is 
considerable evidence prima facie – a close examination of Huxley’s 
morphological science, his interpretation of the natural philosophies upon which 
his morphology was built, his early acceptance and defense of Darwinism, and 
the significance of all of this for religious and natural theological debate will 
demonstrate that Huxley’s defense of Darwin was consistent with pre-Darwinian 
tendencies in natural theology. Moreover, Huxley’s defense of Darwin caused 
him, for the first time, to admit and attempt to delimit the role of natural 
theology within science. Although Darwin provided Huxley with a weapon against 
the most overtly religious aspects of natural theology – such as special creation – 
that weapon was not used to attack the scientific status of design arguments 
wholesale but to acknowledge, redefine, and preserve the integrity of past and 
continuing scientific debates that were of natural theological moment. Stated 
simply: Huxley needed to admit natural theology (or design argument) as a 
matter of science in order to explicate and defend “the Darwinian hypothesis.” 
                                        
12 T. H. Huxley, “Science and Religion,” The Builder 17 (1859): 35; “Time and Life: Mr. Darwin’s 
‘Origin of Species’,” Macmillan’s Magazine 1 (1859): 148. 
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He was willing to do so because religious controversy over special creation and 
evolution were making it untenable that natural theology would any longer 
provide the basis for an Anglican or religious comprehension of the institutions 
and ideas of science. Carefully controlled, the scientific ideas of natural theology 
(its design arguments) could be used to distinguish between natural theology’s 
significance for science and for religion, and, eventually, to help in the liberation 
of science from the social and institutional constraints of religion. 
Chapter Four will show that Huxley’s scientific views prior to the Origin 
were deeply implicative of natural theology, despite Huxley’s strong and opposite 
determination. This is not a matter of only noting that Huxley’s morphological 
science was closely allied to nineteenth-century German transcendental idealism 
and was, consequently, susceptible to interpretation as a form of design 
argument – a fact that is now widely known.13 Rather, I will attend to Huxley’s 
expert attempts to differentiate science from natural theology through novel 
interpretations of continental natural philosophers such as Cuvier and von Baer. 
Huxley had little success in these attempts to separate science from natural 
theology because of the willingness of other British men of science, such as his 
influential rival Richard Owen, to point out design arguments where Huxley had 
left them hidden. Nonetheless, Huxley’s habit, to be studied here, of drawing 
attention away from design arguments in physical science whenever he could will 
                                        
13 Desmond, op. cit. Di Gregorio, op. cit. Lyons, op. cit. 
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still be noticeably in play when, in his defense of the Origin, he is forced to admit 
the relevance of design arguments to the study of natural history. 
 
Huxley’s early science and its relation to natural theology 
 A largely unrecognized value of Huxley as the subject of a study in science 
and religion is the great variety of ways in which his science was engaged by 
natural theology. Whether design was considered evident in biological science 
because of organic adaptive utility, special creation, the progressive development 
of the earth, the progression of organic species one from another, the laws of 
organic development, or – most importantly for Huxley – the formal relationships 
between different “types” of organisms, Huxley’s science was accountable in 
some way. His later evolutionary views, too, were theologically interesting. He 
was an outspoken critic of transmutation who changed methodically, from 1857 
to 1869, into a professed evolutionist possessing a keen understanding of Darwin 
and, often less apparently, an inclination to non-Darwinian evolutionary theories 
that were more or less amenable to design argument.14 
Although Huxley’s ideas in science placed him at the center of the most 
interesting natural theological debates of his time, his social circumstances were 
more marginal. His financial and professional fortunes were never entirely 
secure. He was never a professional “scientist” because there was no such thing 
in his lifetime. Neither was he a member of a recognized secular profession such 
                                        
14 Di Gregorio, op. cit. pp. 3-128. Lyons, op. cit. pp. 37-85; 189-230; 288-78. 
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as the legal or medical, nor a clerical (ordained) natural philosopher, recipient of 
ecclesiastical patronage, or gentleman of independent means; but he sought, 
successfully, to invent the professional “man of science” out of aspects of 
these.15 Significantly, each existent model for Huxley’s ideal profession was 
capable of definition by its relation to natural law and natural theology, which 
was an important credential within the Anglican establishment and under the 
general tenets of religious meaning that were a presumption of Victorian times. 
Huxley’s professional science was intractably and consequentially related to 
natural theology. His alternating displays of reticence and determination in 
speaking to religion always must be understood in that way. 
Huxley’s pre-Darwinian science was primarily concerned with zoological 
morphology – the examination and explanation of animal form. Largely self-
taught, Huxley had studied Cuvier and the German natural philosopher Karl Ernst 
von Baer to especial profit.16 Significantly, as we saw last chapter, Cuvier’s 
geological studies had been the basis for the theories of the English 
catastrophists and superintendentialists; and in the biological sciences, too, 
Cuvier was known in Britain as a favorite of natural theologians. His 
morphological dictum had been that “form follows function,” which could be 
expounded in utilitarian terms to mean that animal forms had been “designed” to 
meet the “conditions of existence” under which different “types” of animals lived. 
                                        
15 White, op. cit. 
 
16 Di Gregorio, op. cit. pp. 3-35; Lyons, op. cit. pp. 49-90. 
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Cuvier’s functional morphology is often thought to have imitated the views 
of Paley’s Natural Theology, but that is an unfortunate conflation. Paley’s 
utilitarian design argument had explained specific zoological organs, such as the 
human eye, in the same mechanical terms that were applicable to pocket 
watches and telescopes; but Cuvier had explained zoological form in terms of 
general typologies, and it was because he had generalized that Huxley could 
learn from him. For example, in an important and possibly accurate critique of 
Cuvier’s methods, Huxley argued that Cuvier’s proven ability to predict the form 
of an unknown animal from a bone or fossil fragment was not attributable to the 
idea that all typical aspects of animal form were functionally interrelated, as 
Cuvier had claimed, but to the knowledge, gained by Cuvier from practical 
experience, that certain body parts were invariably found in certain types of 
animals and never in others.17 Specific and more general animal types, in other 
words, were not identifiable by a common utilitarian design but by an entirely 
formal typology that could be studied without reference to adaptations and 
conditions of existence. 
Huxley’s reinterpretation dissociated Cuvier’s science from Paley and 
utilitarian natural theology. However, it also illustrated how strands of science 
and theology had been knotted together in Britain in ways that disturbed Huxley 
and have confounded historians ever since, making a fine historical 
understanding of Huxley’s relation to natural theology nearly impossible. For 
                                        
17 Di Gregorio, pp. 15-35. Lyons, pp. 54-8. 
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example:  although it was theologically less innovative than had been Buckland’s 
derivation of a superintendential design argument from Cuvier’s geological 
theories (a topic of Chapters Two and Three), Cuvier’s morphology had provided 
the basis for Buckland’s imaginative recreation of an extinct “ante-diluvial” fauna 
in the celebrated book Reliquiae Diluvianae (1823).18 Buckland’s title, which 
translates as “relics of the flood,” has confused historians into considering it a 
work of catastrophical geology. In fact, it was primarily an extension of Cuvier’s 
morphological premises into problems in paleontology: Buckland studied the 
remains of various animals that presumably had been made extinct by the flood 
and surmised how they had once lived.19 Had Reliquiae supported a natural 
theology, it would have led most expediently, not to geology, catastrophism, and 
superintendence, but to the application of Paley’s utilitarian design argument to 
specific extinct organic forms; and Buckland did in fact write a great deal of 
natural theology that explained specific adaptations to lost environments.20 
Reliquiae, however, was not a natural theology, neither utilitarian nor 
superintendential. Apart from its scientific content, its theological claim was that 
geological and literary evidence coincided in testifying to a recent, global flood. 
Reliquiae was diluvialism, not design argument. It attempted to subordinate 
                                        
18 Buckland, Reliquiae, op. cit. (Ch II, note 7). 
 
19 Rupke, Great Chain, op. cit. (Ch I, note 10), pp. 29-41. 
 
20 Ibid. pp. 231-54. 
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natural philosophy to the educational tradition of classical textual studies through 
a reconciliation of Genesis to geology (see Chapter Two). 
Although Reliquiae’s significance for natural theology was negligible, it has 
served to funnel the unfortunate association of Cuvier with Paley, catastrophism, 
and the Genesis and geology controversy, mixing what were distinct aspects of 
scientific and religious thought. Although historians today still confuse Cuvier, 
Paley, catastrophism, and Genesis and geology, they were distinct in Buckland’s 
mind, and Huxley was able to treat them distinctly as well. Cuvier’s 
morphological interest had been the formal relationships between specific and 
ever more general zoological “types.” That was Huxley’s interest, too, and it 
differed from what Paley had explained by design. Through his reinterpretation 
of Cuvier, Huxley could claim that Paley’s utilitarian design argument, which was 
impressive as an explanation for specific zoological features such as eyes, had 
been of no use in describing other and more general aspects of animal form. 
However, Huxley’s reinterpretation of Cuvier offered no alternative to Paley’s 
utilitarian explanation for the form and function of specific organs; rather, it 
concluded that utilitarian design was unimportant to the study of general 
morphology. Paley was not disproved but made irrelevant to Huxley’s scientific 
project, a turn that is consistent with a practical determination to avoid natural 
theology in science. 
What Huxley thought relevant was the embryological typology of the 
German natural philosopher von Baer. Von Baer had written against the idea that 
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zoological species progressed one from another, from lowest to highest type, like 
a “great chain of being.” Although the progression of type had never received 
much play in Britain (aside from Vestiges), it had been important to the romantic 
natural philosophy of the German idealists that had nurtured von Baer, and it 
had taken encouragement from the observation that the embryos of higher 
animals seemed to progress through stages of development that resembled the 
adult forms of lower animals. This progression suggested an argument for 
natural theology by implying that lower zoological forms had somehow been 
intended to become their next higher type. 
However, von Baer claimed that embryological development was not a 
progression from lower to higher type. Rather, embryos first displayed the most 
general features that were characteristic of their type and gradually acquired 
more specific characters until fully and individually formed. Von Baer described 
this development not as the progression of type but as the divergence of 
features characteristic of specific types from those that were characteristic of 
more general types of animals, “so that the same type may exist in many grades 
of [embryological] development.”21 Determining taxonomic classifications did not 
involve comparing the adult forms of lower types to the embryonic forms of 
higher, but was an abstract comparison of all embryos that displayed similarity of 
form, regardless of the embryo’s degree of development in relation to adults of 
its type. The divergence of human from piscine embryos, for example, took place 
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at a fairly early stage in the development of these two distinct but related 
vertebrate types.22 
On von Baer’s scheme, embryonic development could only be said to 
“progress” toward its adult form; there was no progression of type. Since 
“progress” is a teleological concept that implies an intention, end, or goal, 
denying progression of type undercut a great deal of theological language. It 
could not be said upon the basis of von Baer’s embryological typology, for 
example, that fish were intended to progress into mammals and mammals into 
humans. All that could be said was that humans and fish at one point shared an 
embryological form that was common to vertebrates. Huxley’s acceptance of von 
Baer’s typology separated general morphology from the natural theology of 
typological progression, similarly to the way reinterpreting Cuvier had dissociated 
general morphology from the logic of utilitarian design. 
Nonetheless, as was true of his dismissal of organic utility, Huxley’s case 
against typological progression had limits. In Britain, the ideal “chain of being” 
had been less important to the idea of progress than had the suggestion of God’s 
superintendence of natural history – what Rupke has called “the chain of 
history.”23 As we saw in previous chapters, the superintendentialists proposed 
that God had staged repeated creations and extinctions throughout natural 
history with the ultimate intention of creating a world fit for human habitation. 
                                        
22 Di Gregorio, op. cit. 28-35. Lyons, op. cit. 60-66. 
 
23 Rupke, op. cit. 
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The superintendentialists based their claims upon the empirical evidence of 
geology and paleontology conjoined to the theory that a “cooling earth” had 
grown increasingly hospitable of life over time. Although von Baer’s typology 
freed morphology from the typological progression of the German idealists, it did 
not address the claim of the overall “direction” of natural history that was 
supported by the empirical science of the British superintendentialists. In fact, 
because Huxley preferred not to acknowledge the possibility of natural theology 
within natural history, the paleontological record was forcing him to argue 
against very plausible physical evidence for some kind of historical progress or 
advancement in the forms of life.24 
Although Huxley had some success in separating morphological science 
from natural theology, he could do little to subvert either Paley’s explanation of 
specific organs or the superintendentialists’ explanation for the directional 
progress of natural history. Further, it is possible that Huxley’s quibbles with 
theology were narrowing rather than expanding his scientific horizons:  in the 
1850s, he was ignoring specific utilitarian adaptation as a morphological feature 
and was among the most obdurate holdouts against the fossil evidence for life’s 
journey from simpler to more complex forms.25 This may be rephrased to say 
that Huxley was ignoring the problems that Darwin would solve, because 
adaptation and the suggestively ‘progressive’ paleontological record of special 
                                        
24 Lyons, 111-123. 
 
25 Di Gregorio, 114-118. 
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origins and extinctions were among the more significant aspects of natural 
history that Darwin would attempt to explain. Remember, too, that Darwin’s 
science was profoundly considerate or, perhaps more aptly stated, re-considerate 
of natural theology, because, as Dov Ospovat has shown, the logic of natural 
theology was deeply ingrained within Darwin’s thinking.26 Prior to Darwin, Huxley 
had no way to counter the explanations of natural history that were offered by 
the natural theologians, and, although he was committed to the opportunistic 
and selective dissociation of natural theology from science, he often found it 
convenient to ignore problems that natural theology, perhaps, but not yet 
physical science might explain. 
Before we consider Darwin, however, it is important to note some of the 
practical ways in which natural theology impacted Huxley’s early scientific career. 
Huxley’s chief rival for notoriety in science was his elder contemporary, Richard 
Owen. Although the two men were similar in their scientific thinking, Owen 
began his scientific career twenty years before Huxley and pursued success in a 
different way. An important component of Owen’s success was his negotiation of 
the system of Anglican patronage.27 It would be Owen, for example, who would 
coach Bishop “Soapy Sam” Wilberforce in his defense of natural theology against 
Darwin (although Owen in fact saw much to envy in Darwin’s theory). This social 
maneuverability was something more than a professional necessity to Owen; it 
                                        
26 Ospovat, Darwin’s Theory, op. cit. (Ch II, note 1). 
 
27 Desmond, Archetypes, op. cit. Desmond’s view is moderated by Rupke in Richard Owen, op. 
cit. (Ch I, note 13), pp. 161-219 at 203-04. 
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was a part of the culture that was a premise of his success. For example, at one 
time the young Huxley requested of Owen a letter of introduction, and Owen 
delayed for weeks in order to emphasize the significance of replying, “I shall 
grant it.”28 Huxley was turned impotently furious by Owen’s frank affirmation of 
patronage in science. 
Given his ecclesiastical connections and loyalties, it is no surprise that 
Owen was a skilled proponent of natural theology. What is remarkable, however, 
is that Owen exploited precisely the arguments for natural theology that Huxley, 
with equal skill, was diverting from recognition by science. For example, although 
Huxley could insist that organic types did not “progress,” he could not deny that 
there were many levels of orderly and formal resemblances between the types. 
In fact, before Darwin stirred his transmutation into an evolutionist, Huxley’s 
scientific ambition was to specify the organic “laws” that determined the formal 
and presumably fixed relationships between specific and more general 
morphological types. Huxley envisioned this science as a kind of organic 
geometry. The relationships between types were to be defined as abstract 
“general plans” upon which the next more specific types were variably 
constructed, or, more accurately stated, to which the specific types could be 
generally reduced.29 This was an essentially Platonic understanding of 
morphology, and Owen – whose work preceded Huxley’s in this regard – did not 
                                        
28 Lyons, op. cit. p. 197. 
 
29 Lyons, 66-72. Di Gregorio, op. cit. 33-34. 
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hesitate to claim that the general plans were “Archetypes” present to the divine 
mind and serving to direct or guide the progress of natural history. Huxley 
viewed the general types as descriptive but not determinative of organic form, 
and he did not view discovering the determinate causes of types to be a matter 
of immediate scientific concern.30 
Although Huxley complained that Owen’s metaphysical archetypes were 
not in the “spirit” of inductive science, he could not deny their philosophical and 
theological legitimacy.31 In fact, the Oxford geometer and philosopher Baden 
Powell requested from Huxley an account of morphology’s organic schematics to 
ensure the scientific caliber of a design argument that Powell, as discussed 
briefly in Chapter Three, was premising upon “order” rather than “intention” in 
nature. Remarkably, Powell published Huxley’s reply as an appendix to his 
theological treatise The Unity of Worlds and of Nature. Despite his vigorous 
efforts to dissociate science from religion, Huxley’s pre-Darwinian science is, 
literally, a chapter of nineteenth-century natural theology.32 
Owen represented much worse to Huxley than this, however, because 
Owen was able to accommodate Huxley’s morphological science not only to an 
orderly but also a superintendential view of natural history. As has been said, 
Huxley was able to ignore but not explain the fact that all organisms were 
                                        
30 Di Gregorio, p. 15-35, 114-120. 
 
31 Ibid. p. 43. 
 
32 Powell, Unity of Worlds, op. cit. (Ch III, note 47), pp. 537-9. 
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specifically adapted to the conditions of their existence; and he found it much 
easier to deny the validity of “progress” in its typological sense than when the 
superintendentialists meant the “general direction” of natural history evident in 
the paleontological record. Owen had none of Huxley’s theological antipathies, 
however, and could make hay of the fact that the various understandings of 
“design” in nature – the organic schemata, the “direction” of natural history, and 
the utilitarian adaptation of specific organisms to their environment – were not 
competitive but potentially complementary arguments in natural theology. In an 
often quoted and indefinitely suggestive passage, Owen wrote: 
To what natural laws or secondary causes the orderly 
succession and progression of such organic phenomena may have 
been committed we are as yet ignorant. But if, without derogation 
of the Divine power, we may conceive the existence of such 
ministers, and personify them by the term “Nature,” we learn from 
the past history of our globe that she has advanced with slow and 
stately steps, guided by the archetypal light, amidst the wreck of 
worlds, from the first embodiment of the Vertebrate idea under its 
old Ichthyic vestment, until it became arrayed in the glorious garb 
of the Human form.33 
 
Owen’s “wreck of worlds,” written in 1849, was a timely reference to John Bird 
Sumner, made the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1848. Sumner had written thirty 
years earlier that “we are not called upon to deny the possible existence of 
previous worlds, from the wreck of which our globe was organized,” a passage 
that Buckland had quoted in 1819 in vindication of teaching geology at Oxford. 
Significantly, in 1845 Buckland had removed from Oxford in a controversial 
                                        
33 Owen, Richard. On the Nature of Limbs (London : van Voorst, 1849), p.86, as quoted in 
Desmond, Archetypes, op. cit. (Ch I, note 11) p. 47. 
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appointment to be Dean of Westminster in London.34 The “wreck of worlds,” 
then, was a notable indication of how Owen could publicly relate archetypal to 
superintendential natural theology, secular science to clerical politics, and natural 
theology to scientific and religious discourse. Despite a strongly opposite 
determination, Huxley’s archetypal morphology could be smothered by 
theological implications; and the man most capable of this performance was 
Owen, a professional and personal nemesis and an agent of the religious 
establishment. In the 1850s, Huxley badly needed an escape from under the 
biological supports of natural theology; yet his scientific views made this 
impossible. He had reason to cheer the appearance of Origin of Species. 
                                        
34 Buckland, Vindiciae, op. cit. (Ch I, note 29), pp. 26-27. 
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CHAPTER V: 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY AND HUXLEY’S DEFENSE OF ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
 
 
 
Charles Darwin 
 
This chapter continues the immediately previous in maintaining that 
mounting a defense of Origin of Species brought Huxley into the existing tide of 
nineteenth-century natural theological debate rather than opposing him to it. 
However, although Chapter Five furthers the thesis of Chapter Four, it is kept 
structurally apart because it will draw significantly upon the work of Chapters 
Two and Three, as well. 
As we have seen, Huxley’s best pre-Darwinian efforts to differentiate 
natural science from utilitarian, superintendential, and developmental design 
arguments had met with limited success. In 1854, Huxley’s scientific work 
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remained thoroughly enmeshed by the natural theology of his day. It remains for 
Chapter Five, then, to show that Huxley very well appreciated the anti-
teleological significance of the Origin, and that he employed this appreciation in 
defending Darwinism against specific forms of theological and teleological 
interpretation and misinterpretation. In defending Darwin’s views, Huxley would 
play different forms of design argument against one another as part of a 
rhetorical strategy that emphasized the distinction of science from religion. 
Chapter Four showed that Huxley had employed a similar strategy in his 
interpretation of Cuvier and von Baer even before being acquainted with 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. The difference in Darwin’s case, however, is that 
points of natural theology were no longer implicit within Huxley’s public 
consideration of biological science, but quite explicit. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Huxley understood that natural theology was 
a point of controversy with non-scientific theologians whose preference was to 
place science at a remove from more traditional and textual forms of theology. 
Huxley’s published view in 1854 was that science was of little concern to religion 
and theology – that creation by “development,” for example, was no less 
“marvelous” than a special creation and was not an “explanation” of creation in 
any way of concern to religion. This view closely echoed what a traditional 
theologian might have said at that time, if, by “traditional,” we mean less 
scientifically and more textually and traditionally concerned. Nonetheless, in 
1854, Huxley had not been choosing a theological side to play on, whether 
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effectively scientific or traditional. His constant intent had been to liberate 
science from theology and religion or, stating the same thing more accurately, to 
create a new, secular, non-theological and professional science out of various 
parts and aspects of the Anglican political, religious and educational 
establishment. This had meant wresting concessions from scientific and 
traditional theologians alike in the interests of professionalizing science. 
It may not be assumed then, that “science,” “religion” and “theology” 
represented defined, identifiable and stationary targets for Huxley to defend or 
attack with new Darwinian weapons once Origin was published. The Origin was a 
theoretical or hypothetical natural history that was published in mid-nineteenth-
century Britain; and, as such, it appeared within – it was an aspect of, a 
continuation of, a line of – public theological controversy until something could 
be done to set it apart. Recent historical scholarship has determined that much 
of the work of separating science from religion in the public mind was done 
before Darwin published the Origin and in consequence of the sensational 
controversy over Vestiges. However, no one could have been certain of this at 
that time. Moreover, the lines of differentiation between science and religion 
were crossed and complicated by the status of natural theology within science, 
religion and public life in Britain. Utilitarian design arguments seemed antiquated 
by 1859 through long association with biblical special creation, but there was a 
place for them yet within superintendential natural theology and natural history. 
Developmental natural theology seemed theologically, socially and scientifically 
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heterodox because of its association with Vestiges but, even so, had had an 
important public advocate in the Anglican natural theologian Baden Powell. 
Moreover, Huxley came into the controversy willing – as demonstrated by his 
review of Vestiges (Chapter Three) and his interpretations of Cuvier and von 
Baer (Chapter Four) – to negate natural theology within scientific discourse by 
rejecting one form of design argument while standing implicitly upon the 
grounds of another. For all of these reasons, it is unsound to believe that the 
Darwinian controversies were hardly more than an echo of the Vestiges 
controversy and of relatively small consequence to the history of science and 
religion. 
In his public defense of Origin, Huxley would represent evolution in ways 
that were not entirely compatible with Darwin’s own views and that, moreover, 
did not differ greatly from the “developmental” understanding of natural history 
that had outlasted its initial, even regrettable presentation in the much maligned 
Vestiges.1 Moreover, Huxley’s understanding of the role of variation within 
evolution differed from Darwin’s in ways that Huxley recognized would imply a 
new or, at least, a non-utilitarian natural theology. He responded to these 
challenges in a familiar way, by pitting one form of design argument against 
another. This placed Huxley’s defense of Darwin firmly within the terms of the 
debate between “developmental” and “superintendential” natural theologies that 
had been significant in Britain for the previous two decades. What was new in 
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the defense of Darwin, however, was Huxley’s willingness to acknowledge that 
design argument and, implicitly, natural theology had held important places 
within the history of science, and to admit, as well, that natural science impacted 
severely upon matters that were of proper concern to religion and theology. 
Attention to those novelties in Huxley’s public discourse is now necessary. 
 
Natural theology and science in Huxley’s defense of Origin of Species 
For the past thirty or forty years, historians have been eager to point out 
that Huxley was not a fully committed Darwinian.2 He was skeptical that 
evolution could be completely explained by a natural selection of similar 
individuals that would cause the gradual, local modification of a species; and in 
his view the resolvable and sensational debate over whether species had evolved 
was best kept apart from the more difficult question of cause.3 Both problems 
had been fully discussed in Origin of Species but not fully settled. In addition to 
his consideration of Darwin’s causal theory, therefore, Huxley sought to prove 
upon the basis of fossil evidence that evolution had occurred, which was a 
tenuous demonstration at the time and a distraction from Darwin’s larger, causal 
argument. This contributed significantly to beginning the endless, unfortunate 
debates over whether fossil evidence proves Darwin. In fact, Huxley never fully 
endorsed Darwinism, and, although he thought he had demonstrated evolution 
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from fossil evidence by 1876, Huxley remained reluctant to fully endorse natural 
selection for the rest of his life.4 
Accepting evolution without fretting over Darwin’s causal explanation 
meant that Huxley had little difficulty in refitting his pre-evolutionary 
morphological research onto an evolutionary framework: he needed only to 
reconsider organic types to be the consequence of genealogical as well as or 
instead of inherently morphological rules.5 In fact, Huxley appeared to his 
biology students to be unconcerned for evolution and, when questioned on this, 
reasoned that evolution was a distraction from learning basic biological science.6 
The changes to Huxley’s practical morphology that followed upon evolution were 
minimal in comparison to changes to his wider understanding of natural history. 
There is no doubt that Huxley accepted evolution and contributed to 
evolutionary science. Nonetheless, only in disputes with religion did Huxley 
advocate evolution and, especially, Darwinism in their fullest ramifications. 
Michael Ruse has used this to argue that evolution to Huxley was primarily a 
matter of publicity against religion and not of science.7 It is my present purpose, 
however, to discuss Huxley’s Darwinian debates as a matter of natural theology, 
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where the differences between scientific, religious, and public interests were 
often indefinite. When Huxley discussed Darwin’s theory in scientific terms, he 
undoubtedly had natural theology in mind; and in dispute with religion, he had to 
score scientific as well as theological points. As was demonstrated in Chapter 
Three, discussing natural theology as a point of science with muted theological 
ramifications is consistent with trends that had been set prior to the publication 
of Origin. Huxley’s concern was to fix Darwinism within this trend, not to 
manufacture a publicity stunt out of a scientifically dispensable theory. 
This may be demonstrated by reading Huxley’s several reviews, critiques, 
and defenses of Darwin and Origin. In his earliest public comments, Huxley 
treated Darwinism with perceptive clarity and, more remarkably, with 
considerable brevity. His more extensive concern was to provide readers with an 
understanding of Darwin’s contribution to science or – if drawing a remote but 
perhaps helpful analogy may be permitted – to locate Darwin within the natural 
“historiography” of his day. He wanted to orient Darwin’s public audiences to the 
scientific context of controversies in natural theology that they could generally be 
presumed to know something about, including the still simmering (or at least 
warm) debates over geological catastrophes and Vestiges. These were the public 
and controversial precedents that were most notoriously associated with 
Darwin’s hypothesis, and Huxley’s first move was to present them as matters of 
science that could be distinguished from the concerns of textual theology and 
traditional religion. In reading Huxley, however, we should bear in mind – 
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because Huxley was not interested in drawing our attention to it – that the 
distinction of science and natural theology from textual authority was not foreign 
to but, rather, characteristic of nineteenth-century natural theology. 
In his anonymous 1859 Boxing Day review of “The Darwinian Hypothesis” 
in the Times, for example, Huxley abused persons who cited the authority of the 
Pentateuch in believing that the origin of living things was “the immediate 
product of a creative fiat and … [therefore] out of the domain of science,” but he 
wrote more considerately of those who “profess to rest upon a scientific basis 
only … [when they maintain] that every species was originally produced by a 
distinct creative act.” Although all of these persons held similar theological 
beliefs, only some of them had followed scientific thinking; and Huxley wanted to 
view as a matter of science the debatable conviction “that every species is … 
incapable of modification,” a corollary of which was the affirmation of special 
creation. Huxley’s Times review included at least partially sympathetic 
examinations of what had been brought to the bar of evidential reasoning by 
Paley, catastrophism, and Vestiges in their different accounts of the creation and 
history of species. Quite apparently, therefore, Huxley’s contextualization of 
Darwin’s science was a review of past controversies in natural theology, although 
he never used that phrase; and he represented Darwin’s hypothesis as an 
answer to some of natural theology’s scientific deficiencies.8 
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Those deficiencies were most strongly stated in Huxley’s essay “The Origin 
of Species” which appeared, again anonymously, in the April, 1860 edition of the 
“freethinking” Westminster Review, where he was a science editor.9 This essay, 
befitting its forum, was Huxley’s most ostentatiously anti-clerical representation 
of “Darwinism” (a term that appeared in print for the first time in its closing 
paragraph, denoting the promise of Darwin’s hypothesis to be tested, revised, 
and refined by future science); and in it Huxley discharged his first great verbal 
barrages against religion, declaring that “the myths of Paganism are as dead as 
Osiris or Zeus … but the coeval imaginations current among the rude inhabitants 
of Palestine … have unfortunately not yet shared their fate,” and that 
“Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every science as strangled 
snakes beside that of Hercules….”10 However, attacks on theologians and 
traditional religion may not be identified as attacks upon natural theology. 
Huxley’s treatment of the science of special creation was more respectful and, 
notably, a degree more circumspect. 
Huxley’s “The Origin of Species” is such a fine composition that it well 
masks the complexity of the issues it treats. One complex problem concerned the 
relations that pertained to science, religion, and natural theology; and Huxley’s 
continued neglect of any explicit reference to “natural theology” compounded the 
difficulty of being clear about it. Closely following the language he had used in 
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the Times, Huxley allowed once again that special creation and transmutation 
were rival hypotheses that “profess to stand upon a scientific basis.” In the 
Westminster review, however, he singularly challenged the profession of special 
creation upon the ground that it “owes its existence largely to the supposed 
necessity of making science accord with the Hebrew cosmogony; but it is curious 
to observe that, as the doctrine is at present maintained by men of science, it is 
as hopelessly inconsistent with the Hebrew view as any other hypothesis.”11 The 
inconsistency, of course, lay in the fact that scientific special creationists 
understood special creation as an aspect of directed progress and not as a one-
time event, apparently contradicting their intended agreement with scripture. 
Huxley’s claim was seemingly straightforward; and yet, in point of fact, it 
hopelessly confused every point that, in fairness to natural theologians, needed 
to be kept clear. 
As Chapters Two and Three have demonstrated, the theological principle 
affirmed by special creation and theological superintendence was divine 
providence, not scriptural literalism. In fact, the reconciliation of scripture to 
natural history had been attempted by geological diluvialism, and it was 
diluvialism’s failure to reconcile Genesis to geology that had initiated controversy 
in the 1830s over the assertion that natural theology was a necessary premise to 
the affirmation of the moral authority of revelation. As the natural theologians 
understood it, special creation was a point of physical science that served to 
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demonstrate superintendential natural theology – the idea that God had 
discontinuously but designedly “directed” natural forces and natural history to 
desired ends – and superintendence, in turn, provided a rational foundation for 
the moral authority of special revelations that may have been given in civil 
history to an ancient people whose knowledge of the physical world would be 
antiquated by nineteenth-century standards. While affirming the moral authority 
of revelations, the point of special creation, in the hands of a superintendential 
natural theologian, was to spare physical science from engaging Genesis, not to 
make them agree. To refer special creation to biblical accordance in matters of 
physical science was to represent it as a theological failure – which, in 1860, it by 
no means was – and undermine the role of natural theology in religious debate. 
Undermining natural theology, of course, fit Huxley’s desire to separate science 
from religion. Whether by intention or in confusion, Huxley was misrepresenting 
the relation of natural theology to scripture by forcing special creation into an 
agreement with the “Hebrew cosmogony.” 
Having dismissed special creation as a form of “Bibliolatry,” Huxley asked 
whether it “derive[d] any support from sound logic or science?” His summary 
answer was given directly: “Assuredly, not much.” However, the specifics 
provided by Huxley to tell against special creation are well worth our attention. 
He informed his readers that  
The arguments brought forward in its favor are all of one form: … 
we cannot understand the structure of animals or plants, unless we 
suppose that they were contrived for special ends…. But suppose 
we prefer to admit our ignorance rather than adopt an hypothesis 
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at variance with all the teachings of nature? Or, suppose for a 
moment that we admit the explanation, and then seriously ask 
ourselves how much the wiser are we; what does the explanation 
explain? Is it anything more than a grandiloquent way of 
announcing the fact that we really know nothing about the matter? 
A phenomenon is explained when it is shown to be a case of some 
general law of nature; but the supernatural interposition of the 
Creator can, by the nature of the case, exemplify no law, and if 
species really have arisen in this way, it is absurd to attempt to 
discuss their origin.12 
 
It demands remark, however, that a special creationist and a superintendential 
natural theologian could have agreed with most of this, with the certain 
exception of the variance that Huxley asserted between special creation and “all 
the teachings of nature.” If the paleontological record as well as utilitarian design 
arguments proved special creation, as the superintendentialists claimed, then 
special creation would have been one of nature’s teachings, not a contradiction. 
This raised questions over what was acceptable as “sound logic,” “science,” and 
“the teachings of nature” – an interesting problem to find implicit within the early 
thought of the future creator of the neologism “scientific Naturalism.”13 
The other objections to special creation that had been raised by Huxley 
involved the boundaries of natural theology and science. The 
superintendentialists – as exemplified by Whewell and discussed in previous 
chapters – would no more than Huxley have accepted supernatural interposition 
as a physical explanation in the sciences; their objection was to the presumption 
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that all of natural history had its explanation in physics. What was “absurd” to 
the superintendentialists was not the attempt to find a physical, uniform, or 
“scientific” explanation for the origin of species, but the presumption that a 
physical or uniform explanation must be available. Additionally, Huxley’s 
expressed preference for ignorance over utilitarian design as an explanation of 
organic form is a good instance of his practical determination – discussed in 
Chapter Four in relation to Paley, Cuvier, and von Baer – to ignore the 
explanations of natural phenomena offered by natural theologians and, even 
more remarkably, to ignore the very problems in natural history that natural 
theology sought to explain. In his efforts to distinguish science from religion, 
Huxley often found ignorance preferable to natural theology. 
In the passage being considered, in fact, Huxley has been very unclear 
about what kind of “explanation” he is wanting as well as its relation to a 
deliberately maintained ignorance (which is an interesting gap in the thought of 
the future creator of the neologism “agnosticism”). Utilitarian natural theology 
never pretended to explain organic form in terms of “some general law of 
nature,” which is the standard Huxley devised for it. Huxley insisted that “it is 
obviously necessary that we should know all the consequences [of natural 
causation] continued through unlimited time” before “any amount of evidence 
which the nature of our faculties permits us to attain” could justify the “miserable 
presumption” of a supernatural cause, still without clarifying what sort of 
explanation he was considering. If he meant before admitting the end of physical 
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science, then, of course, he would be right. However, Huxley also would describe 
special creation as marking “the youth and imperfection” of biology in a way 
comparable to “When astronomy was young … and the planets were guided in 
their courses by celestial hands,” a claim which seemingly admits supernatural 
causation as a preliminary rather than entirely miserable presumption when it 
premised rather than ended the study of physical order in nature.14 This returned 
Huxley to the need to be clear and definite about the relation of science to 
design argument and natural theology. After all, the superintendentialists would 
be wondering, if supernaturalism were justified in premising the (perhaps 
distinguishable) orders of the cosmic and solar systems, why should it not be 
justified in premising the (possibly separate) origins of the organic and moral 
orders of nature, as well as the origins of different eras in the earth’s history that 
did not seem, from paleontological and geological evidence, to have followed one 
from another upon only physical principles? Whewell, after all, had proposed 
supernatural causation, under the rubrics of superintendential design argument, 
not as the end of physical science, but as a rational complement that might 
explain the general direction of natural history where that direction may be 
inexplicable upon only physical principles. 
Of course, it was the possibility that theological rather than merely 
physical principles may be needed to explain natural history that Huxley had 
consistently refused, not only to admit, but to discuss. In the process of 
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introducing his readers to the scientific context of Darwin’s hypothesis, Huxley 
reduced special creation to the equivalent of supernatural disruptions to the 
physical order. However, the natural theology of Huxley’s day was not thinking of 
special creation as the illogical disruption, but as the superintended direction of 
physical processes. Huxley could not fairly discuss natural theology in terms only 
of supernatural disruption; and, in fact, he did not speak explicitly of natural 
theology at all in “The Origin of Species,” his first strongly anticlerical essay. 
This does not mean, of course, that Huxley was confused or was being 
overly misleading about the basic impact of Darwin’s theory upon the most 
ordinary points of natural theology. He was, in fact, capable of making that 
impact felt in precise, dramatic, and emphatic terms. For example, a point in 
Darwin’s argument that frequently misled readers was the analogy of natural 
selection to the selective breeding of pigeon varieties. Since selectively breeding 
varietals is an intentional process, readers often imagined an intentional agent 
behind natural selection, as well. As Huxley put the problem, “Where in nature 
was the analogue of the breeder to be found? How could that operation of 
selection, which is his essential function, be carried out by mere natural 
agencies?” Already in 1859, however, Huxley made a succinct and disturbing 
reply: in Darwin’s theory, “That which takes the place of the breeder and selector 
in nature is Death.”15 The suggestion that God in special creation would be 
displaced by inscrutable, inevitable, and paradigmatically natural “Death” was 
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what Darwin, especially in Huxley’s hands, brought to the relation of science to 
religion. Whether or not it was possible to see evolution and natural selection as 
part of God’s design, the relation of creation and the “progress” of life to divine 
beneficence would never be the same. If forms of life were designed, they were 
designed to die. 
Although he never went as far as the American theologian Charles Hodge 
in positively declaring that Darwinism “is Atheism,”16 Huxley was always clear 
and careful in protecting Darwin’s theory from being misconstrued in ways that 
suggested the confirmation of traditional religion. However, in moderation of 
Ruse’s suggestion that Huxley did not value Darwin as highly in the scientific as 
in the public and religious sphere, Huxley did not need to be discussing 
Darwinism to the benefit of the general public in order to differentiate it from 
natural theology. He could do so in scientific essays that had no overt pubic or 
religious significance. 
For example, Huxley’s essay “Criticisms on ‘The Origin of Species’” 
appeared in The Natural History Review in 1864.17 It defended Darwin from the 
two “most elaborate” scientific criticisms that had been published against the 
Origin, one written by a German and the other by a French natural philosopher. 
The Frenchman – “M. Flourens, Perpetual Secretary of the French Academy of 
Sciences” – had published a ludicrous critique that afforded Huxley an 
                                        
16 Hodge, What is Darwinism? op. cit. (Ch I, note 34), p. 156. 
 
17 CE II, pp. 80-106. 
 
  167
opportunity to ridicule a naturalist that “cannot imagine an unconscious 
selection” and, therefore, believes that “Mr. Darwin’s great error is that [the idea 
of natural selection] has personified nature” and that Darwin “plays with Nature 
… and makes her do all he pleases.” Additionally, Flourens defended special 
creation by denying embryological development and insisting that completely-
formed individuals merely grew or enlarged during gestation, which was an 
impossible view by 1864. Huxley’s unkind remarks upon such ideas demonstrate 
that he was not less willing or able to savage a man of science than a theologian 
when he believed he had been provided a justifiable opportunity.18 
 The German critique, written by “Professor Kölliker, the well-known 
anatomist and histologist of Würzburg,” mistook Darwin not as having 
personified nature but as being, “in the fullest sense of the word, a Teleologist” 
and for having said, as Kölliker thought, “that every particular in the structure of 
an animal has been created for its benefit….” In Kölliker’s interpretation, 
Darwinian evolution presumed the “tendency of organisms to give rise to useful 
varieties” as well as “the imperfection of organisms and the necessity of their 
being perfected … because Darwin could think of no other principle to explain 
the metamorphoses which … have occurred.” Professor Kölliker thought he was 
contradicting Darwin by asserting that “Varieties arise irrespective of the notion 
of purpose, or of utility, according to the general laws of nature, and may be 
either useful, or hurtful, or indifferent.” Huxley remarked upon the 
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misunderstanding that “It is singular how differently one and the same book will 
impress different minds.” Very differently, indeed, from Kölliker, Huxley had been 
struck “most forcibly … [by] the conviction that Teleology, as commonly 
understood, had received its deathblow at Mr. Darwin’s hands,” and Huxley 
claimed, as well, that “nothing can be more entirely and absolutely opposed to 
Teleology, as it is commonly understood, than the Darwinian Theory.” Huxley 
then provided a more accurate surmise of Darwin’s theory and countered 
Kölliker’s misunderstandings one by one with quotes from Origin of Species.19 
Huxley wrote this essay in critique of two of Darwin’s European critics for 
the benefit of primarily British natural historians, and it reflects his intentions 
toward the latter. Views such as those of Flourens that might persist in Britain 
were being threatened with public ridicule; but Kölliker’s views reflected 
widespread confusion among respected men of science whom Darwin’s transitory 
use of teleological concepts and language had fooled into considering Darwinism 
a style of teleology. Huxley had to correct this misunderstanding because, as he 
said, “of its great general importance” – the only (and oblique) reference in the 
essay to teleology’s theological implications.20 Along with the absence of 
theology, however, Huxley’s discussion of teleology in philosophical and scientific 
terms was simple and direct. He did not hesitate to present “Paley’s famous 
illustration … of all the parts of a watch” in explaining the meaning of teleology 
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as “commonly understood;” and, in contrast to what he had said in the Times 
and the Westminster Review, Huxley’s presentation of Paley in the Natural 
History Review  had no hint of sarcasm or suggestion of religious bias.21 In a 
very interesting passage, Huxley even allowed that Darwin 
had rendered a most remarkable service to philosophical thought 
by enabling the student of nature to recognize, to their fullest 
extent, those adaptations to purpose which are so striking in the 
organic world, and which Teleology has done good service in 
keeping before our minds, without being false to the fundamental 
principles of a scientific conception of the universe. The apparently 
divergent teachings of the Teleologist and of the Morphologist are 
reconciled by the Darwinian hypothesis.22 
 
In addition to the apparent acceptance of teleology as “philosophical,” it requires 
a very careful reader to resist Huxley’s grammatically dubious suggestion that 
teleology was true to a scientific conception of the universe; and it is also 
wonderful to ask whether Huxley saw himself as a “student of nature” who might 
have benefited more than he had from the “good service” of teleology in 
remembering how “striking” were the adaptations of the organic world. Huxley, 
after all, had been content to remain ignorant of adaptation. 
“Criticisms on ‘The Origin of Species’” enables historians to reach one 
important conclusion:  Darwin had brought Huxley into open, extended, 
considerate, and scientific discussion of the concepts and terms of natural 
theological debate. Huxley could not defend Darwin from teleological 
misunderstanding by men of science in Britain without paying respects to 
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teleology as a matter of science; and this was something he had previously and 
studiously refused to do. Nonetheless, Huxley’s consideration of natural theology 
as a part of his defense of Origin of Species was limited to a discussion of 
concepts – he never proposed it for topical discussion. Additionally, Huxley dealt 
more considerately with theology when he treated its concepts in strictly 
scientific and philosophic terms; in his defense of Darwin in other respects, 
Huxley’s anticlerical bias showed as the association of “special creation” and, 
implicitly, natural theology with “Bibliolotry” and religious bias. 
It is not enough, then, to read Huxley’s declamations upon the pernicious 
effects of religion in science, his categorization of special creation and utilitarian 
design as immature science, and his insistence that Origin of Species was a 
deathblow to teleology “as it is commonly understood,” as if these were simple 
statements about the impact of Darwin’s book upon the arguments of natural 
theology. They were, in fact, Huxley’s belated and highly indirect admission that 
natural theology held, or at least had held, a conceptually important place in the 
logic and explanations of modern natural philosophy and natural history. Because 
he had to discuss natural theology as a part of the conceptual background that 
readers must bring to an understanding of Darwin, Huxley emphasized the clear 
opposition of Darwinism to the “common” natural theology of utilitarian design 
and special creation. To Huxley this meant emphasizing, firstly, that there was 
very little of traditionally religious components in Darwin’s thinking, and, 
secondly, that Darwin had an entirely natural and uniform explanation for the 
  171
origin of species. However, Huxley was not being forthright in choosing to 
illustrate natural theology in 1859 by the examples of Paley, clockworks, and 
special creations. Questioned more directly and expressly, we must ask, What 
had Huxley glossed by his qualification of teleology “as it is commonly 
understood” and in its “ordinary sense”? What had he to say about Darwin’s 
relation to teleological arguments that were not premised upon utilitarian design 
and special creation? 
 
Natural theology and the meaning of “Darwinian” evolution in Huxley’s 
defense of Origin of Species 
 
Those questions become difficult to answer because, in his defense of 
Origin, Huxley was speaking on behalf of but not necessarily as would Darwin. 
Moreover, the problem, especially in relation to natural theology, extends well 
beyond an analysis of Darwin and Huxley. Bowler, for example, has argued that 
evolution in the nineteenth century was a “non-Darwinian revolution” in the 
history of science.23 His point was that Darwin’s ideas were received within a 
generally “developmental” understanding of evolution that had existed before 
and continued to exist after the publication of Origin of Species. Although Darwin 
believed that species evolved according to a process of external selection from 
among individuals of the species, pre-Darwinian thought had generally accepted 
evolution as the equivalent of “development,” an idea taken from embryology 
and referring always to its embryological origin to some degree. Embryological 
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development, of course, is organically inherent and is not a selective process.24 
Notably, also, embryological development is generally considered to be linear: an 
embryo develops a certain way, and, theoretically, if you repeated the process, 
then it would develop the same way unless differently affected by “external 
conditions.” Moreover, if you were to reverse the process, then the adult would 
presumably revert to the identical embryo it had once been. Darwinian evolution, 
by contrast, is non-linear because its principal mechanical component, the 
natural selection of individuals from among a special population, is chanceful and 
contingent. To realize how little the nineteenth century appreciated this fact, you 
need only ask yourself how aware the Victorians were that, were the natural 
history of the earth made to repeat itself purely upon Darwin’s terms, any 
“progress” toward “man” would be unnecessary. 
Huxley is susceptible to the charge of having been non-Darwinian because 
he thought of evolution in patently linear terms. Here, the term “linear” is 
preferred to Bowler’s preference for development because Huxley did not reserve 
the idea of evolution only to natural processes that were strictly analogous to 
embryological development, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the fact that 
Huxley was expert in developmental embryology. Huxley referred, for example, 
to the possible evolution of “the cosmic vapour” into solar systems in terms that 
were not organic but merely atomistic; and he seemed to be implying that the 
evolution of fauna may have differed in no obvious way. In this respect, what 
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mattered about evolution to Huxley was linearity and material determinism; he 
was not much constrained by the connotations of embryological development, 
such as growth and the gradual, progressive formation of inherent 
characteristics.25 
Huxley represented Darwin as a newcomer to the train of developmental 
thought already tracked by the organic natural philosophies of Lamarck, 
Geoffrey, and Vestiges.26 However, Huxley was keenly aware that Darwin was 
categorically distinguished from these predecessors by having proposed a 
credible mechanism in explanation of transmutation. Indeed, that was the point 
upon which Huxley corrected even Lyell’s mistaken equation of Darwin’s theory 
with Lamarck’s views.27 Moreover, as was noted under the previous subheading, 
Huxley had a good conceptual grasp of Darwin’s evolutionary mechanism. It is 
worth considering that this may qualify Huxley as a conceptual Darwinian, 
whether or not he adequately understood that Darwin had not derived 
transmutation and evolution from the concepts of development. It was, after all, 
much more straightforwardly as an advocate of development that Alfred Russel 
Wallace had independently formulated the mechanics of “Darwinism” in 1858.28 
                                        
25 CE II, p. 110. 
 
26 CE II, pp. 13-14, 63-71. 
 
27 Lyons, op. cit. pp. 106-07. 
 
28 Wallace, Alfred Russel. “On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely From the Original 
Type” (1858). 
 
  174
Although it is tautological to say that Huxley’s qualifications as a 
Darwinian depend upon what is meant by Darwinism, there is a historiographical 
point to be made. Bowler’s insistence that Darwinism means what Darwin meant 
smacks of Whiggish historiography: in an effort to correct a misrepresentation of 
the significance of Darwin in the history of nineteenth-century biological science, 
Bowler discovered a way to emphasize evolution’s “non-Darwinian” aspects. 
Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Darwinism may be adequately defined by 
Darwin’s particular view. It may be a ground for objection, for example, that 
someone as significant as Wallace, who differed from Darwin in important 
respects, such as by rejecting sexual selection and by arguing more tenaciously 
than Darwin for the complete efficacy of natural selection, could claim that it was 
his “differences from some of Darwin’s views” that made him “the advocate of 
pure Darwinism.”29  
My particular ground for objection, however, is that restricting Darwinism 
to Darwin’s ideas requires historians to accept as definitive what could not have 
been known at the time:  that Darwin would prove largely correct in his 
understanding of the irregularity of organic variation. Darwin thought of variation 
in a pronouncedly non-linear or “random” fashion because he sought to protect 
the importance of natural selection as the determinate factor in the evolution of 
organic form. In a famous metaphor, Darwin explained that the laws of variation 
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may determine the form of individual variations analogously to how the laws of 
physics determine the shapes of stones that may fall from a cliff or precipice.30 
Although the shapes of the fallen stones will in a general sense be determined 
according to the laws of physics, physics is not usefully predictive of any stone’s 
particular shape. In the same way, Darwin thought, the “laws of variation” were 
not usefully predictive of the organic alternatives that would be available to a 
natural selection. 
However, Darwin was far from carrying the day upon this point; and the 
historiographical question, then, is this: had the laws of variation been proved 
somewhat more determinative of organic form than they were in Darwin’s mind, 
would variation and natural selection no longer have been considered to be 
“Darwinism?” I doubt it; and although it is not my purpose to pose that question 
here, it is important to note that Huxley, at least, considered investigation into 
the laws of variation to be a significant problem within Darwinian science without 
expressing concern over the degree to which those laws would prove to be 
formally determinate.31 In fact, Huxley’s predilection for platonic rather than 
utilitarian morphology would suggest a preference for a degree of formal 
determinism within the rules of variation considered apart from natural 
selection.32 
                                        
30 Darwin, Charles. The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, two volumes 
(London : John Murray, 1868), ii, p. 430-1. 
 
31 CE II, pp. v-vi, 33-34, 114-16, 222-223. 
 
32 Di Gregorio, op. cit. pp. 114-120. 
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In Huxley’s mind, then, accepting Darwin’s particular view on variation 
was not a point of adjudication between Darwinian and non-Darwinian evolution. 
There were ways in which variation could proceed in a more orderly or formal 
fashion (as if mere physics broke falling stone into shapely fragments) than 
Darwin believed while keeping variation within the conceptual landscape of 
Darwinism as Huxley accepted it. It is crucial to bear this in mind, because it 
defines a way in which Darwinian evolution, even as the anti-clerical Huxley 
understood it, could serve as a form of natural theology. If the laws of variation 
seemed more favorable to evolutionary success than the laws of physics were 
favorable to sculpting falling stones, then there remained senses in which 
variation may have been “intended” for a general evolutionary use without 
involving the further claim that actual variations were ever designed for a specific 
use. A form of design argument, in other words, may have resided within the 
very mechanism of Darwinian evolution as Huxley was open to receiving it. 
There was an obvious way, then, in which any variation could be 
considered “random” in relation to its biological utility without meaning that the 
laws of variation were not, in another sense, constructive of evolved organic 
form. Huxley certainly noticed this. An example may be made of Kölliker, who, as 
noted above, had claimed that “Varieties arise irrespective of the notion of 
purpose, or of utility, according to the general laws of nature, and may be either 
useful, or hurtful, or indifferent.” Kölliker also denied that nature displayed any 
tendency “to give rise to useful varieties,” and Huxley had affirmed these 
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comments while correcting Kölliker’s mistaken belief that they were a 
contradiction of Darwin. Of course, by denying the tendency toward useful 
varieties, Kölliker was only denying that variations were introduced into nature as 
if they were intended for some specific use. He still believed that the laws of 
variation, whatever they were, were part of a universal “plan” and “harmony” 
that shaped the natural world, organic and inorganic. Huxley quoted Kölliker as 
saying that 
The developmental theory of Darwin is not needed to enable us to 
understand the regular harmonious progress of the complete series 
of organic forms from the simpler to the more perfect. 
 
The existence of general laws of Nature explains this harmony, 
even if we assume that all beings have arisen separately and 
independent of one another. Darwin forgets that inorganic nature, 
in which there can be no thought of genetic connexion of forms, 
exhibits the same regular plan, the same harmony, as the organic 
world; and that, to cite only one example, there is as much a 
natural system of minerals as of plants and animals.33 
 
Evidently, Kölliker thought that serial special creations could still be affirmed 
against Darwin and without any appeal to the argument for specific utilitarian 
design. However, the immediate point is that a natural philosophy, such as 
Kölliker’s, that understood order and harmony in nature to be the gradual 
realization of a general plan that included a series of specific organic beings that 
were adapted to survival in nature, may be represented as a rejection of natural 
theology all too easily. All it took was for Huxley to reiterate Kölliker’s belief that 
the general laws of nature could readily dispense with utilitarian design in 
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providing a quasi-evolutionary explanation of natural history’s “harmonious 
progress … of organic forms….” Dispensing with utilitarian design, in other 
words, may be highlighted in a way that makes Kölliker’s science appear much 
less a natural theology than it was. Huxley, of course, had already exploited this 
kind of conceptual shell game, in which the concept of design is constantly 
shunted aside so that it may never be pointed out, when he separated the 
science of general morphology from the natural theologies of Paley, Cuvier, and 
the German idealists, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
Nonetheless, if Darwin were going to be really useful to liberating science 
from religion, then Huxley would need to show that Darwinism could not be 
neglected as the best explanation for the “progress” of life as easily as Kölliker 
had claimed; and, in fact, Huxley’s defense of Origin contained a demonstration 
of why Darwinism was necessary to an explanation of organic form. Against 
Kölliker, Huxley noted that to claim that natural laws explained the natural order 
did not go very far toward describing the precise natural laws that may explain a 
particular order of nature. Kölliker had very weakly suggested, therefore, that 
non-genetic explanations of the inorganic world may lead us to expect non-
genetic explanations of organisms, as well. The need for Darwinism, Huxley 
noted, resided in the difficulty of explaining biological particulars such as “the 
stripes of dun horses, and the teeth of the fœtal [Bowhead whale].” These 
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perplexing natural phenomena were understandable as the genetic vestiges of 
once-useful adaptations but were very difficult to explain in any other way.34 
What is more remarkable, however, is that Huxley took advantage of 
Kölliker’s simplicity in order to press Darwinism deeply into non-organic nature. 
Reversing Kölliker’s suggestion of a non-genetic explanation of organic form, 
Huxley suggested genetic explanations of inorganic form. He asked Kölliker, 
…is it quite so certain that a genetic relation may not underlie the 
classification of minerals? The inorganic world has not always been 
what we see it. It has certainly had its metamorphoses, and, very 
probably, a long [history of development] out of a nebular 
blastema. Who knows how far that amount of likeness among sets 
of minerals, in virtue of which they are now grouped into families 
and orders, may not be the expression of the common conditions 
to which that particular patch of nebulous fog, which may have 
been constituted by their atoms, and of which they may be, in the 
strictest sense, the descendants, was subjected?35 
 
This passage is remarkable for the way it mixes the organic metaphor of a 
blastema with the physical metaphor of a fog in its description of a genetic 
mineralogy. It may be fairly asked in what sense a blastema and a fog both may 
be thought to have genetic descendents.36 
Oddly enough, the question has a definitive answer, at least, if it were 
asked of Huxley in 1869, when he wrote in a famous passage that nature 
displays 
                                        
34 CE II, pp. 92-3. 
 
35 CE II, pp. 93-4. 
 
36 “Genetics” is meant in the broad sense of inheriting form, or shaped by the process of inherent 
becoming, rather than containing a reference to “genes” (a term coined in 1913). 
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a wider Teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of 
Evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition 
of Evolution. That proposition is, that the whole world, living and 
not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to 
definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which 
the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be 
true, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in 
the cosmic vapour; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a 
knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have 
predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as 
much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapour of 
the breath in a cold winter’s day.37 
 
Organic and inorganic descendent forms are alike in that they share a wider 
teleological cause. In Huxley’s view, mechanical principles that may explain the 
dispersal of the molecules of a breath may also explain, given sufficient 
intelligence and knowledge of the properties of matter, the molecular 
arrangement of a very definite group of genetically descended organisms. All 
that Huxley required to make good his teleological claim was for inorganic 
matter, under the conditions of an initial nebulousity, to possess the property of 
becoming genetically transmutable life (in all its forms) and, also, for evolution, 
in its non-genetic as well as its genetic senses, to be perfectly linear and 
predictable. More breathtaking than a cold winter’s day, when juxtaposed this 
way, was Huxley’s willingness to upbraid Kölliker for having forgotten that the 
particulars of nature need explaining, although, in pursuing another point, 
Huxley would contentedly overlooked any possible doubts that material laws 
prescribed absolutely determinate forms of organic and inorganic evolution. 
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This was not a blind spot in Huxley’s thinking. It was a rhetorical strategy, 
of course. Placed unobtrusively between Huxley’s careful defense of Darwinism’s 
explanatory power and his ready advocacy of genetic explanations for even 
inorganic evolution, Huxley had located Kölliker’s fairly traditional natural 
theology. This natural theology was never designated as such by Huxley but was 
clearly implied by Kölliker’s misinterpretation and criticism of Darwin’s theory; 
and, upon that slight reference to natural theology, Huxley discovered a 
willingness to swing from scientific diligence to rhetorical flourish. Proximity to 
Darwin’s wonderful explanation of a horse’s stripes and a whale’s fetal teeth 
allowed Huxley to imply that a similar explanatory rigor may exist within a 
presumed material determinism so wide that it reduced the possibilities for 
teleology and design to a set of material properties and initial conditions 
pertaining to a cosmic nebula – or a blastema, as the case may be. 
It is remarkable that Huxley’s defense of Origin of Species was not always 
about the explanations of science, and neither was it always about religion. He 
was also concerned to gain control of natural theology’s basic explanation of 
natural history or, in other words, to take control of design arguments. Within 
Darwinism as Huxley accepted it – allowing for the possibility that the laws of 
variation may supplement natural selection in determining organic form – there 
were many possibilities for design argument that could not be easily stamped 
out. These possibilities will be examined in greater detail next chapter. Certainly, 
however, they involved difficult questions about whether variation and natural 
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selection could completely explain organic form, whether the laws of variation 
independently helped “shape” organisms, and whether there were any absolute 
distinctions between merely physical being and the existent forms of organic 
being. In what I consider is fairly called a shell game, Huxley had shunted these 
questions and possibilities collectively under the teleological category of material 
determinism, and then allowed his readers to believe that, to all appearances, 
design was nowhere else to be found in the processes of evolution. This was an 
expert performance; and the point of it, of course, was to make design, if it 
existed in nature, into a concern of physical science stricken from the domain of 
natural theology and religion. 
Huxley, however, was by no means the Darwinian man of science most 
capable of discussing the detailed application of Darwin’s theory. There were 
others, such as Wallace and the American botanist Asa Gray, who understood 
much better than Huxley whether Darwin had explained everything from a dun 
horse’s stripes to a Bowhead whale’s fetal teeth and, ultimately, the evolution of 
human being. The estimations of Darwinism’s explanatory power that were given 
by Gray and Wallace, two major Darwinian natural philosophers and also natural 
theologians, are the topic for Chapter Six. 
  
CHAPTER VI: 
 
DARWINIAN NATURAL THEOLOGY, 1860-1876 
 
 
 
Asa Gray 
 
 
Alfred Russel Wallace 
 
The previous chapter noted that Huxley, although he advocated 
Darwinism and rejected utilitarian design in explanation of organic form, may be 
considered a part of nineteenth-century teleological thought because he 
understood evolution developmentally and linearly. The fundamental proposition 
of evolution was, Huxley had stated, “that the whole world … lay, potentially, in 
the cosmic vapour; and … a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of 
the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted, say the state of 
the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will 
happen to the vapour of the breath in a cold winter's day.”1 This remarkable 
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statement reflected Huxley’s philosophical material determinism and gave his 
teleological perspective so wide a provenance as to suit almost any mechanical 
explanation for evolution that might be offered. Huxley knew, nonetheless, that 
the only scientifically respectable proposal to explain special evolution was 
Darwin’s theory:  the natural selection of inheritable variations exhibited by the 
individuals of a specific population. Today, certainly, Darwinian evolution is 
understood to be a much more random (or, more precisely, non-linear) process 
than would allow for the prediction of specific fauna from knowledge of 
“nebulousity.” Had Huxley misrepresented Darwin’s ideas by proposing 
mechanical linearity as their fundamental principle? How may this question bear 
upon a consideration of Darwinism’s place in the history of nineteenth-century 
natural theology? 
Although Huxley may be broadly categorized as Darwinian because he 
accepted evolution and believed that variation and natural selection were its 
probable cause, he was by no means a practitioner of Darwinian science. In his 
practical work, Huxley’s efforts to demonstrate lines of evolutionary descent from 
fossil evidence superseded any concern for evolution’s causes; and, working 
primarily as a morphologist, he was too little interested in the niceties of 
biological adaptation to contribute much to their explanation. Moreover, in 
Huxley’s view Darwinism allowed for the possibility that the laws of genetic 
variation may have been more determinative of organic form than Darwin would 
admit. It would not be (and has never been) instructive, therefore, to focus too 
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tightly upon Darwin and his “bulldog,” Huxley, in discerning the relation of 
Darwinism to teleology and natural theology. Fortunately, in addition to Darwin’s 
unteleological variations and Huxley’s teleological mechanical determinism, there 
were other views that were equally “Darwinian” and are equally as important for 
understanding the relation of Darwinism to natural theology. In fact, the two 
men who may most nearly have rivaled Darwin in their understanding of 
Darwinism – Gray and Wallace – separately argued for natural theology, or at 
least a design argument, as a consequence of, and not despite, Darwinian 
science. 
Asa Gray (1810-1888) was born in Sauquoit, New York. He earned an 
M.D. in 1831 from the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Fairfield but 
preferred the study of botany to the practice of medicine. Like Buckland, 
Sedgwick, and Whewell among the major figures of this dissertation, Gray was 
an academic natural theologian:  he was a professor of natural history at Harvard 
from 1842 to 1873 and is generally regarded as the most significant American 
botanist of the nineteenth century, especially because of his contributions to 
taxonomy. Through a long and cordial correspondence, Gray proved very helpful 
to Darwin in researching Origin of Species. Following the publication of Origin, he 
was Darwin’s staunchest American supporter in questions of science and, 
perhaps with less warrant, his foremost theological interpreter. Gray’s concern 
for the theological importance of Darwin’s theory followed from a long 
commitment to Protestant evangelical faith and was manifested in 
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correspondence even before the Origin was published. In 1860, Darwin wrote 
that “No one person understands my views and has defended them so well as A. 
Gray; -- though he does not by any means go all the way with me.”2 Gray’s 
efforts as a botanical collector and donor were basic to the creation of Harvard’s 
department of botany, and the university’s renowned Gray Herbarium is named 
after him. Gray’s attempts to relate Darwinism to Christian orthodoxy became a 
part of his immense scientific reputation through the publication of such works as 
Darwiniana (1876) and his lectures on Natural Science and Religion (1882). 
The professional life of Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) is much more 
difficult to characterize. He was an Englishman born in the Welsh village of Usk, 
Monmouthshire (now Gwent). His father’s financial instabilities saw Wallace 
apprenticed as a surveyor by 1837 and, for a decade after, Wallace made a 
tenuous and somewhat transient living by means of his surveying skills. His 
lifelong interest in radical politics dates from this time. His private expeditions as 
a naturalist to the Amazon rainforest (1848-1852) and, more significantly, the 
Malaysian archipelago (1854-1862) were intended partly as business ventures to 
be made profitable from the sale of specimens. In 1858, his paper “On the 
Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type” was sent 
from the jungles of Malaysia to Darwin in England, setting in motion a series of 
events that would make Wallace famous as the co-originator of the theory of 
natural selection. In the late 1860s Wallace became – and for the rest of his life 
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remained – a public advocate for the scientific evidence in favor of spiritual 
phenomena and, no less, an expounder of spiritualist philosophy. Starting in 
1870, he took an interest in the nationalization of Church lands (as well as in 
other social issues) and, from 1880 until his death, presided over the Land 
Nationalization Society. Late in life, he acknowledged that he was – and probably 
always had been – a socialist. Throughout these years, his work as a naturalist 
continued to be significant. In stark contrast to Huxley, however – and, in part, 
as a consequence of his radical views – Wallace believed that science’s true 
interests were best served by keeping science independent of government 
support.3 
Wallace’s status as the co-originator of the theory of natural selection calls 
for particular mention. Although, as Cannon and Ospovat have shown, Darwin 
arrived at his evolutionary theory in ways largely reworked from the concepts of 
utilitarian design, Wallace quite differently became a serious student of natural 
history only after being convinced of transmutation by reading Vestiges. His 
expedition to the Amazon, for example, was partly undertaken in the hope of 
discovering a theory of transmutation. It was not for another ten years, however, 
that, while sick with malaria in Borneo, he hit upon a conceptual solution to the 
problem of originating species:  the “survival of the fittest” of naturally occurring 
                                        
3 Two recent biographies of Wallace are Michael Shermer, In Darwin’s Shadow: the life and 
science of Alfred Russel Wallace (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002) and Ross A. Slotten, 
The Heretic in Darwin’s Court: the life of Alfred Russel Wallace (New York : Columbia University 
Press, 2004). 
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varieties.4 In stark contrast to Darwin’s decades of painstaking research, Wallace 
immediately prepared a theoretical essay and sent it, unwittingly, to Darwin, of 
all people, for review. Darwin found in the essay a remarkable abstract of his 
own more advanced work, exclaiming that “Even his terms now stand as heads 
to my chapters!”5 A delicate question of priority was resolved when Darwin was 
advised by friends to prepare an essay for joint presentation with Wallace’s to 
the Linnean Society of London on July 1, 1858. Informed of this arrangement 
after the fact, Wallace would publicly profess gratitude for the rest of his life for 
having been admitted into a share of the discovery of natural selection and then 
spared a defense of the hypothesis.6 Darwin prepared Origin of Species for 
publication the following year. 
This chapter will contrast the evolutionary views of Gray and Wallace to 
Huxley’s determinism in order to show the teleological range of Darwinian 
scientific thought. It will also combine the technical (intellectual) and social 
histories of natural theology and Darwinian science to substantiate the claim that 
natural theology reached its theological term as an aspect of nineteenth-century 
Darwinian science – the thesis of my dissertation. The criticisms of anti-
Darwinian evolutionists – such as Argyll, St. George Mivart, George Romanes, 
                                        
4 The phrase “survival of the fittest” was coined by the philosopher Herbert Spencer; but Wallace 
advocated its use in preference to Darwin’s “natural selection.” 
 
5 Darwin, Charles. The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, ed. Francis Darwin, three volumes 
(London : John Murray, 1887) ii, p. 116-117. 
 
6 Wallace, Alfred Russel. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, second edition (New 
York : Macmillan and Co., 1871; 1870), pp. iv-v. 
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and Samuel Butler – whose views also had explicit theological importance, are 
largely omitted from this consideration in order to demonstrate that Darwinism, 
even in the hands and minds of its advocates, did not resolve but enlarged the 
increasingly inconclusive debates between developmental and superintendential 
natural theology – debates that had also characterized pre-Darwinian thought. 
Nonetheless, natural theology in the 1860s and -70s would all but lose its pubic 
appeal as a basis for the comprehension of science by Anglican – or, in the case 
of the American, Gray, generally Christian – theology for reasons that included 
the professionalization of science, the technical difficulty of the science and the 
design arguments, the reading public’s increasing expectation that science would 
be presented without a religious gloss, and the religious controversy over 
evolution’s acceptability to Christian faith. In regard to this loss, it should be 
remembered, from Chapter Two, that it was never the primary role of 
scientifically grounded nineteenth-century natural theology in Britain to reconcile 
science to religion, but to publicly secure the liberal Anglican comprehension of 
science by making theology more scientific and less textual and traditional. It 
may be noted, additionally, that there were similar debates in the United States 
over the means to the incorporation of science within public and religious 
institutions – for example, into colleges and universities.7 It is not necessary, 
then, to find a fundamental incompatibility between natural theology and 
Darwinian science in order to account for natural theology’s loss of public note 
                                        
7 A helpful if somewhat dated study is Herbert Hovenkamp, Science and Religion in American, 
1800-1860 (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978). 
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within the Darwinian era:  a general loss of interest in making theology scientific 
would suffice.8 This is remarked and not studied here. It is important to bear in 
mind, however, that it is consistent with nineteenth-century British and, in all 
likelihood, American history that natural theology should vanish, not from within 
what may be broadly considered scientific and Darwinian thought, but from 
within professional science, Christian theology, and general public discourse. 
 
Asa Gray and Darwinian natural theology 
 
As we saw in Chapter Four, Huxley’s defense of Darwin had been 
concerned to abstract the scientific importance of Origin of Species from a prior 
history of controversy over “the species question” in natural theology and, at the 
same time, to prevent Darwin’s being misconstrued as a teleologist in any 
“ordinary sense” of the word. Although it had been relatively easy for Huxley to 
clear up the teleological confusion that followed upon Darwin’s metaphorical 
comparison of natural selection to the cultivation and domestication of plants and 
animals, there was no easy way to resolve doubts about the natural limits of 
variation within a species. Darwin considered that variation proceeded gradually 
and indefinitely, but no physical or mechanical demonstration of this was 
available. Variation was merely an observed “tendency,” a logical counterpart to 
the genetic dictum that “like begets like;” and it was by no means obvious how 
to balance these two opposing but inevitable reproductive principles. In Darwin’s 
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time, definitive statements about the role of variation in speciation were mooted 
by ignorance of variation’s nature and cause.9 
Darwin argued that variations were random with respect to their organic 
form and function, but this was not necessarily the common view. Darwin’s 
meaning was most clearly explained by his “stone house” metaphor: 
If an architect were to rear a noble and commodious edifice, 
without the use of cut stone, by selecting from the fragments at 
the base of a precipice wedge-formed stones for his arches, 
elongated stones for his lintels, and flat stones for his roof, we 
should admire his skill and regard him as the paramount power. 
Now, the fragments of stone, though indispensable to the architect, 
bear to the edifice built by him the same relation which the 
fluctuating variations of organic beings bear to the varied and 
admirable structures ultimately acquired by their modified 
descendants. 
 … 
 The shape of the fragments of stone at the base of our 
precipice may be called accidental, but this is not strictly correct; 
for the shape of each depends on a long sequence of events, all 
obeying natural laws; on the nature of the rock, on the lines of 
deposition or cleavage, on the form of the mountain…. But in 
regard to the use to which the fragments may be put, their shape 
may be strictly said to be accidental.10 
 
In Darwin’s metaphor, the natural laws that determined inter-generational 
organic variation were remarkably impertinent to the needs of organic form and 
function. It was as if the stones from within an architectural edifice were being 
continuously displaced or supplemented by others taken at random from the 
base of a precipice. Darwinian variation could evolve and sustain viable 
organization only because every variation was subjected to a rigorous natural 
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10 Darwin, Variation under Domestication, op. cit. (Ch V, note 30) p. 430-1. 
 
  192
selection. Without selection, variation would proceed without a sense of form or 
function, more akin to the erosion of stone than to structural formation and 
maintenance. 
Darwin used the “stone house” metaphor expressly to disagree with his 
friend and supporter Gray, the American professor, botanist, and natural 
theologian. Gray had written, as Darwin noted, of “his belief ‘that variation has 
been led along certain beneficial lines,’ like a stream ‘along definite and useful 
lines of irrigation.’” In Darwin’s estimation, this was like arguing that “[the 
Creator had ordained] that the crop and tail-feathers of the pigeon should vary in 
order that the fancier might make his grotesque pouter and fantail breeds….” 
The “grotesque” domestic breeds, which were not formed according to a natural 
selection, were what proof Darwin had that variation was not independently 
“definite and useful” but was dependent upon the selection process.11 Was this 
enough, however, to demonstrate that the laws of variation played no 
determinative part in constructing biological forms? 
Gray was the most significant American botanist of his day, lauded by 
Darwin for his contributions to and understanding and advocacy of Darwin’s 
science. Additionally, Gray was an evangelical Protestant and expert natural 
theologian; his several published considerations of Darwinism complemented 
Darwin’s own writings in expressing the gamut of natural theology’s prerogatives 
and possibilities within nineteenth-century Darwinian science. The language of 
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teleology and design was used by Darwin only scientifically and transitionally, 
largely in order to dispense with design and explain in other ways its seeming 
importance to speciation. Gray, however, differed from Darwin not only in 
retaining design as part of his scientific explanation for speciation, but also by 
making natural theology into a particular topic of Darwinian thought. 
For example, because Origin of Species had not provided a harmonization 
of “scientific theory with … philosophy and theology,” Gray undertook this task 
on Darwin’s behalf.12 This forced Darwin into a brief consideration of Gray’s 
natural theology – “a great difficulty,” Darwin said, “in alluding to which I am 
aware that I am travelling beyond my proper province” – with the expressed 
conclusion that “However much we may wish it, we can hardly follow … Gray in 
his belief … that each particular variation was from the beginning of all time 
preordained … [by] an omnipotent and omniscient Creator….”13 Darwin had 
probably overstated or misstated Gray’s claims, as we shall see; and Gray never 
conceded a necessary inconsistency between Darwinism and design. Even so, 
Gray was soon brought to the point of apologizing for his habitual admixture of 
science and natural theology, stating in the preface to his collection of 
Darwiniana that 
… as to the natural theological questions which (owing to 
circumstances needless now to be recalled or explained) are here 
                                        
12 Gray, Asa. Darwiniana: essays and reviews pertaining to Darwinism, ed. A. Hunter Dupree 
(Cambridge, MA : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963 [1876; 1860-1876]), at pp. 
45-46 [1860]. 
 
13 Darwin, Variation, op. cit. pp. 431-2. 
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throughout brought into what most naturalists, and some other 
readers, may deem undue prominence, there are many who may 
be interested to know how these increasingly prevalent views and 
their tendencies are regarded by one who is scientifically, and in his 
own fashion, a Darwinian, philosophically a convinced theist, and 
religiously an acceptor of the "creed commonly called the Nicene,” 
as the exponent of the Christian faith. 
 
In the aftermath of Origin of Species, natural theology was apparently losing its 
place, not only among naturalists and in the language of biological science, but 
among a more general readership.14 
The loss of an audience, however, is not an intellectual resolution. 
Although it was broadly true that Gray had proposed, in Darwin’s words, “that 
each particular variation was from the beginning of all time preordained,” it is 
only by reading Gray that one may see precisely how that claim had been and 
came to be stated. As a naturalist, Gray was attempting by his stream metaphor 
to “save [Darwin] much needless trouble in the endeavor to account for the 
absence of every sort of intermediate [evolutionary] form” as well as of 
monstrous varieties of all sorts. In the metaphor, Gray’s stream was the history 
of evolution – or, more properly, of inherited organic variation – which Gray 
thought should have been much less coherent than it was if natural selection 
were the only directional guide. Gray had presented the analogy this way: 
Streams flowing over a sloping plain by gravitation (here the 
counterpart of natural selection) may have worn their actual 
channels as they flowed; yet their particular courses may have 
been assigned; and where we see them forming definite and useful 
lines of irrigation, after a manner unaccountable on the laws of 
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gravitation and dynamics, we should believe that the distribution 
was designed. 
 
Gary’s claim was that evolution had gone in directions that natural selection 
could not explain, not only at the level of species, but of genus and order.15 
The same claim was later stated in significantly different metaphorical 
terms, in which evolution was likened to the course of a sailing ship. Natural 
selection turned the ship’s rudder, and variation was the wind; the course of 
evolution followed from both; and, although natural selection was a mechanically 
intelligible process, the wind seemingly had a mind of its own, its direction, force, 
and timing unpredictable. The wind metaphor succeeds better, perhaps – 
although historians cite it less often – because streams do not ordinarily have the 
power of escaping the laws of gravitation and dynamics in cutting their courses. 
Gray’s point was that evolutionary “vessels” – that is, organisms and their 
modified descendants – had been “blown” at times and in directions that could 
not be explained by the action of rudders (natural selection) alone. The variable 
action of the wind, then, was evidently intended for the benefit of the organic 
vessels dependent upon it, and with the effect of rudders borne in mind.16 
Gray’s point against Darwin depended upon his ability to cite actual 
instances in which organic variation could not be explained by natural selection 
alone. This is the point at which Gray’s claims became scientifically interesting, 
                                        
15 Ibid. p. 120-122 [1860]. 
 
16 Ibid. pp. 316-7 [1876]. The “lines of irrigation” metaphor alternatively suggests either uniform 
development (if the lines of the streams were self-determined) or superintended progress (if the 
lines were externally determined). The wind metaphor does not force this choice. 
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and the theological interest moved from there. The instances Gray provided – 
such as the metamorphosis of the flounder, the relative pollen production of 
certain trees, and some of the structural peculiarities of orchids – were 
compelling, at least, to Gray: 
We really believe that these exquisite adaptations have come to 
pass in the course of Nature, and under natural selection, but not 
that natural selection alone explains or in a just sense originates 
them.17 
 
It must be born in mind that Gray, although he disagreed with Darwin about the 
explanatory power of natural selection, was not confused about Darwin’s 
explanation and was expert in its application. Gray’s objections to random 
variation and natural selection as the entire explanation for evolution were 
presumably salient. 
Further, it is probable that Gray’s apologetic tone in Darwiniana was due 
less to scientifically suspect instancing than to the theological implications of his 
suggestion. For example, although Gray insisted that he had been “considering 
this class of questions only as a naturalist,” he was nonetheless writing an essay 
on “Evolutionary Teleology” and preparing a concluding plea for natural 
theology, if not as a science, then, at least, as the legitimate concern of a 
scientific mind. Gray’s conclusion to the essay (and to Darwiniana) was that 
… there are … mysteries proper to be inquired into and to be 
reasoned about; and, although it may not be given unto us to know 
the mystery of causation, there can hardly be a more legitimate 
subject of philosophical inquiry. Most scientific men have thought 
themselves intellectually authorized to have an opinion about it. …  
                                        
17 Ibid. pp. 308-20, at 319 [1876]. 
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[A]nd this tradition … illuminated by the Light which has come into 
the world – may still express the worthiest thoughts of the modern 
scientific investigator and reasoner.18 
 
Gray’s apologetic language suggests that natural theology, in 1876, was being 
considered not only to distract but to detract from scientific reasoning; and this 
despite the fact that he was not heavily sanitizing Darwinism with theology. 
Despite holding out for the importance of designed variation, for example, Gray 
acknowledged that “the action of [natural selection], at any given moment, is 
seemingly small or insensible; but the ultimate results are great.” He thought it 
“not improbable that variation itself may be hereafter shown to result from 
physical causes.” He admitted, also, that the vast majority of variations were 
“superfluous” to evolutionary history in a proportion that resembled the ratio of 
seeds to adult organisms in nature. Gray was challenging natural selection and 
random variation, not as a very good and important explanation for evolution, 
but as the entire explanation.19 
It is tempting to conclude that Gray was apologizing for natural theology 
not because it interfered with science but because of an increasing presumption 
against natural theology’s scientific character. Apparently, explicit design 
argument was no longer acceptable as even a complement to science or, at 
least, to Darwinian science. However, before admitting this conclusion, it is 
necessary to look more closely into what Gray was holding within his natural 
theology. The “wind” metaphor is very helpful in this regard because wind is 
                                        
18 Ibid. pp. 319-20 [1876]. 
 
19 Ibid. p. 317 [1876];  62 [1860]; 128-9 [1860] and 306-10 [1876]. 
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easily comprehended as something that may be largely due to intelligible natural 
dynamics and yet seems to contain an unpredictability of its own. Although 
imagining a stream of water that cuts a certain course for no good dynamical 
reason seems almost miraculous, the causes of the wind’s force and direction 
were mysterious in a much more scientifically tolerable way. Those causes may 
be entirely physical; and, yet, the possible physical causes may be thought to 
indicate design; and, finally, it may be that the wind is subjected occasionally or, 
to some extent, continuously to the immediate will of God. In other words, 
Gray’s natural theology was highly superintendential, seeing design both in 
mechanical explanations for evolution and in an evolutionary history that 
complemented and surpassed mechanical explanation. In fact, Gray explicitly 
applied superintendential reasoning to Darwinian evolution in a way that 
integrated the possibility of special creation: 
To compare small things with great in a homely illustration: man 
alters from time to time his instruments or machines, as new 
circumstances or conditions may require and his wit suggest. Minor 
alterations and improvements he adds to the machine he 
possesses; he adapts a new rig or a new rudder to an old boat: this 
answers to Variation. … Now, let a great and important advance be 
made, like that of steam navigation: here, though the engine might 
be added to the old vessel, yet the wiser and therefore the actual 
way is to make a new vessel on a modified plan: this may answer 
to Specific Creation. Anyhow, the one does not necessarily exclude 
the other. Variation and natural selection may play their part, and 
so may specific creation also. Why not?20 
 
Why not, indeed? Superintendential natural theology in Darwinian science 
allowed for a frustrating hodge-podge of possibilities within its “naturalistic” 
                                        
20 Ibid. p. 77 [1860]. 
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reasoning. How could a natural historian tell the difference between variation 
naturally occurring and an organism specifically created as a modification of an 
earlier plan? 
Moreover, the close association of superintendence with theological 
providence was explicit in Gray: 
It need not much trouble us that we are incapable of drawing clear 
lines of demarkation between mere utilities, contingent 
adaptations, and designed contrivances in Nature; for we are in 
much the same condition as respects human affairs…. What results 
are comprehended in a plan, and what are incidental, is often more 
than we can readily determine in matters open to observation. … 
But the higher the intelligence, the more fully will the incidents 
enter into the plan, and the more universal and interconnected may 
the ends be. … Design in Nature is distinguished from that in 
human affairs – as it fittingly should be – by all comprehensiveness 
and system. Its theological synonym is Providence. Its application 
in particular is surrounded by similar insoluble difficulties; 
nevertheless, both are bound up with theism.21 
 
The ability of this line of superintendential reasoning to suggest evolutionary 
science is questionable; and, moreover, it envisions science as a theological 
provenance subject to the difficulties of providential theism. Is there harm in 
that? There may be. Although Gray allowed that Darwinism may be variously 
interpreted, he warned that considering the “origin of the actual species [to be] 
incompatible with final causes and design, is to take a position … highly unwise 
and dangerous…. We should expect the philosophical atheist or skeptic to take 
this ground….”22 In this light, Gray’s generally irenic tone may seem somewhat 
                                        
21 Ibid. 312-13 [1876]. 
 
22 Ibid. p. 122 [1860]. 
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bullying for providence. His natural theology, which made Darwin’s evolutionary 
mechanism into a tool for the superintendence of natural history, recalled the 
difficulties and tensions of an earlier era of theological complicity in the practice 
of science. Conceptually, at least, science remained a theological endeavor. 
 
A. R. Wallace and Darwinian natural theology 
Different problems for the relation of Darwinian scientific thought to 
natural theology were raised by Wallace, the co-originator with Darwin of the 
theory of natural selection. Although from the beginning Gray had acknowledged 
reservations about natural selection as the sole explanation for evolution, 
Wallace was considered a pure advocate who later changed his mind about the 
evolution of human being. This apparent reappraisal – and Wallace’s related 
conviction that the origins of life and consciousness were materially inexplicable 
– often has been considered a byproduct of his conversion to spiritualism. 
Charles H. Smith has argued, however, that Wallace never intended natural 
selection to be a complete theory of evolution. Rather, Wallace thought natural 
selection would account for functional adaptation as a determinant of organic 
form while referring other aspects of evolution to higher powers or laws for their 
explanation.23 If Smith is correct, then Wallace should not be understood to have 
defected from Darwinism in favor of spiritualism but to have been consistent in 
his larger understanding of natural selection and evolutionary theory. 
                                        
23 Smith, Charles H. “Alfred Russel Wallace on Man: a famous ‘change of mind’ – or not?” in 
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 26, 2 (2004): 257-70. 
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The doubtful influence of Wallace’s spiritualism upon his science makes it 
difficult to understand his relation to natural theology, as well. Associating 
spiritualism with inexplicable and supernatural events would be strictly 
inaccurate, however, because Wallace regarded spiritual phenomena as an 
integral part of the natural world in complement to the known laws of physics. 
Because physical forces whose effects may be well understood remained 
unknowable in their essence and seemed to be absolutely immaterial (the 
epitome was gravity and Newtonian physics – although some physicists were 
speaking weightily of an imponderable ether), Wallace felt justified in qualifying 
those forces as “spiritual” and categorizing them with other, more nominally 
spiritual forces such as vitality and consciousness. At the time, this was an 
unwelcome challenge to the nearing equation of science to the principles of 
positivism and materialism.24 
Wallace was not severing ties to empirical science, however, by playing 
counterpoint to positivism. In his view, the “laws” of vitality and consciousness 
were made evident by organic formation similarly to the way in which the laws of 
physics were made evident by planetary and cosmic formation. The key, for 
Wallace, was the conviction that vital material processes differed from non-vital 
material processes in ways that could not be derived from the laws and 
properties of inorganic matter. Instead, a “spiritual influx” was needed to 
account for the initial transition to life from a particular material or molecular 
                                        
24 Wallace, Darwinism, op. cit. (Ch V, note 29), p. 237. 
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arrangement. Similarly, a spiritual influx was required to transition to 
consciousness from unconscious forms of life. Material and biological 
preparations for these categorical transitions may have been infinitely gradual, 
but none of the transitions followed as a predictable consequence of the laws 
that governed their preparation. Novel forces spontaneously appeared, and it 
was under the new pressures of vitality and consciousness that Darwinian 
evolution had ever occurred.25 
Of course, Darwin’s theory presumed rather than explained the existence 
of living organisms, and the evolution of consciousness was also difficult to 
consider scientifically other than as a correlation of brain and nervous 
development, a correlation that Wallace was not contesting. In 1864 he wrote 
what appeared to be a satisfactorily Darwinian account of the evolution and 
antiquity of human being, including both brains and “mind.”26 His public 
association with spiritualism would begin a few years later but did not seem to 
interfere with his Darwinian efforts and convictions.  
The problems with Darwinism did not appear until as late as 1870, when 
Wallace collected the most significant of his previously published “Darwinian” 
essays into a single volume of Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. 
The Contributions concluded with a new essay that conveyed a startling 
revelation: 
                                        
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Wallace, Alfred Russel. “The Origin of Human Races and the Antiquity of Man Deduced From 
the Theory of ‘Natural Selection,’” (1864); Contributions, op. cit. pp. 303-331. 
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It will … probably excite some surprise among my readers, to find 
that I do not consider that all nature can be explained on the 
principles of which I am so ardent an advocate; and that I am now 
myself going to state objections, and to place limits, to the power 
of “natural selection.” I believe, however, that there are such 
limits; and that … we can trace … in the development of organic 
form … the action of some unknown higher law, beyond and 
independent of all those laws of which we have any knowledge. We 
can trace this action more or less distinctly in many phenomena, 
the two most important of which are – the origin of sensation or 
consciousness, and the development of man from the lower 
animals.27 
 
Wallace then argued over twenty-five pages that Darwinism was unable to 
account for the appearance of some of the physical attributes of human beings – 
such as brain size, relative bodily hairlessness, the “specialization and perfection” 
of the hand and foot, and the “wonderful … sounds producible by the human 
larynx…” – whose gradual development was said to be unaccountable upon the 
principles of natural selection; as was also that of the “mental faculties” and the 
“moral sense” of human beings.28 
In itself, perhaps, the appeal to “some unknown higher law” need not 
have distracted anyone. The difficulty, however, was that Wallace did not 
conclude by appealing to a higher law in any conventional sense but by further 
drawing the “inference … that a superior intelligence has guided the 
development of man in a definite direction, and for a special purpose, just as 
man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms.” This was a 
superintendential view, and Wallace expounded upon it. 
                                        
27 Wallace, Contributions, op. cit. pp. 332-333. 
 
28 Ibid. pp. 335-60. 
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The laws of evolution alone would, perhaps, never have produced a 
grain so well adapted to man’s use as wheat and maize; such fruits 
as the seedless banana and bread-fruit; or such animals as the 
Guernsey milch cow, or the London dray-horse. Yet these so closely 
resemble the unaided productions of nature, that we may well 
imagine a being who had mastered the laws of development of 
organic forms through past ages, refusing to believe that any new 
power had been concerned in their production, and scornfully 
rejecting the theory … that in these few cases a controlling 
intelligence had directed the action of the laws of variation, 
multiplication, and survival for his own purposes.  We know, 
however, that this has been done; and we must therefore admit 
the possibility that … some higher intelligence may have directed 
the process by which the human race was developed…. At the 
same time I must confess, that this theory has the disadvantage of 
requiring the intervention of some distinct individual intelligence, to 
aid in the production of what we can hardly avoid considering as 
the ultimate aim and outcome of all organized existence – 
intellectual, ever-advancing, spiritual man. It therefore implies, that 
the great laws which govern the material universe were insufficient 
for his production, unless we consider … that the controlling action 
of such higher intelligences is a necessary part of those laws, just 
as the action of all surrounding organisms is one of the agencies in 
organic development.29 
 
Wallace remarked, as well, that to “infer the action of mind” and “a new power 
of a definite character” from physical preparations made for the subsequent 
development of human intellectual nature was “as strictly in the bounds of 
scientific investigation as … any other portion of my work.”30 
Although these lines were written by an expert in Darwinian science more 
than a decade after the publication of Origin of Species, they remained as 
complete and straightforward an expression of scientifically superintendential 
thinking as any made by a natural historian since Buckland’s original proposal 
                                        
29 Ibid. pp. 359-60. 
 
30 Ibid. p. 335. 
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that geological forces had operated “not blindly and at random, but with a 
direction to beneficial ends … [indicating] an overruling Intelligence continuing to 
superintend … the agents, which he originally ordained.”31 Moreover, it may be 
that Wallace had been even more deliberate than Buckland in proposing a design 
argument that was to be contrasted to a history of arbitrary interventions, 
because Wallace had explicitly escaped “the disadvantage of requiring … 
intervention” by proposing that “the controlling action of … higher intelligences is 
a necessary part” of the laws that always govern the material universe. Although 
the precise sense in which “intelligences” may be categorized with “laws” is not 
made clear by Wallace (and this categorization may have been implicit in his 
opening appeal to a higher law of evolution, as well), the most straightforward 
sense is that the intelligences were ruled by the “ultimate aim … of all organized 
existence” in exercising their direction over the laws of nature. In Wallace’s view, 
the whole material and organic universe was intended for intelligent direction 
according to plan. Natural history was superintendential in design, order, and 
conduct. 
Predictably, Wallace drew critical fire upon publishing this particular 
“contribution” to the theory of natural selection. He did not back down, but 
responded with a clarification that could only have emboldened his opponents. 
He claimed to have been “misunderstood” by critics who accused him of 
believing “unphilosophically … that ‘our brains are made by God and our lungs by 
                                        
31 Buckland, Vindiciae, op. cit. (Ch I, note 29), pp. 18-9. 
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natural selection;’ and that … ‘man is God’s domestic animal.’” He denied having 
made God responsible for human evolution and explained that, although “Angels 
and archangels, spirits and demons, [have become] unthinkable as actual 
existences” in modern philosophy, nonetheless, he had been referring to 
intelligent beings that were posited philosophically and as “an outcome of 
science” to exist in degrees between human intelligence and “the Great Mind of 
the universe.” 
Now, in referring to the origin of man, and its possible determining 
causes, I have used the words "some other power"--"some 
intelligent power"--"a superior intelligence"--"a controlling 
intelligence," and only in reference to the origin of universal forces 
and laws have I spoken … of "one Supreme Intelligence." [These 
expressions] were purposely chosen to show, that I reject the 
hypothesis of "first causes" for any and every special effect in the 
universe, except in the same sense that the action of man or of any 
other intelligent being is a first cause. … I wished to show plainly … 
the possibility that the development of the essentially human 
portions of man's structure and intellect may have been determined 
by the directing influence of some higher intelligent beings, acting 
through natural and universal laws. A belief of this nature may or 
may not have a foundation, but it is an intelligible theory, and is 
not, in its nature, incapable of proof; [it would be exactly similar to 
deducing], from the existence on the earth of cultivated plants and 
domestic animals, the presence of some intelligent being….32 
 
This passage states Wallace’s commitment to spiritualism very starkly and is well 
worth quoting at length for that reason. Of course, it is (and was) difficult to 
read such a passage without being discomfited by Wallace’s naïve expectation 
that science and spiritualism could be credibly mixed – a concoction that Huxley 
caricatured as Wallace’s belief in human development by “a sort of supernatural 
                                        
32 Wallace, Contributions, op. cit. pp. 372-372A. 
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Sir John Sebright.” (Sebright was a renowned bird fancier). However, as is 
generally the case with Huxley, his caricature identified the chief characteristics 
of its subject: Wallace’s principal claims were that the development of the human 
form had been (as Huxley put it) “superintended,” and that superintendence 
advanced a case for spiritualism as an outcome of science. Although it would be 
foolish to accept at face value Huxley’s exaggerated comparison of Wallace’s 
Darwinism to supernatural bird-fancying, nonetheless, historical appreciation of 
Wallace’s view does fairly begin by considering the mediate relation of 
superintendential design argument to the history of science in Britain. The 
immediate comparison of scientific positivism and evolutionary science to 
spiritualism and supernaturalism leads to nothing but the perpetuation of 
Huxley’s point of view.33 
It has been a major concern of my dissertation to show that the relation 
of theological superintendence to natural science in Britain had been close, 
subtle, and shifting, but not identical. Generally, natural theologians had been 
wont to consider design argument as broadly scientific or, perhaps, as a 
distinctly theological science rather than as a definite component of the physical 
sciences. Indeed, to admit design argument into the physical sciences would 
have worked against the overriding concern of formulating a liberal and 
theological comprehension of science. Zoology and botany, of course, had been 
problematic in this regard because the concept of utilitarian design had long 
                                        
33 CE II, p. 120-22; 161-65; 173-79; 184-86. 
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figured significantly into scientific explanations of specific organic form. Whewell, 
for example, had considered it impossible even to begin to understand biological 
organization except by premising the “fundamental idea” of specific utilitarian 
design. Nonetheless, an idea is not an argument; and Whewell had always 
considered design arguments to be properly a consequence and not an aspect of 
physical science. 
In Britain, the move from utilitarian to developmental thinking in 
explanation of specific form had been closely associated with the publication of 
Vestiges and with subsequent criticism of the developmental hypothesis by 
utilitarian and superintendential natural theologians such as Whewell. This 
controversy had caused natural theology to be closely and rather casually 
associated with opposition to development and, by extension, antagonism to 
Darwin’s ideas. Unfortunately, this simple opposition seriously mischaracterizes a 
much more complex relationship and history. As Chapter Three has shown, the 
criticisms of Vestiges by natural theologians had been scientifically expert, 
although they had been theologically concerned. Furthermore, a credible and 
specifically Anglican defense of development had been presented by the very 
liberal natural theologian and philosopher of science Baden Powell. It was 
Powell’s point that developmental progress (embryological development provides 
the epitome) characteristically displays order, direction, and causal uniformity; 
and this idea had premised a design argument that had advocated uniform 
progression in natural history to the exclusion of discontinuity and 
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superintendence. Powell’s natural theology of development had echoed and 
substantiated the theme of “creation by law” that had been advocated in 
Vestiges as a theological parallel to the hypothesis of development. Vestiges, 
however, had notoriously failed to provide credible causes in support of specific 
organic developments and, as Huxley had severely objected, had sometimes 
mistaken the “law of development” for a causal entity, so that development was 
considered to be self-causing and self-explanatory. The vapidity of that 
hypothesis was a chief reason why utilitarian and superintendential thinking had 
retained their potency against all developmental hypotheses even until the late 
1850s. However, Darwin and Wallace had ended this historic theological and 
scientific standoff or, as Bowler would have it, this conceptual “logjam” by 
proposing a credible mechanics of evolution.34 Subsequently, the nineteenth-
century debate over organic form was partially transformed into a consideration 
of the ways in which the mechanics of Darwinism could be said to indicate 
design. 
Wallace’s place in the new flow of scientific ideas, however, is not well 
represented by the subsequent history of Darwinian science. The historical 
accident that had assigned to Wallace and Darwin a technical share in originating 
a theory of natural selection also ensured that Wallace would be largely 
considered Darwin’s lesser partner. Viewed as an outgrowth of his presumed 
Darwinism, Wallace’s objections to natural selection as an explanation of human 
                                        
34 Bowler, Non-Darwinian, op. cit. (Ch II, note1) pp. 47-66. 
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development seem very curiously construed. But Wallace, writing from 
somewhere in the jungles of Borneo, would not have understood his initial 
thinking, at least, in terms of this historical accident. If the overriding concern for 
Darwinism is appropriately replaced by a broader and prior concern for science, 
natural philosophy, and natural theology, then Wallace’s evolutionary views take 
on a very different significance. According to this line of reasoning, what is most 
significant about Wallace’s ideas is their mutual connection to the previously 
distinct traditions of developmental and superintendential ways of understanding 
natural history. It is remarkable, even extraordinary, that Wallace’s deviation 
from Darwinism should have taken the form of a superintendential 
understanding of development, and, seen in this light, his reasoning becomes 
less fanciful than when viewed as the outcome of supposedly cross-bred 
commitments to science and spiritualism. 
Generally, historians of science have associated the post-Darwinian idea of 
designed or guided evolution more closely with earlier developmental thought 
than with the directed discontinuity of the catastrophists and 
superintendentialists, as well as more closely with science than with natural 
theology.35 However, as argued in Chapter Four, there are no logically or 
historically sound reasons for those preferences; and it is at least possible that 
the historiographical difficulty of placing Wallace among Darwinian or post-
Darwinian thinkers highlights their implausibility, as well. In pre-Darwinian 
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thought, the debates between causally uniform progress (development) and 
intelligently directed progress (superintendence) had been increasingly 
associated with scientific discussion after the publication of Vestiges (1844). As 
we have seen, if the details of this controversy are studied carefully, then even 
the categorical distinction between developmental and superintendential thought 
appears to have been misleadingly nominal.  Both, for example, accepted the 
idea of gradual progress in natural history and, in that sense, at least, were 
equally “developmental.” The real objection of the superintendentialists was not 
to development in all respects but to causal uniformity or, in other words, to the 
idea that progress in natural history was synonymous with uniform development. 
If the possible causes of progress are considered to be distinct from the 
argument for uniformity, then the logical distinctions between development and 
superintendence tend to break down. Gray, for example, quickly came to think of 
Darwinian evolution as “directed” or “guided” in a markedly superintendential 
way; and now Wallace, who described his understanding of human development 
also as “directed” and “guided,” is seen to have done a similar thing. 
In stating his objections to Darwin, however, Gray had conformed to 
intellectual types by associating natural theology with the Christian 
comprehension of science and, also, by distinguishing a naturalist’s concern for 
the laws of nature from a natural theologian’s concern for the relation of those 
laws to the special or higher direction of natural history. Gray also apologized for 
admixing science and natural theology. In marked contrast, Wallace neglected 
  212
these typical distinctions. He insisted that his argument for the superintended 
development of human being was not less scientific than was the claim that 
natural selection could explain the non-human organic world. The implications of 
such a view are worthy of extended comment. 
By classifying superintendence as scientific, Wallace implicitly denied that 
the natural world was scientifically unintelligible except upon the presumptions of 
uniformity and positivism. In this respect, his post-Darwinian understanding of 
science was not remote from views the catastrophists had held in controversy 
with uniformitarians forty years earlier. Nonetheless, Wallace had clearly refused 
any explicit association with natural theology by employing his design argument 
in the interests of spiritualism and science rather than theism and Christian faith. 
Perhaps this was to be expected from a radical free-thinker whose concern was 
less for God and religion than for the natural existence and deathly predicament 
of the human spirit. Nor is it surprising that Wallace, who had been an 
appreciative reader of Vestiges, would neglect to mention the resemblance of his 
views to those of Vestiges’ theological critics. By considering superintendence to 
be a “strictly scientific” argument, by categorizing intelligent immaterial agency 
among the laws of nature rather than the claims of theology, and by separating 
the life of the human spirit from the concerns of religion, Wallace was negating 
distinctions that were widely accepted in recognition of natural theology and the 
differentiation of science and religion in Britain. It may be added that, in many 
ways, these radical ideas in Wallace are logical extensions of the naturalization of 
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Anglican theology that had been pursued forty years earlier by Sedgwick in the 
interests of a liberal and scientific Anglican theology, as discussed in Chapter 
Two. How far wrong would it be to say that Wallace’s superintendential 
argument for spiritualism was natural theology without the theology? 
After decades of increasingly close association between natural theology 
and science, superintendential design argument was being removed from the 
realm of theology entirely and represented by Wallace as a scientific and spiritual 
rule of the universe. Of course, this does not deny that Wallace’s argument for 
superintendence was adaptable for use by a natural theologian; nor does it 
affirm that men of science were pleased to have spiritualism associated with 
their emergent profession. It does, however, display continuity between 
Wallace’s views and the history of natural theology in Britain. 
There is also another way in which Wallace may befuddle the standard 
historiographical account of Darwinian science’s distinction from and destruction 
of natural theology. Although many of Darwin’s critics – and in this, Gray is 
representative – had argued that natural selection was insufficient to explain 
organic evolution, Wallace was alone in accepting natural selection as a “law” of 
organic nature – a scientific explanation so secure that aspects of nature 
exceeding its scope would demand a complementary explanation, not a rejection 
or modification of the law.36 Even Darwin would not go so far. Of course, Wallace 
                                        
36 Wallace understood that natural selection was a “law” of nature in a particular way. He 
claimed, for example, that the available evidence for the action of natural selection was better 
“than even direct observation would be, because it is more universal, viz., the evidence of 
necessity. It must be so;” and he “deduced” the origins and antiquity of the human races from 
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believed that the development of human being exceeded natural selection’s 
explanatory power. What is equally remarkable, however, is that Wallace then 
returned to the metaphor of cultivated plants and domestic animals in 
explanation of human being. This had been Darwin’s first metaphor for natural 
selection in Origin of Species, of course; and, if you accept it as inherently 
Darwin’s, then Wallace may be considered to have gone back on Darwinism 
when he reverted to the metaphor’s original, intentional significance, which 
Darwin had certainly abandoned. However, it is inappropriate to think of Wallace 
that way. He had initially discussed the breeder metaphor – and rejected it as 
inappropriate to selection under the conditions of nature – without knowing what 
Darwin was doing with it.37 
The challenge for historians is to recognize that selective breeding is not 
Darwin’s metaphor inherently and absolutely. Wallace’s reversion to a non-
Darwinian use of the metaphor, especially, reveals its first and undeniably 
superintendential significance. Although Darwin would use the idea of a natural 
selection to remove the initial suggestion of intention from his explanation of 
evolution; nonetheless, the metaphor of a pigeon fancier in its initial significance 
was thoroughly superintendential. Indeed, there had been a great initial 
confusion in many of Darwin’s readers concerning the proper relation of a natural 
to an intentional selection, and Huxley as well as Darwin had fought hard against 
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that confusion. Of course, presuming that only Darwin made a scientifically 
appropriate use of the metaphor will blot from the history of science the 
metaphor’s remarkable susceptibility to superintendential interpretation. That 
very presumption, however, is what Wallace disputed. His status as a Darwinian 
and scientific thinker is a challenge for historians today. 
The challenge is severe, moreover, because of its importance for a 
reconsideration of views that historians of science and theology have generally 
considered to be nearly dismissible, such as those represented by Argyll. In The 
Reign of Law, Argyll spoke of superintendence in terms of evident providence 
and supernatural (or, in his preferred terms, “superhuman”) contrivance – very 
volatile categories of mid-Victorian thought – and he listed Darwinism with other 
naturalistic theories that, in Argyll’s view, could prove nothing more than that 
God had created specific things by superintending their natural development. 
Interestingly, Argyll not only considered the development of human being to be 
the result of superintendence, as would Wallace; he also made use within his 
design argument of the apparently contrived adaptations of orchids, as had Gray. 
The logical and evidential relation of Argyll’s natural theology to evolutionary 
science may be more important and significant than has been supposed.38 
Although Argyll has been taken seriously by Desmond, at least, as a 
political force within evolutionary debates, his intellectual place in those debates 
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may prove important to reconsider.39 Especially, it may be asked why the views 
of Argyll, Wallace and Gray were received so dissimilarly by all parties in the 
Darwinian controversies, despite some similarity in their reasoning. One 
important consideration, of course, is the degree of scientific expertise – much 
lessened in the case of Argyll – and of explicit theological purpose – much 
greater in Argyll’s case – that each man brought to his review of how natural 
history escaped the explanatory confines of natural selection and causal 
uniformity. More fully, however, the different public reactions to Gray, Wallace, 
and Argyll may be referable to historically prior distinctions, such as those drawn 
in Chapters Two, Three and Four, between the philosophical and academic 
natural theologies of Sedgwick and Whewell, the popularly read natural 
theologies of Vestiges and Hugh Miller, the more immediately social and political 
natural theologies of Brougham, Turton, and Irons, and the deliberate excision of 
any form of natural theology from scientific discourse that was practiced by 
Huxley prior to his public defense of Darwinism. I doubt that the public and 
scientific standing of the directional views of Wallace and Gray, among the 
Darwinians, and of Argyll, among Darwinism’s opponents, may be adequately 
understood without attending closely to Darwinism’s connection to earlier 
controversies in superintendential and developmental science and natural 
theology. 
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At the very least, reading Gray and Wallace must cause many historians to 
reconsider their belief that Darwinism and the publication of Origin of Species 
represented an evaporation of the scientific waters in which natural theology had 
been swimming for centuries. Such a belief grants to Huxley and likeminded 
others the power of having historians to understand Darwinism as he would have 
had us do it. Yet, other than Darwin himself, there may have been no men of 
science possessed of a better understanding of, or more prominently associated 
with Darwinism than were Gray and Wallace on their respective sides of the 
Atlantic. Even Huxley must yield to them, at least, upon the point of a detailed 
understanding. It is surely significant, then, that Gray and Wallace both urged 
that natural theology be counted, not as Darwinian science, but as part of the 
broader category of Darwinian scientific thought. Our next step, then, is to 
consider what Huxley made of such proposals for a Darwinian natural theology. 
 
Huxley and Darwinian natural theology 
Huxley responded to Wallace but not Gray, a fact that physical and social 
geography may well explain. Fortunately for this study, however, Wallace had 
raised issues of greater interest to historians of science and natural theology. His 
initial criticism of natural selection, which had come comparatively late and was 
fused to a defense of spiritualism and superintendential natural philosophy, 
presented Huxley with an intricate ball of political, social, and definitional threads 
to unravel. A decade earlier, and only six months after publication of the first 
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edition of the Origin, Huxley had represented the Darwinian hypothesis as an 
unqualified boon to liberal thought, excitedly writing that “every philosophical 
thinker hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the armoury of liberalism.”40 But 
this initial liberal euphoria over evolution, if it ever existed, had been quick to 
dissipate. People who had been accepted as liberal and Darwinian were soon 
suspected of harboring other designs. Chief among the newly suspect was 
probably Mivart, who committed what, to Huxley, was the ultimate sin of vocally 
abandoning Darwin for Rome; Huxley never defended Darwin more fiercely than 
from Mivart. Wallace, however, was also seen as a fracture in the block of early 
liberal support for Darwin. 
Wallace’s views, moreover, were much more difficult to redress, because 
it was often his support rather than his criticism of Darwin that was unwanted. 
For example, although Wallace genially accepted subordination in having first 
proposed the theory of natural selection, yet he remained a qualification in 
perpetuity of Darwin’s liberally advertised authority and originality.41 Similarly, 
although he promoted natural selection as a law of nature, he stated it to be a 
penultimate explanation of evolution. He claimed that there was an empirical 
basis for spiritualist beliefs; and Huxley, who despised spiritualism for its 
credulity and social marginality, was too much an empiricist to presumptively 
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dismiss that claim from scientific court.42 Moreover, land nationalization was too 
radical a proposal to be safely associated with liberal scientific professionalism, 
even to the mind of an anti-cleric such as Huxley; and Wallace presided over the 
land nationalization movement while eschewing the emergently professional 
scientific societies of Huxley’s London as inimical to a true spirit of discovery. 
In the end, although deserters from Darwinism such as Mivart received no 
courtesy from Huxley, Wallace received the measured respect of an intramural 
dissenter. The difference in Huxley’s consideration of Mivart and Wallace in the 
essay “Mr. Darwin’s Critics,” for example, was unreasonably extreme.43 A proper 
explanation of Huxley’s response to Wallace’s view of human evolution would 
need to account for these many factors. However, what is of greatest importance 
now is not a full explanation but a limited analysis of Huxley’s engagement with 
Wallace in its significance for the history of Darwinian science, teleological 
argument, and natural theology. To this purpose, a few more contextual 
observations would be helpfully made. 
In “Mr. Darwin’s Critics,” Huxley accepted Wallace’s criticisms of Darwin, 
as he also did Mivart’s, as “an attention to those philosophical questions which 
underlie all physical science, which is as rare as it is needful.” One point that 
Huxley found very objectionable, however, was Mivart’s off-handed remark that 
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"Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much 
time to the study of Christian philosophy;” and much of Huxley’s work in the 
essay was to trace – it may be better characterized as stalking – Mivart’s steps in 
a tour of Christian theological and dogmatic history. In the process, Huxley 
tested and found wanting Mivart’s claim “that ancient and most venerable 
theological authorities distinctly assert derivative creation, and thus their 
teachings harmonise with all that modern science can possibly require."44 
Huxley’s relentless pursuit of Mivart and Catholic tradition has been used 
by historians to support the claim that Huxley’s interest in Darwin was motivated 
less by science than by anti-clericalism and the professional need to liberate 
science from theology.45 The truth of this may be substantially granted. It is an 
important qualification, however, to note that Huxley, in responding to Mivart, 
explicitly affirmed that theological problems are among “those philosophical 
questions which underlie all physical science.” The same affirmation underlay 
Huxley’s response to Wallace. 
This is not to say, of course, that Huxley thought religion was basic to 
science. The point is more nearly opposite: Huxley was allowing that one of the 
basic reasons for doing science was to arrive at natural philosophical truth in 
points of religion. This fairly echoed what the natural theologians of this study 
had always claimed: that the scientific veracity of natural theology could 
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legitimate the Anglican political establishment at a time when traditional 
authorities and special revelations were being widely rejected as inadequate to 
the task. In fact, Huxley’s notice that “attention to those philosophical questions 
which underlie all physical science … is as rare as it is needful” is a substantial 
echo of Brougham’s complaint, made four decades earlier in the introduction to 
his Natural Theology, that “scientific men were apt to regard the study of Natural 
Religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits.”46 Indeed, since 
Brougham’s heyday, as argued in Chapter Two, natural theology had been 
supposed to set liberalism and science against traditional authorities and 
revelations in matters of concern to the religious establishment. It had been a 
common liberal theme that revelation and tradition were incredible without 
natural theology. In his dispute with Mivart, then, Huxley needed only to 
assume, in accordance with decades of natural theology written from a liberal 
perspective, that any authority adequate to the legitimacy of religion must be 
adequate to criticizing it, as well. 
Remarkably, Huxley could easily make this assumption. At this point in my 
argument, however, this will (or ought to) seem remarkable only because it has 
not been thought necessary heretofore to properly explain it. Until now, 
historians have been willing to attribute the comparatively favorable reception of 
Darwinism to public exhaustion over the earlier, sensational controversy over 
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Vestiges.47 Fundamentally, this historiography proposes that evolution was not so 
bad an idea once people had got used it. As we have seen, however, there was a 
great deal more to the story than that. 
The controversy over Vestiges had not concerned only whether the 
natural world had “developed” or been “created.” It also had concerned, and 
much more significantly, a possible Anglican comprehension of the practices and 
institutions of science. Everything that Huxley now required to set Darwinian 
science against Mivart’s religion – including intellectual and social respectability 
and responsibility – had been provided to him by four decades of pre-Darwinian 
natural theology; even including – if you credit the interpretations of historians of 
science such as Cannon, Ospovat and Gillespie – Darwin’s theory itself.48 There is 
no way, then, to oppose scientific Darwinism to the history of natural theology; 
no, not even when Darwinism is found in Huxley’s hands, at his most fanatically 
anticlerical moment, being used as a weapon of science in an attack upon 
religion. Huxley’s forceful success against Mivart was not gained only by a 
general acquiescence to the idea of evolution, nor did it depend only upon 
Darwin’s scientific merit and prestige in comparison to that of the clergy. It 
followed, more seriously, from public recognition of a new and liberal authority in 
religion, the result of earlier attempts to liberalize the Anglican establishment and 
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make it more scientific. Huxley could assume the authority of the scientific 
natural theologian in his defense of Darwin and counterattack upon Mivart. 
We may conclude, then, that Darwinian thought, especially in controversy 
with religion, was a part of the long and publicly attested relation of science to 
natural theology in Britain. It is as properly a part of natural theological history 
as of the history of science. Mivart, by contrast, had dissented from Darwin by 
appeal to the authority of Catholic tradition. This was not an impotent appeal, 
because it could claim allegiance to the contemporary Anglo-Catholic movement. 
It must be allowed, then, that the prestige of scientific natural theology in 1871 
was comparable to that of a very powerful and more overtly religious 
phenomenon; and this conclusion defies the widespread notion that Darwinism 
had put a stop to natural theology. This allowance must be made, moreover, 
although it was part of Huxley’s scientific industry to distinguish Darwinism from 
natural theology as much as possible. It may be stated, in sum, as a principal 
conclusion of this dissertation, that Huxley rode the high tide of liberal natural 
theology when he set Darwinism to break upon the wavering restraints of 
Christian tradition. It only remains to show that the scientific logic of Darwinism, 
in the aftermath of the publication of the Origin, was no less a part of natural 
theological history than was its social note. 
In referring evolution to Catholic dogma, the anti-Darwinian Mivart had 
suggested a superintendential view of the creation of life. 
As much as ten years ago an eminently Christian writer observed: 
'The creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search 
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after manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual 
"catastrophes." Creation is not a miraculous interference with the 
laws of Nature, but the very institution of those laws. Law and 
regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of 
creation. With this notion they admitted, without difficulty, the 
most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by 
law. They held that when God said, "Let the waters produce," "Let 
the earth produce," He conferred forces on the elements of earth 
and water which enabled them naturally to produce the various 
species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains 
attached to the elements throughout all time.’ 
 
… As to the present day … there are many as well versed in 
theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural 
knowledge, who would not be disturbed by the thorough 
demonstration of his theory [or] be in the least painfully affected at 
witnessing the generation of animals of complex organisation by 
the skilful artificial arrangement of natural forces, and the 
production, in the future, of a fish by means analogous to those by 
which we now produce urea.49 
 
Such passages are remarkable, of course, for their ambiguity in specifying the 
orderly manner in which organic creation was “instituted” as an elemental power. 
It is not necessary, however, to know definitively whether Mivart’s analogy to a 
“skillful artificial arrangement” of things was basic or transient to his evolutionary 
view. Ambiguity was generally sufficient (or even helpful) to the recommendation 
of superintendential arguments; and it is, of course, a restrictedly theological 
problem to decide whether a design argument that may have been premised 
upon natural uniformity could lend credence to a religious authority that was 
premised upon special revelation. The majority of nineteenth-century theologians 
who were able to declare Christianity compatible with Darwinism would take 
intellectual residence within ambiguities of this sort. Gray and Mivart are fair 
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examples of many others. They emphasized what natural philosophy did not 
know and made Darwinism into one aspect of a larger and theologically 
presumptive understanding of “guided” evolutionary development. 
The principal advantage of focusing upon Wallace is that he had proposed 
a superintendential argument that was based upon the scientific precision rather 
than the philosophical qualification of natural selection. Wallace was not as 
sparing of natural selection’s explanatory power as was Gray, for example, 
whose teleology had been proposed to “save” Darwin from the “needless 
trouble” of accounting for significant aspects of organic history. Wallace’s point, 
by contrast, was very demanding: he claimed that the relation of natural 
selection to “many phenomena” was analogous to the relation of a natural 
species to cultivated and domesticated varieties. The order of Wallace’s logic is 
important. He was not arguing that, for all anyone knew, natural selection was 
consistent with the presumption of theological superintendence. Rather, he 
presumed the non-intentional mechanics of natural selection and argued that 
their mechanical relation to definite phenomena suggested a superintendential 
analogy. His claim was not that the superintendence of evolutionary history 
remained philosophically plausible, but that the theory (he preferred to say the 
“law”) of natural selection had furthered the approach to a scientific 
demonstration of spiritual superintendence. 
Although Huxley disagreed with this claim, he did not treat it 
contemptuously. The jest about a “supernatural Sir John Sebright,” for example, 
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served better to relieve the tension over Wallace’s celebrated faux pas than to 
pile on in contempt. Although the nature of Wallace’s objections to natural 
selection did not then allow for definitive resolution, Huxley did his best to meet 
the more debatable of them within reason. He particularly responded to 
Wallace’s claim that, "whether we compare the savage with the higher 
developments of man, or with the brutes around him, we are alike driven to the 
conclusion, that, in his large and well-developed brain, he possesses an organ 
quite disproportioned to his requirements." Wallace was really making two points 
here:  firstly, that – to judge by comparative brain size – certain forms of human 
intellectual and moral activity had become possible well before human culture 
had developed a capacity to take advantage of them; and, secondly, that the life 
of “savage man” was insufficiently removed from the conditions of earlier brutal 
survival to account for the brain’s development upon the principle of selective 
advantage. The development of the human brain, then, was physically 
unnecessary and had been directed to the subsequent development of 
intellectual and moral (or “spiritual”) human being.50Huxley responded by noting 
“that nothing can be more admirable than … what a savage has to learn … that 
every time a savage tracks his game he employs a minuteness of observation, 
and an accuracy of inductive and deductive reasoning which … would assure 
some reputation to a man of science….” Huxley was speaking past the point, 
however, since Wallace had not denied the accomplishments of modern-day 
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savages generally. Rather, Wallace had cited several modern instances of savage 
tribes that “pass their lives [exercising] few faculties not possessed … by many 
animals,” reasoning that the lives of the earliest savages would have been no 
less brutal. The higher accomplishments of modern savages, in other words, 
were a part of Wallace’s contention, not an exception: it seemed that savage 
intellects were inherently capable of much more than had been necessarily to 
their benefit. Huxley then added, “…suppose, for the sake of argument, that a 
savage has more brains than seems proportioned to his wants, all that can be 
said is that the objection to natural selection, if it be one, applies quite as 
strongly to the lower animals. The brain of a porpoise is quite wonderful for its 
mass, and for the development of the cerebral convolutions. And yet … [it is] 
difficult to imagine that their big brains are only a preparation for the advent of 
some accomplished cetacean of the future.”  The impossibility of saying how 
deeply into natural history these objections to natural selection may go was a 
point against Wallace.51 
Huxley also addressed Wallace’s claim that certain characteristically 
human mental faculties were impossible to explain as the gradual accumulation 
of variations benefiting earlier savage individuals or societies. The inexplicable 
faculties included abstract reason, ideal conception, formal artistic sensibility, and 
formal mathematical facility. Huxley replied that such things had benefited 
individuals within more advanced societies. 
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…The lowest savages are as devoid of any such conceptions as the 
brutes themselves. What sort of conceptions of space and time, of 
form and number, can be possessed by a savage who has not got 
so far as to be able to count beyond five or six...? None of these 
capacities are exhibited by men, unless they form part of a 
tolerably advanced society. And, in such a society … a selective 
influence is exerted in favour of … the possession of these 
capacities. 
 
The savage who can amuse his fellows by telling a good story … 
[or] carve … the figure-head of a canoe … profits beyond his duller 
neighbour. He who counts a little better than others, gets most 
yams…. The experience of daily life shows that social existence 
exercise[s] the most extraordinarily powerful selective influence in 
favour of novelists, artists, and strong intellects of all kinds; and it 
seems unquestionable that all forms of social existence must have 
had the same tendency, if we consider the indisputable facts that 
even animals possess the [rudiments of intelligence]….  
 
Huxley has not specified, however, whether his first exemplary savages were 
devoid of advanced conceptions or of the capacity for conceptions of that kind: 
whether, in other words, they had not yet applied themselves to carving a good 
figure or were incapable of imagining one. Moreover, he assumes that societies 
will select for intellectual qualities that may be dispersed among individual 
members, but he does not specify any selective benefit to the society. There is 
no reason for any society to select for the benefit of an individual. The problems 
were not avoided, certainly, by discovering them in animals, as well.52 
The point is not to sustain Wallace’s objections to natural selection, of 
course, but to note their perplexity, and that Huxley took them seriously as 
Darwinian problems. Huxley could be somewhat mocking of Wallace’s logic – “if 
Mr. Wallace's doctrine holds good, a higher power must have superintended the 
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breeding up of wolves from some inferior stock, in order to prepare them to 
become dogs” – but  he did not prohibit its scientific notice.53 Although Huxley 
was skeptical of superintendence as a contribution to physical science, his 
scientific positivism was not so far advanced that, at any time after publication of 
the Origin, he ever banned superintendential reasoning from the pale of natural 
philosophy. 
Moreover, this was not a great change from Huxley’s public appreciation 
of earlier superintendential contributions to science. When first apologizing for 
Darwin and the Origin, as noted in Chapter Five, Huxley had distinguished 
superintendential explanations of natural history that had a basis in science from 
others that were theologically premised. It may be, in fact, that there is no 
appreciable difference of tone or judgment between Huxley’s treatment of 
special creations and geological catastrophes in 1860, and his treatment of 
Wallace in 1871. If there is a difference, however, it is all in favor of the scientific 
standing of Wallace. Undoubtedly, this may be explained by the close association 
of Wallace with natural selection and Darwinism. That, however, is precisely the 
point:  Wallace was a Darwinian superintendentialist, and he was considered as 
such by Huxley. 
The decades-long tradition of superintendential natural theology in Britain, 
which must be properly distinguished from the utilitarian natural theology of 
Paley, as well as from the developmental teleology of Vestiges, was, if anything, 
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more deeply integral to Darwinism than it had been to the earlier natural history 
of catastrophes and special creations. Wallace, as the co-originator of the theory 
of natural selection, quintessentially reminds us that Darwin’s initial metaphor – 
selectively breeding fancied pigeons – was actually superintendential, not 
utilitarian or developmental. There was no utility to the forms of fancied pigeons 
– as noted above, Darwin had made that point to Gray – and no equivalent to 
the pigeon fancier may be found in the progress of embryological development. 
The post-Darwinian logic of “guided” evolution, then, whenever it was found in 
the thought of Darwinians such as Wallace and Gray, was not simply a failure to 
appreciate how thoroughly Darwin had foreclosed upon the categories of 
utilitarian design and embryological development within evolutionary science; 
rather, it was adherence to the superintendential bases of Darwinian thought. 
This important fact has been obscured from historical appreciation, firstly, 
by the now discredited association of Darwin with the developmental logic of 
Vestiges; and, secondly, by the ongoing historiographical failure to distinguish 
superintendence from supernatural intervention and utilitarian special creation in 
nineteenth-century natural philosophy and natural theology. Possibly, the long 
confusion of superintendence with intervention has made it impossible for 
historians to see superintendence within science. Nonetheless, within the science 
of natural selection, considered as an aspect of natural historical design 
argument and exemplified by Wallace and Gray no less than by Darwin, the logic 
of either designed utility or embryological development ultimately played very 
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little part. When these men spoke of evolutionary “development,” they had 
something more closely associable with superintended progress in mind. 
Remarkably, this is true no less of Darwin than of Wallace, even though Darwin 
had worked toward natural selection by distancing himself from Paley and the 
logic of utilitarian natural theology, while the younger, more radical Wallace had 
distanced himself from Vestiges and the logic of embryological development. 
It is impossible not to notice, then, that Huxley’s deterministic 
understanding of evolution was not characteristic of Darwinian thought. As noted 
at this chapter’s outset, Huxley understood evolution in terms of linear material 
determinism; and, although he seemed unconcerned to distinguish the 
determinism of organic development from that of atomistic mechanics, material 
determinism in any form is incompatible with superintendence. 
It is important to remember, however, that Huxley’s evolutionary 
determinism was teleological – it progressed in a definite direction as if designed 
to do so. What Huxley’s evolutionary thought disallowed was not teleology and 
design, but superintendence. Remarkably, this identical point of contention had 
stood at the heart of natural theological debate since at least 1830, when the 
uniformitarianism of Lyell’s Principles of Geology challenged the catastrophism of 
Buckland and Whewell. Moreover – as we saw in Chapters Three, Four, and Five 
– the desire to exclude superintendence from science had been implicitly basic to 
Huxley’s criticisms of design arguments since at least the early 1850s. 
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It is very significant, then, to find the rejection of superintendence made 
explicit in Huxley’s public debate with Wallace – a fellow Darwinian – in 1871. It 
means that Huxley was more explicitly engaged with superintendential thought 
as a Darwinian than he had been previously. Of course, Wallace – unlike the 
earlier superintendentialists – had invited Huxley to consider superintendence as 
a matter of science, not of natural theology, and that made a great difference 
because, as we determined in Chapter Four, the attempt to consider natural 
theology only in scientific terms had figured significantly into Huxley’s defense of 
Origin of Species. Also, Huxley continued to reject superintendence – previously 
implicitly, now explicitly. 
Nonetheless, if we accept that Huxley was in some sense a Darwinian, 
then we may permissibly include material determinism with superintendence as 
categories of nineteenth-century Darwinian teleological thought. It is only by 
defining Darwinism as the attempt to explain natural history exclusively by 
random variation (in Darwin’s sense of that phrase) and natural selection that 
historians may doubt the forms of teleology that clearly persisted within 
nineteenth-century Darwinism. Measured against that exclusive standard, 
however, not even Darwin was always a true Darwinian. 
Very remarkably, however, to include Huxley among the representatives 
of Darwinian teleology does not secure but renders very problematic any further 
role for natural theology within Darwinian science. As a form of material 
determinism, Huxley’s teleology foreclosed upon the possibility of 
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superintendential natural philosophy and natural theology. As we saw in 
Chapters Two and Three, superintendence, following its introduction into British 
natural philosophy by Buckland in 1819 and its philosophical systematization by 
Whewell in the 1830s, had engaged theism by allowing, within the context of a 
design argument, that there may be non-physical explanations for natural history 
and non-uniform explanations for the order of nature. Throughout his scientific 
life, Huxley had been constantly antagonistic to any suggestion of 
superintendence within science. Prior to the publication of Origin of Species, this 
antagonism had remained largely implicit to his thought. In his defense of Origin, 
however, Huxley necessarily began to engage superintendential thought as an 
aspect of science – even though, at the same time, he misleadingly encouraged 
the association of Darwinism with earlier natural histories of uniformity and 
development. In 1871, by arguing explicitly against the Darwinian 
superintendentialism of Wallace, Huxley was at last directly engaging the debate 
between superintendence and uniformity that had given nineteenth-century 
natural theology its life in Britain. Huxley was, however, the epitome of the new 
professionalism in science. By engaging Wallace in debate over superintendence 
as a point of science, as well as by sustaining objections to superintendence from 
within science, Huxley was strongly encouraging the drift of natural theology out 
of theological and into scientific discourse. 
Of the three forms of Darwinian teleology studied in this chapter, only 
Gray’s remained a natural theology in the originally recognizable form of a design 
  234
argument set into the context of a larger theology. This confused 
contextualization is of more than semantic notice, of course, even though it may 
be difficult to know what to do about the meaning of “theology” if natural 
theology and religious theology had become exclusive discourses. The deepest 
confusion was not about definitions, however. Rather, it lay within the whole 
intellectual and social endeavor, from 1818 until sometime later, to make the 
Anglican establishment into something comprehensively scientific. By 1870, the 
radical free-thinker Wallace remained a superintendential natural philosopher but 
had suggested no reason why a superintendential design argument should imply 
religious credence; and, in responding to Wallace, Huxley showed himself finally 
determined to rebut superintendence explicitly and entirely. Gray, however, even 
in 1876, continued to see Darwinism speculatively as an aspect of the theistic 
superintendence of natural history. Moreover, to the (perhaps limited) extent 
that superintendence remained a characteristic way of understanding Darwinian 
problems, Gray’s speculation was not as peripheral to science as we might 
expect. Indeed, it may be that the standing of Wallace and Gray as “Darwinians” 
is adequate to a consideration of superintendential thought as an aspect of 
nineteenth-century Darwinism. 
We may conclude, then, that Darwinism was very much a continuation of 
the nineteenth-century’s conceptual debate between superintendence and 
uniformity in explanation of the direction of natural history – a debate that was 
coterminous with the revival and importance of natural theology in Britain at that 
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time. This may be added to our earlier conclusion that the social note or 
authority of Darwinism, especially in controversy with religion, had followed from 
the importance of natural theology in Britain, as well. Taken together, this arrives 
at the point of my dissertation:  natural theology was not opposed to or ended 
by Darwinian science; rather, natural theology became an aspect of scientific and 
no longer of theological discourse by arriving at its theological term within the 
history of nineteenth-century Darwinian thought. It is important for more 
historians to recognize that Darwinian science was as much a late episode in the 
history of British natural theology as it was an early episode in the history of 
secular and professional science. Any acceptable understanding of the relative 
importance of science and religion in the social and public life of Britain and, in 
all probability, the United States, will depend upon it. 
    236
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